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ABSTRACT 
A remarkable feature of human behaviour is that it is possible to extrapolate 
a large amount of information about what a person thinks or believes, purely by 
observing their behaviour. There are separate systems in the brain that decode 
what action is being performed and why that action is performed. Independently, 
these systems are reasonably well understood but the way in which they interact is 
still an open question. In this thesis I investigate how we come to understand others 
actions, particularly if they are unusual or irrational. Irrational actions provide a 
special test case for examining this question because full comprehension requires 
an understanding of what an agent is trying to achieve as well as an understanding 
of why they are performing the action in an unusual way.  
The first study in this thesis uses fMRI to identify the neural networks that 
differentiate rational and irrational actions. It also examines the extent to which 
activity within these networks is dependent upon the presence of a human agent. I 
report that both the action observation network and the mentalizing network are 
sensitive to the rationality of actions but neither system differentiates the social 
form of the agent. In the second study, I aimed to further this knowledge by 
examining the cognitive processes that underpin rationality comprehension. I used 
eye tracking to identify how participants direct their attention and predict action 
goals during observation of rational and irrational actions. A number of eye tracking 
markers which reflect rationality detection were identified. 
A second major aim of this thesis was to examine whether individuals with 
autism spectrum condition (ASC) have a specific impairment in rationality 
comprehension. Previously neural differences during irrational action observation 
have been reported but the cognitive reasons for this difference have not been 
specified. In study three participants with ASC observed rational and irrational hand 
actions during eye tracking. The rationality detection markers identified in the 
previous study were present in individuals with ASC suggesting that the cognitive 
mechanisms for rationality understanding are intact. However, subtle group 
differences emerged when considering social components of the task. I 
hypothesised that these differences would be larger in an interactive rationality 
comprehension task. 
In study five I evaluate the use of an overimitation paradigm in typically 
developing children. I conclude that imitation behaviour is dependent upon social 
responsiveness and rationality comprehension. Furthermore, these aspects of 
imitation behaviour can dissociate when comparing explicit judgements of 
rationality and implicit imitative responses. In the final study I therefore use this 
task to examine rationality comprehension and social responsiveness in children 
with ASC. I report that children with ASC have the capacity to understand action 
rationality but may have difficulty with social modulation of their responses.  
I conclude this thesis with a new model of rationality comprehension which 
links brain, cognition and behaviour. I also propose why individuals with ASC may 
have difficulty with the social component of action comprehension tasks. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 ACTION UNDERSTANDING AND MENTALIZING IN ADULTS 
By observing the people around us, we are able to make sense of their 
actions in terms of what they are doing and why. For example, walking around a 
ďƵƐǇ ƐŚŽƉƉŝŶŐ ĂƌĞĂ ? ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ĞĂĐŚ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ƉĂƚŚ ƚŽ ĂǀŽŝĚ
bumping into them, make inferences about what they are buying and the beliefs or 
desires that are attached to their actions. Thus, action understanding is fast, 
automatic and can afford complex interactions between individuals. By watching 
the lady at the greengrocers reaching for the plums, we can see from the shape of 
her hand and the subtle movements of her muscles that she is squeezing the fruits. 
Extrapolating this information and combining it with the action context, we may 
infer that she is trying to select the ripe fruit. Perhaps she is going to make a plum 
crumble for pudding. If on the other hand, the lady starts to prod the plums with 
her elbow instead, this action is much harder to understand. We may need to make 
more elaborate inferences about her beliefs, knowledge or intentions in order to 
fully rationalise her behaviour.  
The way in which we understand and interpret ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŝƐĂĐŽƌĞ
topic for social cognition and one that this thesis aims to advance. In particular, I 
focus on how we respond to actions that seem irrational as these are the cases in 
which interpretation and inference are also needed for understanding. First, I briefly 
introduce the cognitive theories that attempt to explain how we move from the 
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visual perception of an action to an understanding of what the agent is doing and 
why. I will then outline the case for studying irrational actions and why they are 
important for action understanding. Following this I describe some of the tools that 
we can use to examine the mechanisms of action understanding and review 
previous studies which have contributed to our understanding of this topic. Finally, I 
identify the key questions that this aims to thesis address and summarise the 
experiments that will be reported. 
1.1.1 A HIERARCHY OF ACTION UNDERSTANDING 
When observing an action, we can understand it at a number of different 
levels (Hamilton & Grafton, 2007). In a bottom-up framework, basic action 
understanding starts with perceptual input. Beyond this, we can extract kinematic 
features of actions such as muscle contractions, hand posturing and the trajectory 
of the movements. Our perceptions here are of a stream of movements which we 
need to segment into discrete units of meaningful action in order to gain 
understanding (Heider, 1958). Adults are able to parse movement sequences into a 
series of actions and are consistent in their boundary demarcations (Newtson, 
1973). These demarcations are understood in terms of action goals (Newtson & 
Engquist, 1976) or outcomes (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) and 
are organised hierarchically (Baldwin & Baird, 2001). Thus, we can represent an 
action in terms of its immediate goals, like grasping a plum, or in terms of higher 
order goals like checking the plum is ripe. Judgements about future intentions can 
also be made: she is going to make a plum crumble (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). The 
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key to this view of action understanding is the fact that actions are represented in 
terms of goals and sub-goals in a hierarchical structure.  
This structure of action is revealed when we consider studies of imitation in 
which participants observed an action and were subsequently asked to copy it 
(Wohlschläger, Gattis, & Bekkering, 2003). Children copy the goal of an action 
(touching a particular object) but will ignore the means by which the action was 
achieved (whether the experimenter used their left or right hand), indicating that 
touching the object was the dominant goal whereas using the left hand was a 
subordinate goal that was not imitated. This pattern of results changed when the 
objects were absent and the experimenter touched a particular location on the 
table with their left or right hand. In this case children faithfully imitated the hand 
used, presumably because the children now perceived the goal of the action to be 
using the correct hand (Bekkering, Wohlschläger & Gattis, 2000). A similar pattern 
of results show that adults also organise actions into a hierarchy of goals. They are 
more likely to imitate an action goal and object treatment but rely on their own 
motor programs for movement kinematics and effector choice (Wohlschläger & 
Bekkering, 2002). 
Action goals are therefore central for action understanding. However, the 
ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘ŐŽĂů ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ?dŚĞŐŽĂůŽĨĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶĐĂŶ
be defined as a physical object that is to be grasped or manipulated (Gattis, 
Bekkering, & Wohlschlaeger, 2002). In this view, a goal-directed action is an action 
that targets or manipulates a particular object. Alternatively, the term goal has also 
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been used to describe the desired end state of an action and a goal-directed action 
under this view describes an action that changes the state of world to match the 
desired end state (Travis, 1997). The experiments in this thesis use this second 
definition, examining simple goal-directed hand actions in which the goal of the 
action is to move or retrieve an object to and from a particular location. In the next 
section I review theories of how we identify and understand the goal of an observed 
action. 
1.1.2 COGNITIVE MECHANISMS OF ACTION UNDERSTANDING: 
UNDERSTANDING THE  ‘WHAT ? OF AN ACTION 
The ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ ǁĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ŐŽĂůƐ ŝƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
embodiment. The theory of embodiment proposes that we apply the knowledge of 
our own bodies onto others in order to understand their action goals. One such 
influential theory was pioneered by Marc Jeannerod. It is based on the idea that 
during action execution we have a covert representation of the actions that we will 
produce. This covert representation (or s-state) is a motoric representation that has 
not yet been potentiated. When observing someone else performing an action, this 
s-state may also be active in the observer. In this way, the observer is performing a 
simulation of the action that they are witnessing within their own motor system. It 
is argued that this motor simulatiŽŶŐƌĂŶƚƐƚŚĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌ ?ƐŐŽĂůƐ
ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ďǇ  ‘ƉůĂĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ƐŚŽĞƐ ? (Jeannerod, 1995). 
Evidence for this account comes from studies which demonstrate a functional 
relationship between action production and the mental simulation of that action. 
C H A P T E R  1   W G E N E R A L  I N T R O D U C T I O N  |  1 3  
 
This relationship has been established between the time it takes to perform and 
action and the simulated performance time (Decety, Jeannerod, & Prablanc, 1989). 
This time also increases to the same degree when task difficulty of the actual or the 
imagined action increased (Decety & Lindgren, 1991). Physiological responses to 
performed and simulated actions are also similarly altered by task difficulty. This 
has been demonstrated using electromyographic (EMG) recordings from the active 
(or imagined to be active) muscle (Bonnet, Decety, Jeannerod, & Requin, 1997) and 
in recordings of heart rate (Decety & Jeannerod, 1993). Finally, mental rehearsal of 
actions in athletes also improves actual action performance as much as physical 
practice of that action (Vogt, 1995).  
As simulation theory emphasises embodiment of actions in order to access 
understanding, it predicts that understanding should relate to ability to perform 
these actions. Superior action understanding performance has been demonstrated 
for individuals that have related motor expertise (Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 
2008) while poorer gesture comprehension relates to gesture production ability in 
patients with limb apraxia (Buxbaum, Kyle, & Menon, 2005). Developmental studies 
also report that motor ability and action comprehension are tightly coupled 
(Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010). 
Studies of brain function also support this embodied approach to action 
understanding.  The involvement of the motor system during action observation 
tasks is frequently reported and the recent discovery of mirror neurons provides 
physiological evidence in support of action simulation (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & 
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Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). Furthermore, involvement of 
the motor system during action comprehension tasks is demonstrated by 
interference studies in which performing an incongruent action during an 
understanding task impairs performance (Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003). 
Further discussion of the brain systems recruited during action understanding is 
reported in Section 1.2 of this introduction. 
While simulation theory has gained a large amount of support, there is also 
evidence which does not fit with this account of action understanding. A point of 
contention for simulation theory is at what level of action does simulation occur (De 
Vignemont & Haggard, 2008)? As previously mentioned, actions can be considered 
as a stream of fluid muscle expansions and contractions, of movements and joint 
angles. Do we represent each of these aspects of an observed action motorically?  
Or do we simulate actions more generally in terms of their abstract goals?  The 
direct-matching account argues that we represent actions at a kinematic level of 
description (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti et al., 2001). Through this bottom-up 
matching, we are able to represent an actor ?s goal by covertly representing the 
motoric components of actions and therefore understand what it is that we would 
be doing if it were us performing the action (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004).  
Problems with this account lie with the problem that direct matching is not 
always possible. For example, children are able to understand actions that are 
performed by adults but their limbs are much shorter and their hands much 
ƐŵĂůůĞƌ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƵŶĂďůĞƚŽƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĂĚƵůƚ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĂŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĐĂůǁĂǇ
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(Wohlschläger et al., 2003).  Furthermore, the precise kinematics used to perform 
even a simple action is not always directly observable and understanding the exact 
means by which an action is achieved is not as important as understanding the 
action goal in many cases. Recent studies also suggest that action simulation can be 
ŵŽĚƵůĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ(Liepelt, Cramon, & 
Brass, 2008) and through social interaction (Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2010). 
Therefore, a simple, bottom-up matching approach does not encompass the 
flexibility within the action understanding system. 
Additionally, if we consider how best to respond to observed action, it is not 
always useful to represent the actor ?s own motor plan as we do not always wish to 
perform an imitative response. Rather a complementary action which helps to 
achieve the agents ? goal would be more useful. For example helping someone to 
move a table, one person must walk forwards whilst the other walks backwards. Yet 
the movements still need to be coordinated to successfully work together. In this 
situation, a representation of the actor ?s motor plan would interfere with your own, 
making joint action much less successful than is (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 
2006).  
A further problem with a simulation account of action understanding is that 
many of the same motor acts are used to achieve different action goals. For 
example reaching to grasp a wine bottle and reaching to grasp a dumbbell could 
have exactly the same kinematics but the goals of these actions are patently 
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ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?/ĨƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŵŽƚŽƌƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐĂůůŽǁƐƚŚĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽ
these goals, how can it distinguish between these two motorically similar actions?  
More recently theories regarding the role of the motor system during action 
observation have moved towards a predictive account (Csibra, 2004; Kilner, Friston, 
& Frith, 2007). Csibra argues that the activation of the motor system during action 
observation is the result of predictive action monitoring. Under this theory, 
interpretations about the goals of actions are completed outside of the motor 
system. Once an action goal has been predicted, the motor system then 
reconstructs the motor programme required to achieve that goal. Thus, this account 
places emphasis on top-down propagation of goal information to the motor system 
rather than a bottom-up matching approach. In essence, the observer is able to 
make predictions about the goal that an actor may have using Bayesian inference. 
From these predictions, an observer can then access a motor code that they can use 
to achieve that goal. As an action ensues, the observer can then compare their 
action prediction with the one that is occurring and update their prediction of the 
action goal accordingly. Emerging evidence for this model comes from computer 
simulations (Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 2011) and electroencephalograpy (EEG) data 
which show predictive rather than reactive neural responses to observed actions 
(Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, & Sirigu, 2004). 
This predictive account also resolves a number of the problems raised 
against the simulation theory. For example, the level of ascription used by the 
motor system is selected by the observer, based on their interpretation of the 
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action goal. Translation between adult and child actions is no longer a problem if 
ƚŚĞ ŵŽƚŽƌ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ŝƐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌƐ ? ŵŽƚŽƌ ƌĞƉĞƌƚŽŝƌĞ ĂŶĚ
based on the perceived goal. Finally, top-down modulation of the motor system can 
be based on goal inference in the context of the observed actions (see Csibra (2004) 
for a full account). 
In summary, this section reviews theories for how it is that we can represent 
ǁŚĂƚŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ŐŽĂůƐĂƌĞ ?/ƚŵĂǇďĞĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƐŝŵƵůĂƚion or of predictive inference 
but it is commonly accepted that the motor system is used to understand the goals 
of others. Another important aspect of action understanding is being able to 
interpret why a particular goal-directed action was performed and what the actor 
was intending, given the action context. In the next section I focus on the theories 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚƌǇƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶŚŽǁǁĞŵĂŬĞŝŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ‘ǁŚǇ ?ŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
1.1.3 INFERENTIAL PROCESSES AND THEORY OF MIND: UNDERSTANDING 
THE  ‘WHY ? OF AN ACTION 
Understanding why someone has performed a particular action requires the 
observer to make a mental state judgement about the actor. For example, the lady 
at the green grocers now selects some brussels sprouts. From her behaviour we 
may guess that she likes the taste of sprouts or that she believes that eating sprouts 
is good for your health. This representation of others beliefs, desires or intentions is 
termed Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) or mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 
2003). Originally, when theory of mind was first described, it involved the 
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ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ(Premack & Woodruff, 1978). However, the 
investigation of how mental states are represented has been dominated by tasks 
requiring an understanding of beliefs. This is probably because the false-belief task 
provides a clear-cut assessment of theory of mind abilities (Dennett, 1978).  
In the original study by (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) participants were told a 
story in which an agent (Maxi) holds a false belief about the location of some 
chocolate. When asked where Maxi will look for his chocolate, the participant needs 
to inhibit their own knowledge of the location of the chocolate and separately 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ DĂǆŝ ?Ɛ ĨĂůƐĞ ďĞůŝĞĨ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ĐŽƌƌĞĐtly predict his behaviour.  An 
extensive number of studies conclude that children start to pass this false belief 
task from around the age of 4 years and up (see Wellman, Cross, & Watson (2001) 
for a review) so it is commonly reported that mentalizing abilities start to develop 
throughout early school years. However, recent evidence from implicit mentalizing 
tasks with infants suggests that this ability starts to appear much younger (see 
section 1.5.2 for a review of the development of mentalizing abilities). 
It is widely acknowledged that adults are very adept at mentalizing (Apperly, 
Samson, & Humphreys, 2009) but the question of how we mentalize is largely a 
philosophical debate (Goldman, 1993; Gopnik, 1993). Empirical studies assess the 
quality of adult mentalizing using tasks that involve reading social stories and 
answering questions that require the reader to represent the mental state of one of 
the characters (Happé, 1994) or labelling the interactions of cartoon shapes that are 
interacting in a socially meaningful way (Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000a; 
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Heider & Simmel, 1944). Most adult studies of mentalizing use brain imaging 
techniques to identify the neural mechanisms that are engaged during mentalizing 
tasks. These studies are reviewed in section 1.2.2. 
1.1.4 ACTION RATIONALITY 
Whilst the separate topics of how we understand basic actions and how we 
ŵĞŶƚĂůŝǌĞ ĂďŽƵƚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞůǇ ƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ ? ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ
picture of how we link action comprehension and mentalizing to create a full 
understanding of what someone has done and why is less studied. This thesis 
contributes to this gap in the literature by studying responses to irrational actions. 
Rationality understanding provides an important bridge between action 
understanding and mentalizing as it may require a combination of basic action 
comprehension and inferential processing simultaneously (Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, 
& Gergely, 2007). If this is the case then examination of responses to irrational 
actions can provide us with information about how the processes of action 
understanding and mentalizing work together. In this section I start by providing a 
working definition of action rationality and review a cognitive theory which suggests 
that understanding irrational actions requires basic action understanding processes 
as well as mentalizing. 
The principle of rational action states that an agent will act in the most 
efficient manner possible, considering the environmental constraints that have an 
impact on their action (Dennett, 1987). Therefore, within this thesis I use the term 
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 ‘ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŝƐŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŽƌƵƐĞƐƵŶƵƐƵĂůŵĞĂŶƐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ
a particular goal. Critically for this view, the action context or the environment does 
not provide an explanation for the unusual behaviour displayed. Therefore, the 
action cannot be understood in terms of the physical context. Instead, the observer 
needs to give mentalistic explanations for why the actor performed the action in an 
unusual or inefficient manner (Heider & Simmel, 1944). 
A teleological account of action understanding provides a cognitive 
framework that can explain how we understand basic actions, but it also provides 
an account for how we understand actions that violate the principle of rationality 
(Gergely & Csibra, 2003). This theory proposes that actions are understood in terms 
of their outcomes or goals and the means by which this action was achieved is 
explained with respect to the environmental context. For example, a child running 
towards her mother leaps over a box that is in the way. We understand her goal is 
to get to her mother and the leaping action is necessary to avoid the box. In this 
way, her actions are explained in terms of contextual reality and there is no need to 
represent her mental states such as the desire to reach her mother or her belief 
about the solidity of the box. Csibra and Gergely (1998) refer to this form 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂƐƚĂŬŝŶŐĂ ‘ƚĞůĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĂĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂů
precursor to mentalizing. In the case of an irrational action, the girl still makes a 
leap towards her mother but this time the box is not in the way. Taking a 
teleological stance is not sufficient to explain this behaviour because the physical 
context does not constrain and rationalise her action. Instead we need to invoke an 
alternative mentalistic action explanation with which we can understand her 
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behaviour. Perhaps she is trying to impress her mother or perhaps she believes 
there is a hole under the grass that she needs to leap over. Here, both real and 
fictional factors are incorporated into our explanation of her behaviour. Thus the 
action goal can be represented as a desire (wanting to reach her mother) and the 
physical constraints are actually her beliefs (there is a hole under the grass). Csibra 
and Gergely argue that when an action is rational, basic teleological reasoning is 
used to understand it. However, when an action is irrational it is necessary to switch 
to the more computationally demanding strategy of mentalizing. Thus it seems that 
in cases where actions are irrational, the full consort of action understanding is 
required (see Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1. Teleological and mentalistic representations of rational and irrational actions. 
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Previous studies have examined a number of different types of irrational 
actions. Some irrational actions used an unusual effector such as the use of a knee 
or forehead to operate a switch that could be easily operated by a hand (Brass et 
al., 2007; Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Vivanti et al., 2011). Alternatively, 
actions were completed using an inefficient movement path when a more direct 
route was available (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Jastorff, Clavagnier, Gergely, & Orban, 
2011; Marsh & Hamilton, 2011). Finally, other studies engineered a mismatch 
between the stereotypical use of an object and the action performed with that 
object to generate irrational actions (de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 
2008). Within this thesis, I refer to all of these actions as irrational and treat them 
similarly although differences between these types of irrational actions may exist. 
This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, Section 7.3. 
Having established that irrational actions may be an important tool to 
investigate how action understanding and mentalizing processes are combined, I 
now review the different methods that have been used to measure action 
understanding. In particular I focus on whether action understanding and 
mentalizing dissociate in the brain, in eye gaze, in people with autism spectrum 
condition and in typical child development. First I consider our knowledge of how 
the brain processes actions and mental states. 
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1.2 BRAIN NETWORKS FOR ACTION UNDERSTANDING 
There are two brain networks that are commonly reported as being engaged 
during action understanding tasks. These are the action observation network (AON) 
and the mentalizing network (MZN). Early studies reported engagement of the AON 
and MZN in quite different circumstances, but the extent to which the AON and 
MZN function independently and how they interact is currently debated (see Van 
Overwalle and Baetens (2009) for a meta-analysis).  In the following sections, I 
review current knowledge of the action observation network and mentalizing 
networks respectively. Following this, I address the question of how independent 
these networks are and discuss the circumstances in which both networks are 
simultaneously engaged. 
1.2.1 THE ACTION OBSERVATION NETWORK  
Many previous studies have examined brain responses during the 
observation of simple, goal-directed actions and have localised an action 
observation network (AON, Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010).  This network 
comprises the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and a 
swathe of visual cortex from extrastriate body area (EBA) through middle temporal 
gyrus (MTG) to superior temporal gyrus (STG).   The IFG and IPL are commonly 
considered to be the core of the human mirror neuron system (Gallese, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  
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Mirror neurons are defined as single cells which respond when an individual 
performs an action and observes an equivalent action.  Such neurons have been 
recorded in the premotor and parietal cortex of the macaque monkey (Fogassi et 
al., 2005;  Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, 
Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992).  Though individual mirror neurons have not been 
studied in the same regions in the human brain, neuroimaging evidence suggests 
that equivalent systems can be found (Van Overwalle, 2009; Caspers et al., 2010).  
The controversy (Hickok, 2009) over whether the mirror neuron system in monkeys 
is the same as the system identified in humans has largely been resolved by two 
recent fMRI studies.  The first demonstrated matching fine-scale patterns of activity 
in parietal cortex during performance and observation of finger and hand actions, 
which implies that very similar neuronal populations are engaged in each task as 
predicted by the mirror neuron hypothesis (Oosterhof, Wiggett, Diedrichsen, 
Tipper, & Downing, 2010). Second, Kilner et al., (2009) asked participants to 
alternately perform and observe hand actions during fMRI.  Suppression of the 
BOLD signal in inferior frontal gyrus was found when the action performed matched 
the previous observed action and when the action observed matched the previous 
performed action.  The best explanation for this pattern of activity is that 
performed and observed actions both engage the same population of neurons, as 
required by the mirror neuron hypothesis.  Throughout this thesis, I use the term 
 ‘ŵŝƌƌŽƌ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ĂƐ Ă ĐŽŵƉĂĐƚ ǁĂǇ ƚŽ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ƚŚĞ ŚƵŵĂŶ ŵŝƌƌŽƌ ŶĞƵƌŽŶ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ
without requiring the presence of mirror neurons themselves, and I use the term 
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 ‘ŵŝƌƌŽƌŝŶŐ ?ƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŝŶĐůĂƐƐŝĐŵŝƌƌŽƌƐǇƐƚĞŵƌĞŐŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂƐƐƵŵĞĚ
to link representations of performed and observed actions. 
Since the discovery of human mirror systems, a number of claims have been 
made concerning their function.  The mirror system seems to match observed 
ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ŵŽƚŽƌ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ƐŽ ŝƚŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ĂůůŽǁƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ  ‘ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƐŝĚĞ ?  ?Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia 2010) using processes of simulation (see section 1.1.2). Other claims 
suggested that the extended mirror system plays a role in emotional contagion 
(Singer et al., 2004; Wicker et al., 2003), or that it provides a mechanism for 
empathy (Gallese, 2003), language (Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998) and mentalizing 
abilities (Gallese & Goldman 1998). Therefore, the mirror system could provide a 
unifying basis for social cognition (Gallese, Keysers & Rizzolatti 2004). However, the 
evidence for some of these claims remains weak. 
In this section, I focus on the claim that the mirror system provides the brain 
ďĂƐŝƐ ĨŽƌ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŐŽĂůƐĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?  DƵůƚŝƉůĞ
studies have reported that the core human mirror system regions of IPL and 
premotor cortex are engaged when typical individuals observe another person 
acting (reviewed in Caspers et al. 2010).  But can we go further and consider what 
cognitive processes might take place in these regions?  As described in section 1.1.1, 
we can represent an observed action in multiple ways.  It is possible to encode the 
ƐŚĂƉĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚŽƌ ?ƐŚĂŶĚ  ?Ă ŬŝŶĞŵĂƚŝĐ ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ ) ? ƚŚĞ ŽďũĞĐƚ ƚŚĞǇ reach towards (a 
ŐŽĂůĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ )ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůůŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƵŵĂŶďƌĂŝŶůŝŬĞůǇrepresents all 
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these features simultaneously, but can we distinguish how and where these are 
encoded?  
Recent work suggests that kinematic and goal features of observed actions 
engage slightly different components within the human mirror system.  Studies 
examining kinematic processing in the human brain indicate involvement of both 
higher order visual systems and IFG.  For example, if you see a person lift a box, you 
can normally infer the weight of the box based on kinematic factors such as the 
velocity of ƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ůŝĨƚŝŶŐĂĐƚŝŽŶ(Hamilton et al. 2007).  However, this ability is 
ĚŝƐƌƵƉƚĞĚŝĨƌĞƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞƚƌĂŶƐĐƌĂŶŝĂůŵĂŐŶĞƚŝĐƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƵƐĞĚƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞĂ  ‘ǀŝƌƚƵĂů
ůĞƐŝŽŶ ?(Pascual-Leone, Walsh, & Rothwell, 2000) of the IFG (Pobric & Hamilton 
2006).  BOLD responses in IFG are also sensitive to different hand apertures during 
grasping actions (Hamilton and Grafton, 2008) and to different grasp types for 
example, ring pull vs precision grip (Kilner et al., 2009). Evidence from single cell 
recordings in macaque monkeys also provides support for the idea that kinematic 
analysis occurs in area F5 (the monkey homologue of human IFG) as different types 
of grasp elicit different neuronal firing rates (Bonini et al., 2011; Spinks, Kraskov, 
Brochier, Umilta, & Lemon, 2008). 
In contrast, studies of goal processing suggest that the parietal mirror 
system, in particular anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS), is sensitive to action goals, 
independent of the kinematics that were used to achieve that goal. Hamilton and 
Grafton (2006) used a repetition suppression task in which participants watched 
movies of a hand reaching for a food item or tool during fMRI scanning.  Data 
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analysis compared trials where the goal of the action was the same as the previous 
trial (e.g. take-cookie followed by take-cookie) compared to trials where the goal of 
the action was different to the previous trial (e.g. take-disk followed by take-
cookie).  The results show that BOLD signal in just one cortical region, the left aIPS, 
was suppressed when participants saw a repeated action-goal regardless of the 
hand trajectory used.  This pattern of response is predicted only in brain regions 
which contain neuronal populations that are sensitive to the manipulated features 
of the movies (taking a cookie versus a disk)  (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 
2006). This means that aIPS contains neuronal populations which are sensitive to 
action goals. Oosterhof et al. (2010) also found evidence for the encoding of action 
goals in aIPS using multi-voxel pattern analysis.  Further studies found that the IPL 
also encodes action outcomes, regardless of the action kinematics (Hamilton & 
Grafton, 2009). In this study the same object was acted upon, only the means by 
which the goal was achieved was manipulated. Action outcome resulted in 
differential BOLD responses in the IPL regardless of the action kinematics.   Data 
from monkeys is also compatible with this position, with reports of single neurons 
which differentiate reach-to-eat and reach-to-place actions in the IPL (Fogassi et al. 
2005).   Note that goal here is defined very simply in terms of the identity of the 
object a person grasps, for example, taking a cookie compared to taking a computer 
disk.  More complex action sequences and their goals might be represented 
elsewhere. 
Together, these studies demonstrate that the human mirror system 
responds selectively to observed actions, and that different types of action 
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processes depend more on different components of the mirror system.  In 
particular, kinematic features of an action are encoded in the frontal mirror system, 
while goal features are encoded in the parietal mirror system.  However, these 
mirror systems are not necessarily the only brain regions with a role in action 
understanding.  As detailed in the next section, some action comprehension tasks 
also engage brain areas associated with mentalizing.   
1.2.2 THE MENTALIZING NETWORK 
Multiple studies have identified a mentalizing network in the brain, 
comprising medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ).  
Temporal poles and precuneus are also sometimes found (see Gallagher & Frith, 
2003; Amodio & Frith, 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003 for reviews).  These regions 
are engaged when reading stories which require mental state attributions (Saxe & 
Powell, 2006; Young, Dodell-Feder, & Saxe, 2010) or when considering the beliefs 
and future actions of others in interactive games (Fletcher et al., 1995).  For 
example, playing rock-paper-scissors encourages partŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐƚŽƚŚŝŶŬ ? “ŚĞƚŚŝŶŬƐ/ ?ůů
ĚŽƌŽĐŬ ?ďƵƚ/ ?ůůĚŽƐĐŝƐƐŽƌƐĂŶĚƚƌŝĐŬŚŝŵ ? ) ?ĂŶĚĐŽŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵŽĚĞůƐĐĂŶƚƌĂĐŬƚŚŝƐ
type of belief inference occurring in mPFC and TPJ (Hampton & Bossaerts, 2008; 
Yoshida, Seymour, Friston, & Dolan, 2010). However, the mentalizing network is not 
only engaged in tasks requiring explicit verbal belief inference.  I focus here on the 
increasing number of studies which report engagement of this network during non-
verbal or minimally verbal tasks in which participants spontaneously attribute 
intentions or consider the longer term motivations underlying an action.  
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One of the earliest nonverbal mentalizing studies recorded brain activity 
while participants viewed animated triangles moving on the screen (Castelli, Happé, 
Frith, & Frith, 2000).  For some of these animations, typical individuals 
spontaneously describe the action in terms of the mental states of the triangles 
(e.g. the big triangle is coaxing the little triangle), while for others the action of the 
triangles is purposeless.  Observation of the mentalizing triangles results in 
activation of mPFC and TPJ, despite the lack of verbal stimuli or instructions.    
More recently, spontaneous activation of mentalizing systems during action 
observation was reported by Brass et al. (2007). In this study Brass and colleagues 
showed participants movies of unusual actions (e.g. turning on a light with your 
knee).  In some cases, the context made the action rational (e.g. turning on a light 
with your knee because your hands are fully occupied) but in other movies the 
same action was judged as irrational (turning on the light with your knee when your 
hands are free). Brass et al report greater activation in the mentalizing network 
including TPJ and mPFC when participants viewed irrational actions compared to 
rational ones.  Critically, this activation was not related to the unfamiliarity of the 
actions because all actions were unusual.  Rather, the engagement of TPJ and mPFC 
reflected the rationality of the actions.  This study shows that observation of human 
actions without instructions to mentalize can engage brain regions associated with 
mentalizing if the observed actions are hard to interpret. 
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1.2.3 SIMULTANEOUS ENGAGEMENT OF THE AON AND MZN 
From the evidence reviewed in the previous sections, it seems logical that 
the action observation network and mentalizing networks should play 
complementary roles in understanding observed actions. The action observation 
ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĞŶƚĂůŝǌŝŶŐŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ  ‘ǁŚǇ ? ?However, 
one review has claimed that these networks function independently and are rarely 
active concurrently (van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Since this review was 
published however, there have been a number of studies which refute this claim. 
This section reviews the evidence for simultaneous engagement of the AON and 
MZN during action understanding tasks and assesses the validity of the claim that 
these networks play complementary roles in action understanding. Concurrent 
ĂĐƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨďŽƚŚƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŝƐƐĞĞŶǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚŝƐĂƐŬĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞ ‘ǁŚĂƚ ?Žƌ
 ‘ǁŚǇ ? ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚŽďƐerved actions (Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011). In 
their fMRI study, participants showed increased BOLD responses in IPL and IFG 
regions during action observation when participants were asked to think about how 
the actions were being performed. In the same subjects and with the same action 
stimuli, mPFC and TPJ were more active when participants were asked to think 
about why the actions were being performed. This study shows a nice dissociation 
between levels of action processing in the brain. It seems that the mirror systems 
ĂƌĞƌĞĐƌƵŝƚĞĚĨŽƌŬŝŶĞŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŐƌŝƉƉŝŶŐĂƚŝŶĐĂŶ ?
but the mentalizing system is recruited for long-term intentionality judgments such 
ĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƌĞĐǇĐůŝŶŐƚŚĞĐĂŶƚŽƐĂǀĞƚŚĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚis study the 
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engagement of AON and MZN is dependent upon instructions to think about 
different aspects of the stimuli (see Ampe, Ma, Hoeck, Vandekerckhove, & 
Overwalle, in press) and may not reflect spontaneous action understanding. 
Further studies have refined our knowledge of when action understanding 
engages mentalizing brain systems.  de Lange et al. (2008) showed participants 
images of ordinary actions, actions which had an unusual intention and actions 
which had unusual kinematic features. This study found that while participants 
watched actions with an unusual intention, there was greater activity in the STS and 
mPFC, whereas actions with unusual kinematic features activated the IFG more. 
This study suggests that both mirror and mentalizing systems are complimentary 
systems which both contribute to action understanding.  The additional recruitment 
of the mentalizing system for action understanding in social contexts is also 
reported in a study by Ramsey & Hamilton (2010). In this study, participants 
watched short movies of a toy animal hiding in one of two locations. Following the 
hiding phase, an actor came out from behind a curtain, surveyed the possible 
locations and reached into one to find the toy. Similar to the previously mentioned 
studies, the results showed complimentary activation of both mirror and 
mentalizing systems; the IFG was sensitive to action trajectory while the mPFC and 
right temporal pole were sensitive to successful search behaviour. The design of 
these studies does not allow strong conclusions about whether participants were 
attributing beliefs to the actor or only considering intentions, but both studies show 
that tasks focused on intentions with no explicit belief component are processed 
differently from tasks that focus on simple goals.  
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A different way to probe the interaction of the AON and the MZN is to 
record brain responses during observation of irrational actions.  As previously 
argued in section 1.1.4, understanding the rationality of actions in a teleological 
fashion is a developmental step between basic action comprehension and theory of 
mind (Csibra, 2003; Gergely & Csibra, 2003).  This means that tasks involving implicit 
rationality judgement may provide a link between AON and MZN systems.   Three 
previous studies have examined brain responses during passive observation of 
irrational actions.  First, Brass et al. (2007) as previously described in section 1.1.4, 
found that both pSTS and mPFC showed greater responses to irrational actions than 
to rational actions. Brass et al. (2007) suggest that these results support an 
inference based model of action understanding in which observed irrational actions 
ĂƌĞ  ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ DE ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ƚĞůĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
reasoning about action is a precursor to mentalizing (Csibra, 2003; Gergely & Csibra, 
2003). Differential AON activity was not reported in this study, possibly because 
these regions respond most robustly to familiar goal-directed hand actions. 
In a second study, Marsh and Hamilton (2011) showed both typical and 
autistic participants videos of rational and irrational hand actions during fMRI.  
Every movie showed a simple goal-directed hand action with a straight or curved 
trajectory; action rationality was defined by the presence or absence of a barrier. In 
a rational action, the arm reached for an object in a straight, efficient trajectory or 
in a curved trajectory over a barrier. Matched irrational actions were those that 
took either the same curved trajectory with no barrier or the straight trajectory 
where the hand appears to pass through the barrier.  In the irrational movies, the 
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unusual means by which the action was performed might prompt the observer to 
engage in inference or mentalizing.  Results showed that right IPL was more active 
when typical and autistic participants saw irrational actions, while mPFC was less 
active when viewing irrational actions in the typically developing participants only.  
These results provide an important distinction between typical and autistic 
responses to action rationality.  However, there is an inconsistency in the finding of 
a decrease in mPFC activity in Marsh and Hamilton (2011), compared to the 
increase in mPFC activity reported by Brass et al. (2007).   
A third study of observation of irrational actions reports a different pattern 
of results again. Jastorff, Clavagnier, Gergely, and Orban (2010) showed participants 
movies of an actor reaching over a barrier to pick up an object.  Actions varied in 
terms of trajectory height and barrier height, and movies with a mismatch were 
more irrational. They report no differential MZN activity during the observation of 
irrational actions, but found that activity in the middle temporal gyrus (MTG) 
correlates with action rationality as judged by each participant after scanning.  
Responses in this region were also sensitive to barrier height and arm trajectory.  
Overall, three papers have been published on observation of irrational 
actions and all three report different effects.  There might be an increase in mPFC 
activation for irrational actions (Brass et al., 2007) a decrease in mPFC (Marsh & 
Hamilton, 2011) or no change (Jastorff et al., 2010).  These mixed results make it 
hard to develop theories or models concerning the interaction of the AON and the 
MZN during the processing of complex action stimuli. The first study in this thesis 
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will seek to clarify these mixed results by examining the differences between 
previous studies. I aim to replicate the finding that action rationality does indeed 
engage both action observation and mentalizing systems simultaneously (see 
Chapter 2). If this is the case, then examining the cognitive processes involved in 
understanding irrational actions may be the key to understanding how the action 
observation and mentalizing networks interact. I now review other methods that 
can be used to examine the cognitive processes involved in action understanding. 
1.3 EYE GAZE 
Eye-tracking can be used as a natural, implicit and dynamic measure of 
action understanding. For example, the finding that adults and children anticipate 
action outcomes by looking towards the action goal before the action is complete 
has been used to assess action understanding (Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck & von 
Hofsten, 2006; Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Gredeback, Stasiewicz, Falck-Ytter, 
Rosander, & Hofsten, 2009). The seminal study by Flanagan and Johansson was the 
first to demonstrate this effect. They asked participants to complete a block 
stacking task and to watch someone else complete the same task while their eye 
movements were recorded. A comparison of eye movements during the 
observation and execution tasks revealed some remarkable similarities. Specifically, 
they reported robust anticipation of both observed and performed actions such 
that participants reliably fixated the end point of an action, prior to it being 
completed. In contrast, action anticipation was not present in a condition in which 
the blocks moved independently.  
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Since the discovery of anticipatory eye movements, much research has been 
conducted to identify the cognitive processes that they reflect. Due to the tight 
coupling between eye movements for observation and execution tasks, Flanagan 
and Johansson proposed this as evidence for a direct-matching or simulation 
approach to action understanding (see section 1.1.2).  
Several studies provide support for the idea that anticipatory eye 
movements during observation reflect motor system activity. Gredebäck & 
Kochukhova (2010) demonstrate a positive relationship between manual ability to 
perform a simple puzzle task and faster anticipation of actions during observation of 
the same task in 25 month old infants, suggesting the development of motor skills is 
linked to the development of predictive eye movements. Ambrosini, Sinigaglia and 
Costantini (2011) ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŶŐ ĂŶŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌƐ ? ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŽƉĞƌĨŽƌŵ
the observed action inhibits predictive eye movements, showing that capacity for 
action is also reflected in this measure. Further evidence of the involvement of the 
motor system during action observation comes from an interference paradigm 
(Cannon & Woodward, 2006). Adults watched goal-directed hand actions whilst 
performing a simple motor task, a working memory task, or no task. Anticipatory 
looking was reduced only when participants were concurrently performing the 
motor task compared to all other conditions. This interference effect demonstrates 
the involvement of the motor system in generating predictive eye movements. 
Although the motor system is implicated in generating predictive eye 
movements, emerging evidence suggests that predictive eye movements are not 
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identical to those produced during action execution. This is contrary to the 
predictions of the direct matching hypothesis. For example, Rotman, Troje, 
Johansson, & Flanagan (2006) showed action anticipation for unpredictable actions 
was slower than for predictable actions but that latency of prediction was linked to 
the time at which the goal of the action became apparent. Eshuis, Coventry, & 
Vulchanova (2009) also argue that anticipatory looking is driven by the goal of the 
action. They report that participants only demonstrated anticipations for goals that 
had an end effect (sounds/movement at the goal location). Therefore, they suggest 
that predictive eye movements are driven by the intention of an agent to achieve a 
goal and the desirability of the goal end state. They also found that observation of 
human motion was not necessary for anticipatory looking, and therefore conclude 
that the human mirror system cannot be driving this process (but see Ramsey and 
Hamilton (2010) for evidence that self-propelled shapes can also activate the 
human mirror system). 
Only two previous studies have investigated action rationality with eye 
tracking. The first measured predictive eye movements and found that action 
anticipation was slower when an action was irrational (Gredebäck & Melinder, 
2009). This finding is consistent with Rotman et al. (2006), suggesting that 
predictive eye movements are driven by goal understanding. However, this study 
failed to control for goal salience and action kinematics between rational and 
irrational actions and this may impact the results (this is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3, section 3.2.1). The second study to measure responses to irrational 
actions found that participants looked longer at the face following an irrational 
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action, in comparison to a matched rational action (Vivanti et al., 2011).  It was 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽƐĞĞŬĂŶĞǆƉůĂnation for 
the irrational action. Both of these studies investigate only one cognitive 
component of irrational action understanding, using one eye tracking measure. 
Understanding rationality may include many cognitive processes such as action 
monitoring, goal prediction, evaluation of the environmental constraints and 
detection of rationality.  
On the whole, action understanding research that employs eye-tracking has 
been dominated by the analysis of predictive eye movements. However, the 
research reviewed in this thesis has demonstrated that predictive eye movements 
can be modulated by motor ability, goal type, action predictability and 
environmental features (Gredebäck, Stasiewicz, Falck-Ytter, von Hofsten, & 
Rosander, 2009). In addition, speed of anticipation is very sensitive to the way in 
which the stimuli is constructed (Rotman et al., 2006) and so it is very difficult to 
compare across studies. It seems that this simple measure alone is not able to 
reflect the multiple cognitive processes that underpin action understanding, 
especially when actions are more complex. The experiment presented in Chapter 3 
aims to identify the eye tracking measures that can allude to the cognitive 
processes involved in the observation of irrational actions. It also tests the 
hypothesis that predictive eye movements are generated by the motor system by 
comparing predictive eye movements for rational and irrational actions. It seems 
that observation of irrational actions may require additional engagement of the 
mentalizing network whereas observation of rational actions relies on the action 
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observation network. If predictive eye movements are modulated by action 
rationality, then they cannot be a product of the motor system alone. 
1.4 AUTISM 
Typically, we automatically attribute goals and intentions to the agents that 
we observe. However, individuals with autism may not make these same 
attributions. Currently there are two competing theories that claim that people with 
autism have difficulty understanding goals and intentions of others. These are the 
 ‘mentalizing ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďƌŽŬĞŶ ŵŝƌƌŽƌ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? ĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ
proposes that one of the two reviewed action understanding networks function 
atypically in autism. In the mentalizing theory, it is proposed that only mentalizing 
network is atypical, while at least basic processing in the mirror system is normal.  
In contrast, the broken mirror theory proposes that a core deficit in mirroring leads 
to difficulties with mentalizing.  In this section, I examine each of these theories and 
then consider the evidence from each, looking at traditional behavioural tasks, 
implicit measures such as eye tracking and EMG, and neuroimaging measures. 
1.4.1 MENTALIZING THEORY  
There is little disputing the repeated finding that many children and adults 
with autism have particular difficulties with false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985; Frith, 2001).  Brain activity in mentalizing regions when participants with 
autism watch the animated triangles movies is also abnormal (Castelli, Frith, Happé, 
C H A P T E R  1   W G E N E R A L  I N T R O D U C T I O N  |  3 9  
 
& Frith, 2002). The mentalizing theory proposes that difficulties with false belief 
ƚĂƐŬƐĂƌĞƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨĂŶŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵĞŶƚĂůƐƚĂƚĞƐ(Frith, 
Morton, & Leslie, 1991), or to represent the mental states of others independently 
of what they know to be true (Leslie, 1987).  Within this field, there is an important 
distinction between implicit and explicit mentalizing (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).   
Explicit theory of mind is measured with traditional false-belief tasks such as 
DĂǆŝ ?Ɛ ĐŚŽĐŽůĂƚĞ  ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ŝŶ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ1.1.3, Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  Typical 
children under around 4.5 years old often fail this task, and autistic individuals with 
a verbal mental age below 9.2 years also tend to fail (Happé, 1995).  However, more 
able individuals with autism often pass false-belief tasks, and may even pass more 
complex second order tasks (Happé, 1994).  Thus, there is a dissociation between 
the time course of explicit false belief development in typical children (emerging at 
around 4.5 years and complete by 8 years) and the time course of autism (emerging 
between 1 and 2 years of age and lasting throughout the lifespan).  This has led to a 
search for precursors to mentalizing and to the investigation of other theories of 
autism. 
In contrast to the late development of explicit mentalizing, implicit 
mentalizing seems to be present from early infancy (Kovacs, Teglas, Endress, Téglás, 
& Endress, 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) and is measured by recording gaze 
durations and eye movements when participants view movies in which an actor has 
a false belief (see section 1.5.2 for details of the typical development of 
mentalizing).  Recent data demonstrate that even high functioning adults with 
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Aspergers syndrome who pass verbal false belief tasks fail to show implicit 
mentalizing in an eye tracking task (Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009).  It is 
now argued that failure of implicit mentalizing is the core difficulty in autism (Frith, 
2012).  This resolves the difficulties over the time course of mentalizing failure, 
because implicit mentalizing develops over the first two years of life at the same 
time that autism emerges, and implicit mentalizing remains impaired in high-
functioning adults with autism.  Brain imaging data on implicit mentalizing in autism 
is not yet available, but it is possible that current tasks such as describing the 
behaviour of animated triangles tap into implicit mentalizing resources.  Brain 
activation in this task is atypical in high functioning adults with autism, despite their 
good explicit theory of mind skills (Castelli et al., 2002).   
Research on implicit mentalizing and the precise difference between implicit 
and explicit tasks is on-going, and further developments in understanding the role 
of implicit theory of mind in autism are likely.  For present purposes, I contrast a 
pure mentalizing theory of autism with a broken mirror theory.  The pure 
mentalizing theory predicts that mentalizing is a single, core deficit in autism and 
that other social brain systems are unaffected or secondarily affected.  For example, 
basic goal understanding processes should be intact in autism under the mentalizing 
theory because these do not require the mentalizing network.  However, there is 
still debate over whether difficulties with mentalizing are a single, core deficit in 
autism or whether these are a consequence of atypical processing in other social 
brain systems, for example the mirror system.  I consider this question in the next 
section.   
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1.4.2 BROKEN MIRROR THEORY  
The broken mirror theory claims that developmental failure of the mirror 
system is the primary social difficulty in autism, and a cause of poor mentalizing.  
Under this theory, deficits in understanding the kinematic and goal features of an 
action would lead to further difficulties in understanding emotions and mental 
states.   Initial evidence in support of this theory came primarily from studies of 
imitation.  When typical adults imitate hand actions, the mirror system is activated 
(Buccino, Binkofski, & Riggio, 2004; Decety, Chaminade, Grèzes, & Meltzoff, 2002; 
Iacoboni, 1999) and damage to the mirror system in adults causes imitation 
difficulties (Heilman, Rothi, & Valenstein, 1982). It is often reported that autistic 
children have specific difficulties with imitation (see Williams, Whiten, and Singh 
(2004) for a review) and this difficulty may have cascading effects into the social 
domain, leading to difficulty in understanding the intentions or emotions of others  
(Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006; Williams, Whiten, 
Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001). 
Evidence for atypical mirror system functioning in autism comes from 
studies which report atypical brain responses during action observation (Nishitani, 
Avikainen, & Hari, 2004; Oberman et al., 2005), or during a facial imitation task 
(Dapretto et al., 2006). A more recent variant of the broken mirror theory focuses 
not on comprehension of individual goal directed actions, but on the prediction of 
actions in a sequence.  The account is based on the finding that mirror neurons in 
parietal cortex encode actions as part of a sequence (Fogassi et al., 2005).  For 
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example, some mirror neurons in the IPL respond selectively when the monkey 
brings food to his mouth or sees someone bring food to their mouth, but not when 
bringing a small object towards the shoulder or seeing someone bring an object to 
their shoulder.  They suggest these mirror neurons allow an observer to chain 
actions together and represent intentions.  Building on this work, Cattaneo et al., 
(2007) measured electromyographic (EMG) recordings from a jaw-opening muscle 
(mylohyoid MH) in children when they were performing simple reach-to-eat and 
reach-to-place actions.  In typical children, MH activity increased during the reach 
phase of a reach-to-eat action but not of a reach-to-place action, and similar results 
were found for observation of actions.  Thus, typical children chain together the 
reach and mouth-open actions of an eating sequence, and show similar predictive 
mouth opening when observing others.  In contrast, matched children with autism 
did not show this anticipatory mouth opening, during either performance or 
observation.  Based on these data, Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro (2010) put forward 
an action-chaining hypothesis of autism.  They suggest that predicting actions and 
inferring intentions in this way is a precursor to mentalizing and belief inference 
skills.  If this is true, then a deficit in action chaining could lead to the social deficits 
we see in autism (Rizzolatti, Fabbri-Destro, & Cattaneo, 2009). 
In the next section, I evaluate the claims that either the whole mirror system 
or the ability to chain actions in a sequence is abnormal in autism.  I focus mainly on 
recent studies which use implicit (eye tracking or EMG) measures of action 
comprehension, and neuroimaging studies. 
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1.4.3 BEHAVIOURAL STUDIES OF ACTION UNDERSTANDING IN AUTISM 
The extent to which there is a global imitation impairment in individuals with 
autism remains a subject of contention. There have been multiple studies that 
report reduced imitation in children with autism on a number of different imitation 
tasks, including imitation of meaningless actions, mimicry of facial expressions and 
the spatial perspective taking component of imitation. These results have led to the 
claim that imitation is globally impaired in individuals with autism (Williams et al., 
2004).  However, there are also a number of studies which lead us to question this 
claim. By varying the nature of the task and the clarity of the instructions, it is 
possible to improve imitation performance in children with ASC. For example, it has 
been demonstrated that children with autism are capable of imitating both hand 
actions and facial expressions when they are explicitly instructed to do so (Beadle-
Brown, 2004; McIntosh, Reichmann-Decker, Winkielman, & Wilbarger, 2006). They 
also perform better when the imitation task ŝƐǁĞůůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚĂŶĚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ
spontaneous imitation (Hepburn & Stone, 2006). 
Some imitation tasks can separate imitation of action goals from imitation of 
the means by which the goal was achieved. This is an interesting distinction because 
we know from neuroimaging findings that these action features are represented in 
different brain regions and fall at different levels of the action hierarchy. The use of 
one such task elegantly demonstrated that children with autism were able to 
imitate action goals but failed to spontaneously copy the action style (Hobson & 
Lee, 1999; Hobson & Hobson, 2008). Intact goal-directed imitation in children with 
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autism has also been seen in a simple hand movement task.  Autistic children and 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐ ŵĂƚĐŚĞĚ ĨŽƌ ǀĞƌďĂů ŵĞŶƚĂů ĂŐĞ ǁĞƌĞ ƚĞƐƚĞĚ ŽŶ ĞŬŬĞƌŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ŐŽĂů ĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚ
imitation task described in section 1.1.1 (Bekkering et al., 2000). Both groups of 
children accurately imitated the action goal, i.e. they touched the appropriate dot 
on the table.  Interestingly however, both groups of children made systematic hand 
errors in which they failed to make contralateral movements across their body 
when this action was demonstrated. Instead they tended to make the more 
efficient, ipsilateral movement to touch the correct dot (Hamilton et al., 2007). This 
pattern of behaviour is indicative of goal-directed imitation as children are 
representing the action goal but using their own motor programs to generate an 
action that will achieve their goal (Bekkering et al., 2000). Therefore, this study 
provides evidence that individuals with ASC do represent action goals in a hierarchy 
and are able to imitate these goals.  
Further evidence for good goal understanding in children with ASC is 
demonstrated in a study where children observed an adult attempting and failing to 
dismantle a dumb-bell. Both typically developing and autistic children were able to 
complete this action, despite never actually witnessing a successful attempt 
(Aldridge, Stone, Sweeney, & Bower, 2000; Carpenter, Pennington, & Rogers, 2001). 
dŚŝƐ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ǁŝƚŚ ĂƵƚŝƐŵ ĂƌĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ĂŶ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?
intended goal without needing to see it physically performed.  In summary, it seems 
that autistic children are able to imitate goal-directed actions, when given clear and 
explicit instructions to do so. The behavioural evidence reviewed here suggests that 
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simple goal representation is intact in autism, contrary to the predictions of the 
broken mirror hypothesis. 
However there is mixed evidence for individuals with autism being able to 
understand more complex goals or sequences of actions. In a picture ordering task, 
children with autism were able to correctly sequence a series of pictures that 
depicted goal-directed actions (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986) but in a 
comparable task, adolescents with autism were less able to order object-directed 
action sequences (Zalla, Labruyere, & Georgieff, 2006).  
More recently, a study by Boria et al. (2009) demonstrated poorer 
understanding of subsequent actions in children with autism. In this study, children 
were shown static images of a hand either touching an object, grasping-to-use it or 
grasping-to-place it. Children were asked what the actor was doing and why. 
Children with autism were able to distinguish touching and grasping actions. They 
were also able to identify subsequent use of the object as well as typically 
developing children in the grasp-to-use condition. However, their performance was 
substantially poorer when identifying the grasp-to-place actions, with object-use 
dominating their responses, despite the grasp type rendering this action 
implausible. Boria and colleagues argue that children with autism are unable to use 
the motor information to make an inference about the subsequent action, 
providing evidence for the action chaining theory. However, in their second similar 
experiment, children with autism were able to identify grasp-to-place actions if an 
image of the end goal was also present. Boria argues that this evidence 
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corroborates their initial finding and children with autism are not just making 
stereotyped, object-use responses. An alternative explanation for this improved 
ability in the second experiment could be that the imagination demands are 
reduced as the action end point is visible. A better test of this effect should test 
different, dynamic grasps with the possible end points visible. This will reduce the 
imagination demand of the task and will require correct analysis of the motor 
properties of the grasp to infer the subsequent action. 
1.4.4 IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ACTION UNDERSTANDING IN AUTISM 
Eye tracking studies of action observation have also been used to assess 
mirror neuron function in autistic children. Typically, eye movements during action 
observation and action execution are predictive of the actions that they are 
monitoring. It has been suggested that these predictive eye movements are 
reflective of mirror neuron function as eye movements during action observation 
mirror those during action execution (see section 1.3 for a full review of the 
evidence for this claim). In a study of autistic five-year olds, (Falck-Ytter, 2010) 
demonstrated that infants with autism were able to anticipate actions to the same 
degree as typical infants and adults. This finding suggests that even young children 
with autism are able to predict the actions of others and provides evidence against 
impaired action chaining in autism.  
However, other studies of action chaining in autism do suggest difficulties. 
Cattaneo et al (2007), as described earlier, showed that children with autism failed 
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to produce predictive MH muscle activation during the performance or observation 
of a reach-to-eat action, in contrast to typical control children.  They argue that this 
indicates a failure of action chaining in participants with autism.   One limitation in 
this study is the failure to exclude dyspraxia in the autistic sample of participants; 
dyspraxia is often comorbid with autism (Ming, Brimacombe, & Wagner, 2007) and 
impacts on motor control but it is not linked to mentalizing. 
Further evidence for impaired action chaining in autism comes from a study 
by Fabbri-Destro et al. (2009) who used a similar methodology to that of Johnson-
Frey et al. (2004). In this study, children with and without autism were asked to pick 
up a block and move it to either a small or large container whilst their movement 
time was measured. Throughout the experiment, the task demands of the reach 
action remained constant. However, manipulating the size of the container 
increased the task demands of the place action. Despite the controlled demands of 
the reach action across conditions, typically developing children modified the speed 
of the initial reach action such that they were slower when the following action was 
harder and faster when the following action was easier. This bias is thought to 
reflect future planning of the second action in the sequence. In children with 
autism, the speed of the reach action was not biased by the difficulty of the 
following action, indicating a lack of action planning. Overall, the evidence for 
impaired action chaining in autism is mixed. Eye-tracking studies show that online 
action prediction is functioning typically in autistic children.  Studies that use more 
complex action sequences do reveal differences between typical and autistic 
children although they fail to control for motor ability in their tasks. Further 
C H A P T E R  1   W G E N E R A L  I N T R O D U C T I O N  |  4 8  
 
research is needed to assess the action chaining account of the broken mirror 
hypothesis. 
1.4.5 NEUROIMAGING STUDIES OF ACTION UNDERSTANDING IN AUTISM 
Neuroimaging techniques provide the most rigorous tests of the integrity of 
the mirror system in autism.  A number of early studies report differences between 
typical and autistic participants. For example, Oberman et al. (2005) report reduced 
mu wave suppression during observation and execution of hand actions in typical 
participants but mu suppression only occurred during execution tasks in the autistic 
participants. In addition, Théoret et al. (2005) demonstrated that motor evoked 
potentials, induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation during action observation 
were reduced for autistic participants. However, no group differences in magneto-
encephalographic recordings were found between typical and autistic participants 
during the observation of hand actions (Avikainen, Kulomäki, & Hari, 1999). It is 
important to note that all of these studies used measures with very limited 
localisation of effects and participant numbers were low. 
fMRI studies provide evidence with better spatial resolution and can identify 
specific brain abnormalities in a more convincing way. Dapretto et al. (2006) 
conducted the first study to provide evidence for the broken mirror hypothesis with 
fMRI. In their study, participants were asked to observe and imitate emotional facial 
expressions during fMRI scanning. They report reduced activation in the IFG 
component of the mirror system during observation and imitation in autistic 
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participants. Furthermore, the amount of activation significantly correlated with 
autistic symptom severity. However, imitation of emotional facial expressions is not 
a goal-directed action task and it is very different from the original hand-grasping 
studies that were used to study the mirror neuron system in monkeys (Gallese et 
al., 1996). Therefore, this study provides only weak evidence for the broken mirror 
hypothesis.  
In a more comparable study of hand actions, Dinstein et al. (2010) asked 
participants to perform and observe sequences of simple hand postures during 
fMRI scanning. They report no group differences between autistic and typical 
participants during observation or execution of hand postures in mirror neuron 
regions. In addition, autistic participants demonstrated normal movement 
selectivity for repeated hand postures in left anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) and 
ventral premotor cortex (vPM) in both observation and execution conditions. This 
study provides the first robust evidence against mirror system dysfunction in 
autism. 
Only one study has tried to assess the integrity of both mirror and 
mentalizing systems in autism in the same study (Marsh & Hamilton, 2011).  
Manipulation of action rationality was used as a tool to engage the mentalizing 
system. As previously reported, Brass et al. (2007) demonstrated that irrational 
actions automatically activate the mentalizing system in the typical observer, even 
with no prior instruction to mentalize. By using matched rational and irrational 
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action stimuli Marsh and Hamilton were able to dissociate mirroring and 
mentalizing systems in the autistic brain in a non-verbal, action observation task. 
Eighteen adults with autism and 19 age and IQ-matched typical adults 
completed the experiment.  They watched movies of simple, goal-directed reach 
actions to either a piece of food or a tool during fMRI scanning.  Some actions were 
rational while in others the hand took an irrational route to reach the target object.  
Control movies depicting a shape drifting across the screen were also shown.  The 
results showed that both typical and autistic participants engage mirror regions, in 
particular left aIPS when observing hand actions.  In addition, this area was also 
sensitive to action goals in both participant groups. As the left aIPS is the 
established goal processing region of the mirror system as defined in Hamilton and 
Grafton (2006) and Hamilton and Grafton (2008), this result provides evidence 
against a global mirror neuron deficit in autism and corroborates behavioural 
evidence that suggests that goal understanding is intact in autism.  
In contrast, differences between the typical and autistic participants 
emerged when regions outside the mirror system were examined, and when action 
rationality was considered.  In both typical and autistic participants, the right aIPS 
was activated for irrational actions compared to rational actions. However, in the 
mPFC, only typical participants differentiate irrational from rational actions.  mPFC 
activity in the autistic participants remained the same regardless of the rationality 
of the observed action.  These results demonstrate that, within the same group of 
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participants, responses in the mirror system to observed actions can be normal 
while responses in the mentalizing system are abnormal. 
1.4.6 SUMMARY 
Evidence for the integrity of mirroring and mentalizing brain systems in 
autism has been reviewed above.  In typical individuals, the mirror system encodes 
action kinematics and goals while the mentalizing system plays a role in making 
ŝŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ďĞůŝĞĨƐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? ǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƉŽŽƌ mentalizing 
in autism is clear cut, but there is much less support for the proposal that this social 
difficulty originates in failure of mirror systems. Many studies have demonstrated 
good goal understanding in autism, together with normal brain responses in mirror 
systems. Few studies have directly tested the integrity of mentalizing systems in 
relation to action understanding in autism but initial reports suggest that this may 
be functioning atypically. Action rationality is a new tool that can tap in to both 
mirror and mentalizing systems and studies comparing rational and irrational 
actions may be able to provide us with a better understanding of the interactions 
between mirroring and mentalizing. However, a better understanding of what 
action rationality is and why irrational actions engage the mentalizing system is also 
needed. Implicit measures, such as eye-tracking, give us insight into the fast, 
automatic processing of actions and can allude to subtle differences in perception in 
autism. This is the subject of the experiment reported in Chapter 4. 
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1.5 DEVELOPMENTAL STUDIES 
Investigating the emergence of action understanding and mentalizing skills 
throughout development can also provide us with information about the nature of 
these processes and how they are linked. Does one skill develop before the other or 
do they both develop simultaneously? In this section I briefly review the 
developmental work that contributes to our understanding of the development of 
action understanding and mentalizing. Finally, I consider the development of 
rationality understanding and when this skill emerges. 
1.5.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACTION UNDERSTANDING 
It seems that the first year of life is crucial in the development of many 
abilities that relate to action understanding. In a longitudinal study, Carpenter et al. 
(1998) document the emergence of gaze and point following, imitation of actions 
and gestures and production of communicative gestures. All of these abilities 
emerged within the first year in a progressive sequence. Interestingly, the authors 
note that production of actions like pointing commonly preceded comprehension of 
ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ŵŽƚŽƌ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŝƐ Ă ƉƌĞĐƵƌƐŽƌ ƚŽ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ
comprehension. The coupling between action comprehension and motor ability was 
also demonstrated when 18-to 25-month-old infants were given a puzzle to solve or 
asked to watch someone else perform the same puzzle while their eye movements 
were recorded. Infants who were able to complete the puzzle also made predictive 
saccades to the next puzzle piece during observation of another person completing 
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the puzzle.  However, those infants who did not have the manual ability to 
complete the puzzle also failed to make these predictive eye movements during the 
observation task (Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010).  Both of these studies provide 
evidence that is consistent with an embodied approach to action understanding and 
imply that action production is an important precursor for action understanding. 
Goal attribution is also thought to develop in the first year of life. This was 
first demonstrated in a study in which 6-month-old infants were habituated to a 
reach action in which an actor repeatedly picked up one of two objects. At test, the 
object locations were switched but infants looked longer when the actor reached to 
the new object at the old location. This indicates that the infants expected the actor 
to maintain their goal (the object that they previously reached for), despite the 
objects switching locations (Woodward, 1998). Further variations of this task have 
demonstrated that this goal attribution is aided by manual experience of the same 
actions prior to observation (Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005) and it is 
related to the causal consequences of the actions (Woodward & Sommerville, 
2000). Therefore, it seems that basic action comprehension skills develop early in 
life and resemble the sophisticated goal hierarchy that has been identified in adults. 
There is also evidence that 18-month-old infants understand the intentions 
of others, even if they do not witness a completed goal-directed action. This was 
demonstrated in a study in which infants observed an actor attempting but failing 
to pull a dumbbell apart. When given the dumbbell themselves, infants 
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subsequently completed the action indicating that they were able to represent the 
failed intention of the actor (Meltzoff, 1995). 
In sum, it seems that action understanding abilities are extremely well 
developed from an early age. Sophisticated processes of goal attribution and 
intention understanding are intact by the end of the first year and may mature 
alongside the development of motor capabilities. In contrast, explicit mentalizing 
skills are commonly thought to develop much later.  
1.5.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MENTALIZING 
As briefly summarised in section 1.1.3 mentalizing ability was traditionally 
assessed using a false-belief task. The developmental stage at which children are 
able to track beliefs and understand that another agent holds a false belief has been 
the topic of much debate. Originally it was proposed that children start to represent 
others knowledge and track beliefs from the age of 4.5 years (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983) but more recent evidence shows that if you simplify the task children as 
young as 3 years can pass (Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013). Debate about how 
best to assess mentalizing and what skills are required to pass the false belief task is 
on-going (see (Wellman et al., 2001) for a meta-analysis). Individual differences in 
mentalizing development were assessed in a longitudinal study of 45 children who 
were assessed during infancy and again at 4 years of age (Wellman, Lopez-Duran, 
LaBounty, & Hamilton, 2008). This study demonstrated that early attention to 
C H A P T E R  1   W G E N E R A L  I N T R O D U C T I O N  |  5 5  
 
actions can predict later mentalizing abilities, again implying that action 
understanding and mentalizing are linked in some way. 
More recent studies have advanced our knowledge of the developmental 
trajectory of mentalizing by assessing false-belief attribution in infants using eye 
tracking (Kovacs, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, 
Senju, & Csibra, 2007). In these studies, the classic false belief paradigm is acted out 
non-verbally on screen whilst the ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? ĞǇĞ ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƌĞ ƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚ ? ƚ
test, when the protagonist who holds a false belief reappears on screen, infants 
made predictive eye movements to false belief location rather than the true object 
location, indicating they are anticipating that the protagonist will behave in 
accordance with their false belief. Using this implicit measure of belief tracking, 
mentalizing has been identified in infants as young as 7-months old (Kovacs, Téglás, 
et al., 2010). 
The difference in developmental time-course between implicit and explicit 
measures of mentalizing has led to dual process explanations (Apperly & Butterfill, 
2009). Apperly and Butterfill (2009) propose that implicit mentalizing reflects a fast 
and automatic process which develops early in life but is limited in its flexibility. In 
contrast explicit mentalizing is incredibly flexible and can undertake complex 
cognitive processes but it is slow and cognitively demanding.  
The distinction between implicit and explicit processes and the degree of 
automaticity involved in these processes is interesting, especially when we consider 
ƚŚĂƚ ĂĚƵůƚƐ ǁŝƚŚ ^ ǁŚŽ ĂƌĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƉĂƐƐ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ĨĂůƐĞ ďĞůŝĞĨ ƚĂƐŬƐ ůŝŬĞ  ‘DĂǆŝ ?Ɛ
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ĐŚŽĐŽůĂƚĞ ?ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĨĂŝůĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚĂƐŬǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŝƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚůǇƵƐŝŶŐ
eye-tracking (Senju et al., 2010). The distinction between implicit and explicit 
processes emerges as a theme throughout this thesis. The studies I present here use 
both implicit and explicit measures of rationality understanding in an attempt to 
examine inconsistencies between them. 
1.5.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONALITY UNDERSTANDING  
Infants are sensitive to the rationality of actions from as early as 6-months of 
age (Gergely Csibra, 2008; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). This sensitivity has been 
measured using implicit measures of looking time and predictive eye movements 
(see section 1.3). Another way to investigate rationality understanding is to examine 
responses to irrational actions in imitation tasks. In a striking study of rational 
imitation, it was demonstrated that 14-month old infants may modulate their 
imitation behaviour based on action rationality (Gergely et al., 2002). Infants were 
shown a demonstration of an actor turning on a light box with her forehead. In one 
condition, the demonstrator was unable to use her hands to touch the light because 
she was holding in a blanket around her shoulders. Due to the constraint of holding 
the blanket, one can argue that using her forehead was the most rational way to 
turn on the light. In a second condition, the actress did not hold the blanket around 
her shoulders but instead demonstrated that her hands were free by placing them 
on the table next to the light. Results showed that infants were significantly more 
likely imitate and to turn on the light with their forehead in the condition in which 
ƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ŚĂŶĚƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ ?dŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶĨĂŶƚƐĂƌĞ
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evaluating the rationality of actions with respect to the goal and the constraints 
that act upon the actor when making decisions about what to imitate. If an action 
can be rationalised by the environmental constraints, infants will imitate selectively 
but if it is not possible to rationalise the action, infants faithfully imitate.  
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨƌĞĐĞŶƚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚŝƚŵĂǇďĞƚŚĞŝŶĨĂŶƚƐ ?ĂďŝůŝƚǇ
to perform the head-touch action in the hands free condition which drives faithful 
imitation, rather than rationality evaluation. The head-touch action is easier for 
infants to perform when they can put their hands on the table next to the light box 
(as in the hands free condition) compared to across their chest (in the hands 
constrained condition). Therefore, infants have greater motor resonance for the 
hands-free action and imitate it faithfully (Paulus, Hunnius, & Bekkering, 2012; 
Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, 2011a, 2011b). 
Despite the mixed evidence for faithful and selective imitation in infancy, 
studies of 2-to-8-year old children also display an apparent paradox in imitation 
behaviour (Over & Carpenter, 2012), on some occasions choosing to faithfully 
imitate and on others, to be selective. The differences in imitation behaviour cannot 
be explained by developmental changes as both selective and faithful imitation co-
occurs throughout development. This is introduced in more detail in section 5.2 of 
this thesis. In Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis, I investigate some of the social cues 
which may modulate imitation of irrational actions. 
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1.6 CONCLUSIONS  
By examining the mechanisms through which irrational actions are 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ? / ŚŽƉĞ ƚŽ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ŽƵƌ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ ǁĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?
complex behaviour. Within this question I assess brain, cognition and behavioural 
responses to irrational actions so that we can really tease apart the mechanisms 
through which action understanding is achieved at all levels of ascription. I place 
specific emphasis on the comparison between implicit and explicit measures of 
understanding as interesting inconsistencies between these measures have arisen 
in the past. 
A second important question that this thesis also addresses is the extent to 
which irrational action understanding is impaired in individuals with autism. A 
previous neuroimaging study has highlighted different neural responses to irrational 
actions in people with autism (Marsh & Hamilton, 2011) but an understanding of 
what this difference means for cognition and behaviour is still required. Therefore, 
each of the tasks that I develop for use in the typically developing population will be 
applied to people with autism to establish which action understanding mechanisms 
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1.7 SUMMARY OF STUDIES 
Study 1:  Here I aimed to replicate the finding that observation of irrational 
actions does simultaneously engage the mirror and mentalizing networks in 
typically developing adults. In addition, I question the extent to which this 
engagement is reliant on a human agent performing these actions. Participants 
watched movies of matched rational and irrational hand actions during fMRI 
scanning. Movies also varied with respect to how visible the agent was (fully visible, 
face occluded or invisible). Participants were asked to rate the rationality of each 
movie after scanning. Results supported the previous finding that observation of 
irrational actions engages the mirror system (IPL, IFG) and the mentalizing system 
(mPFC, TPJ) simultaneously. Activity within these regions also correlated with 
participants individual judgements of action rationality.  The amount of social 
information available to the observer did not impact upon this engagement.  This 
suggests that rationality is computed for human agents and inanimate objects alike 
and also that both mirror and mentalizing systems are not as selective for human 
action as previously thought. 
Study 2:  Here I investigate the cognitive processes that underpin rationality 
understanding using eye tracking. Previous eye tracking studies of action 
understanding use a variety of measures and it is not clear which is best. This study 
aimed to assess the suitability of different measures that may reflect irrational 
action understanding and to develop a principled analysis protocol that can be 
applied to an autism sample (study 3). We ran several analyses on looking time to 
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various areas of interest, scan paths and goal fixation latency. From these analyses 
we identified the measures that reflect action rationality, social form or interactions 
between rationality and social form in typical adults. These were looking times to 
the action goals, the hand, the barrier and the face; a scan path analysis in which we 
identified the origin of the first saccade to the action goal; and predictive goal 
fixation time when the goal saccade originated at the hand. These measures are 
now used in study 3. 
Study 3: This builds on study two using an adult ASC sample and a second 
typically developing sample matched for age and IQ.  Using the measures identified 
from study two, I was able to assess the similarities and differences between typical 
and ASC eye movements during irrational action observation. Results showed that 
typical eye movement patterns replicated those from study two. Additionally, 
participants with ASC showed very similar patterns of eye movements to the 
typically developing group, reflecting the rationality and social form of the action. 
The main difference between groups was that the ASC group showed reduced visual 
attention to the actions, looking less at the action goals and the hand and making 
less predictive saccades from the hand to the goal. However, when these predictive 
saccades were present, ASC participants were just as fast to predict the actions as 
typically developing individuals. This pattern of results is indicative of intact action 
understanding mechanisms in ASC but the reduction in attention to actions may 
reflect poor social modulation of behaviour. 
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Study 4: As study three did not show different eye movements between 
groups for rational and irrational actions, I decided to investigate rationality 
understanding in a more social, interactive environment. Overimitation is a 
phenomenon in which typically developing children copy the actions of other with 
high fidelity, even when they are visibly unnecessary or irrational.  It is not clear if 
this is due to a failure of causal reasoning or a social drive to affiliate.  To test these 
theories, I gave typically developing children an overimitation task, using simple and 
familiar objects. In this task, children saw a demonstrator produce three actions on 
a box in order to retrieve a toy; one of these actions was irrational (e.g. tapping the 
lid of the box twice). I then measured whether the child completed the unnecessary 
action when given the box. Overall, the propensity to overimitate increased with 
age and with understanding of the objects. These results support the hypothesis 
that overimitation is a socially driven behaviour that also reflects rationality 
understanding. I therefore predict that children with ASC will not overimitate to the 
same degree as typically developing children. 
Study 5: In the final study of this thesis, I tested children with ASC and matched 
typically developing children on the overimitation task developed in study four. 
While ASC children were able to complete all of the goal-directed, rational actions 
in this task, they show a significant reduction in overimitation behaviour as well as a 
reduced understanding of action rationality. This leads me to conclude that 
overimitation is a socially driven phenomenon that may reflect a desire to affiliate 
with the demonstrator or to conform to the normative behaviour demonstrated. In 
either case, children with ASC are immune to this drive. 
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CHAPTER 2. RESPONSES TO IRRATIONAL ACTIONS IN ACTION 
OBSERVATION AND MENTALIZING NETWORKS OF THE 
HUMAN BRAIN 
2.1 ABSTRACT 
By observing other people, we can often infer goals and motivations behind 
their actions.  This study examines the role of the action observation network (AON) 
and the mentalizing network (MZN) in the perception of rational and irrational 
actions.  Past studies in this area report mixed results, so the present chapter uses 
new stimuli which precisely control motion path, the social form of the actor and 
the rationality of the action.  A cluster in medial prefrontal cortex and a large cluster 
in right inferior parietal lobule extending to the temporoparietal junction was more 
active during observation of irrational, compared to rational actions.  Activity within 
the temporoparietal region also correlated on a trial-by-trial basis with each 
particŝƉĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?  dŚĞƐĞ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ
observation of another person performing an irrational action engages both action 
observation and mentalizing networks. These results advance current theories of 
action comprehension and the roles of action observation and mentalizing networks 
in this process. 
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2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 made the case that irrational actions may be used as an important 
tool to investigate the interaction of the action observation (AON) and mentalizing 
(MZN) networks. This is a theoretically interesting question as it can help us 
understand how we move from understanding what someone is doing to why. 
However, previous studies report mixed results with respect to the simultaneous 
engagement of the AON and the MZN during irrational action observation. As 
reported in section 1.2.3, Brass and colleagues (2007) report an increase in activity 
in the mPFC during observation of irrational actions, whilst Marsh & Hamilton 
(2011) report a decrease. However Jastorff and colleagues (2011) report no change. 
The aim of the present chapter is to re-examine brain responses during irrational 
action observation using new and well controlled stimuli. To optimise my 
experiment, I first consider some possible explanations for the differences between 
the reported results.   
One difference between the studies was the analysis method used. While 
Marsh and Hamilton (2011) and Brass et al. (2007) examined responses to movies 
designed to be rational or irrational  Jastorff et al. (2010) correlated individual 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? ƌĂƚŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ǁŝƚŚďƌĂŝŶ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?
Here the difference in perceived rationality between conditions was subtle, so 
detecting rationality might require a fine grained analysis of action kinematics, thus 
engaging MTG.  A second important difference is in the precise stimuli used.  Brass 
et al. (2007) used novel whole-body actions which were rationalised by the 
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environmental constraints.  Marsh and Hamilton (2011) used simple goal-directed 
hand actions, as did Jastorff et al. (2010). These stimuli differ in the amount of social 
information available to the observer in each study, from the whole body (Brass et 
al, 2007), the torso, arm and face (Jastorff et al, 2010) or the hand and arm alone 
(Marsh and Hamilton, 2011).  It is possible that changes in the amount of social 
information available allow the observer to interpret the actions differently.  The 
importance of social information for understanding action rationality is 
demonstrated in eye tracking studies which show that participants fixated the face 
of the actor more following their completion of an irrational action (Vivanti et al., 
2011) ? dŚŝƐ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ƐĞĞŬ ƚŽ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ƵŶƵƐƵĂů
behaviour by looking at their facial expression (Striano & Vaish, 2006) or gaze 
direction (see Carpenter & Call (2007) for a review) .  
Conversely, studies suggest that even young infants can distinguish action 
rationality for objects with no social form, for example a moving ball or block 
(Csibra, 2008).  In adults, perceived rationality of a chain of moving dots modulated 
activity in the pSTS (Deen & Saxe, 2011). This suggests that social form is not 
necessary for rationality discrimination.  However it remains to be seen whether 
activity in AON and MZN during irrational action observation is modulated by the 
social form of the actor.  
To address these differences, the present study will use well-matched 
stimulus videos which precisely control the rationality of the action and the social 
form of the actor.  All stimuli will depict goal-directed actions that either curve over 
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a barrier (rational) or curve with no barrier (irrational), and all are matched for 
action kinematics and timing.  Three different social forms will be compared: a full 
human (face + body), a human body only (head not visible) and a moving ball with 
no human present.  Finally, the data analysis will consider both the effects of 
rationality as defined by the movie categories and the relationship between brain 
ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƌĂƚŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?  dŚĞƐĞ ŶŽǀĞů
and well controlled stimuli will allow me to define the relationship between the 
AON and MZN during complex action understanding.   
Due to the inconsistent results reported in previous studies, I do not make 
strong predictions about the direction of the effect in mPFC but I do predict its 
involvement. I also consider the connectivity of the mPFC using psychophysiological 
interactions (PPI). 
2.3 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
2.3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty-five participants (19 female, mean age = 21.48, 24 right-handed) 
gave written informed consent before taking part. Participants were recruited 
through a web-advert on the university intranet and were paid £10 for 
participation. The study was approved by the University of Nottingham ethics 
committee.  
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2.3.2 STIMULUS GENERATION 
 Movie clips presented during fMRI scanning are illustrated in Figure 2.1. In 
each clip a red ball started on the left of the screen and was moved to one of two 
containers on the right. The trajectory of the ball between the start point and the 
goal was either a straight action or a curved action. Both actions were matched for 
timing on a frame by frame basis such that the start and end point of the action 
coincided. All movies lasted 3.7 seconds.  
To generate these movies, first a male actor was filmed moving the ball to 
the upper or lower container along a straight or curved trajectory (4 movies).   Care 
was taken to match the timing of the different actions and to ensure that the 
trajectories to the upper and lower containers were mirror images of each other.  
Then, a red barrier was superimposed over each movie using VirtualDub software.  
Two versions of the curved action movies were created. In one version, the barrier 
was placed between the start point and the goal such that the action had to curve 
over the barrier to reach the goal, thus making the curved trajectory rational. In the 
second version the position of the barrier had no bearing on the action trajectory 
and so the action was irrational.  This set of six movies (rational straight, rational 
curved, irrational curved, with 2 goals for each) were then edited to vary the social 
information available. In the human face condition, the head, torso, hand and arm 
of the actor were fully visible. In the human no face condition, a black strip was 
superimposed at the top of each movie so that the face was occluded but the torso 
of the actor was still visible. To generate the movies in which the ball moved 
C H A P T E R  2   W B R A I N  R E S P O N S E S  T O  I R R A T I O N A L  A C T I O N S  |  6 7  
 
independently, the coordinates of the ball were recorded for each frame of each 
movie. A red ball was then digitally superimposed on a still image of the background 
scene in the appropriate position for each frame. Video editing was completed 
using Matlab 6.5 and VirtualDub. The final stimulius set comprised 18 movies (three 
action types X two goals X three social conditions).  These conditions will be 
referred to by codes denoting the social form of the stimuli (ball (b), face (f) and no 
face (n)) and the rationality of the action trajectory (rational straight (RS), rational 
curved (RC) and irrational curved (IC)).  As the main focus of this paper is on the 
effects of rationality, only the responses to rational curved and irrational curved 
movies are included in the main analyses. Rational straight actions are included in 
the design to prevent the participant from expecting a curved movement trajectory 
on every trial but they are not included in the analyses.  
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Figure 2.1.The middle frame from each movie. In each movie the ball starts on the left and is placed 
in one of two containers on the right. Coloured lines visualise the movement trajectory of the ball and 
do not appear in the movie. Rationality is constrained by the position of the barrier. 
 
2.3.3 FMRI PROCEDURE 
During fMRI scanning participants saw movies of 3.7 seconds duration in an 
event-related design with a 600ms ISI.  One run of scanning contained each of the 
18 movies, repeated six times in a pseudorandom order. Care was taken so that 
same movie was not repeated consecutively. Each run of scanning lasted 
approximately 9 minutes and participants completed two runs. To maintain 
alertness, six catch trials were presented randomly within a run. Participants were 
asked to answer a simple question about the movie they had just seen, for example 
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 ‘ŝĚƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌƉůĂĐĞƚŚĞďĂůůŝŶƚŚĞƚŽƉďŽǆ ? ?WĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚĂ
button response, these responses were not analysed. Whole brain images were 
collected with a 3T Phillips Achieva MRI scanner using a 32-channel phased array 
head coil. 40 slices were collected per TR (3mm thickness). TR:2500ms; TE:40ms; flip 
angle:80 ; FOV:19.2cm; matrix: 64x64. 214 brain images were collected during 
each of two functional runs. High resolution anatomical scans were also collected.  
Following fMRI scanning, participants were asked to watch each movie again 
ĂŶĚ ƌĂƚĞ ŝƚƐ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ƵƐŝŶŐ Ă ďĂƚƚĞƌǇ ŽĨ Ɛŝǆ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? dŚĞƐĞ ŝƚĞŵƐ ǁĞƌĞ P  ‘dŚĞ
ĂĐƚŽƌ ǁĂƐ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ Ăƚ ƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŐŽĂů ? ?  ‘dŚŝƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƐĞĞŵĞĚ ǁĞŝƌĚ ? ?  ‘dŚĞ
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƵŶƵƐƵĂů ? ? ‘dŚŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƵŶŶĂƚƵƌĂů ? ? ‘dŚŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ
ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ĂŶĚ  ‘/ ǁŽƵůĚ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ƚŚŝƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇ ? ?  ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ
rated movies for likeability, using a battery of four statements. Participants were 
asked whether they agreed or disagreed on a scale of one to five. The score on 
negative items was reversed and a total rationality and likeability scores were 
computed for each participant for each movie (maximum score of 30 indicated most 
rational and a maximum score of 20 indicated most likeable).  
2.3.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
Data were analysed using standard procedures in SPM8.  First, images were 
realigned, unwarped and normalised to the standard SPM EPI template with a 
resolution of 2x2x2mm.  After normalisation, 8mm smoothing was applied. Two 
different design matrices were created for each participant. In stimuli driven design, 
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nine regressors were generated, one for each action type (rational straight, rational 
curved and irrational curved) crossed with each social type (face, no face and ball) 
plus an additional regressor for catch trials. In the parametric design, a regressor 
was entered for each social category (face, no face and ball) and two further 
parameteric regressors per social category were generated to represent the 
modulation of that social category by rationality and by likeability.  The weightings 
ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌĂŵĞƚƌŝĐ ƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŽƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĂƚ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ƌĂƚŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ
rationality and likeability for each movie.  For each design, each trial was modelled 
as a box-car of 3.7 seconds duration, convolved with the standard haemodynamic 
response function. 
Using results from the stimulus-driven design, forward and reverse contrasts 
were calculated for action rationality (bRC + fRC + nRC) > (bIC + fIC + nIC), social 
form (ball > person and no face > face) and interactions between rationality and 
social form. The parametric design was used to identify brain regions which respond 
linearly to ratings of rationality and likeability. Correction for multiple comparisons 
was performed at the cluster level with a voxel-level threshold of p<0.005 and k=10 
and a cluster-level threshold of p<0.05 (FWE corrected). All figures are illustrated at 
this threshold. In social form contrasts, a small volume correction was applied to 
the action observation network. This mask was downloaded from 
ǁǁǁ ?ŶĞƵƌŽƐǇŶƚŚ ?ŽƌŐĂŶĚǁĂƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƚĞƌŵ ‘ĂĐƚŝŽŶŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
The mask included IPL, IFG and visual cortex. No additional activations were found 
when applying this correction.  
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To investigate the functional connectivity between the AON and the MZN, 
we also used psychophysiological interactions (PPIs). The mPFC was selected as a 
seed region based on the rational > irrational contrast and consisted of 197 voxels 
(see Figure 2.3). A PPI regressor was then calculated by extracting the BOLD signal 
from this region in individual participants. This signal was deconvolved to estimate 
the underlying neural activation and multiplied by a contrast vector which 
differentiates rational from irrational actions. This PPI regressor was entered into a 
third general linear model. Five additional regressors were entered but not 
analysed. These consisted of the extracted BOLD signal from the mPFC, a contrast 
vector for rational > irrational movies and a regressor for each of the three social 
form categories. All PPI analyses were performed using the SPM8 PPI toolbox.  
Forward and reverse contrasts were calculated for rational PPI > irrational PPI.  
2.4 RESULTS 
2.4.1 BEHAVIOURAL RATING OF STIMULI 
Mean rationality ratings of each movie are presented in Figure 2.2. A 3 
(social) x2 (action) x2 (goal) repeated measures ANOVA revealed that rational 
actions were rated as more rational than irrational actions (F(1,24)=36.48, 
p<0.0001). An effect of social form showed actions performed by the ball were 
rated as less rational than human actions (F(2,48)=3.30, p=0.04). There was no 
effect of goal on rationality ratings (F(1,24)=0.04, p=0.85).  A significant interaction 
between social form and action was found (F(2,48)=6.53, p=0.003), and inspection 
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of the plots suggests the rational curved action by the ball was rated as less rational 
than the equivalent human actions (F(1,24)=36.48, p<0.001). All other interactions 
were not significant. Participants reported liking rational actions more than 
irrational actions (F(1,24)=7.29, p=0.01) but an interaction between action type and 
social form shows that this effect is stronger in the face and ball conditions 
compared to the no face condition (F(2,48)=6.39, p=0.003). Mean ratings of 




Table 2.1 Ratings of rationality and likeability for each movie type. Values are means ± standard 
deviations. 
 
 Rational Straight 
 
Rational Curved Irrational Curved 
Goal Top Bottom Top Bottom Top Bottom 
 
Rationality Ratings      
Face 
 
21.7 ± 6.9 26.6 ± 3.2 20.0 ± 8.1 20.3 ± 7.6 13.1 ± 6.8 11.2 ± 5.1 
No Face 
 
23.1 ± 6.5 24.6 ± 5.6 20.8 ± 7.1 21.6 ± 7.0 12.0 ± 5.4 12.4 ± 6.2 
Ball 
 
16.8 ± 6.6 20.2 ± 7.3 15.8 ± 7.3 17.2 ± 8.4 13.0 ± 7.5 11.2 ±6.5 
Likeability Ratings      
Face 
 
12.2 ± 2.9 13.7 ± 2.6 13.0 ±3.6 12.8 ± 3.5 11.0 ± 3.6 10.7 ± 4.1 
No Face 
 
12.6 ± 3.2 13.4 ± 3.0 12.2 ± 4.1 13.0 ± 3.3 12..3 ±3.5 12.6 ± 3.5 
Ball 
 
13.3 ± 4.0 14.4 ± 3.9 13.4 ± 4.1 11.7 ± 3.2 12.5 ± 4.0 12.6 ± 4.1 
       




Figure 2.2. Mean rationality ratings for rational straight (dark grey), rational curved (mid-grey) and 
irrational curved (light grey) actions as a function of social form. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard 
error of the mean. 
 
2.4.2 BRAIN RESPONSES TO IRRATIONAL ACTIONS 
Brain responses whilst viewing rational actions (bRC +fRC + nRC) were 
contrasted with responses whilst viewing irrational actions (bIC + fIC + nIC). Three 
clusters responded more to irrational actions, compared to rational actions. These 
were identified as a diffuse cluster in right IPL extending into right TPJ; right IFG; 
and a large area of middle occipital cortex (Figure 2.3A (blue), Table 2.2). In the 
reverse contrast, a large cluster in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) showed greater 
deactivation during irrational actions (Figure 2.3B, Table 2.2).  
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Figure 2.3 Brain areas that are sensitive to action rationality. Panel A: Areas that were more active 
during observation of irrational curved actions compared to rational curved actions (blue), the areas 
ƚŚĂƚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚůŝŶĞĂƌůǇƚŽŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƌĂƚŝŶŐƐŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ŐƌĞĞŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ
in which these contrasts overlap (turquoise). Parameter estimates (average SPM beta weights for the 
cluster) are plotted for key regions. IPL: inferior parietal lobule, IFG: inferior frontal gyrus, TPJ: 
temporoparietal junction. Panel B. Brain regions that responded more to rational curved actions, 
compared to irrational curved actions (red). mPFC: medial prefrontal cortex. All images are whole-
brain cluster-corrected at p<0.05, FWE corrected. 
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T MNI co-ords 
x y z 
a) Rational > Irrational       
Medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC) 
0.035 197 4.49 -18 47 4 
 0 35 -8 
 -15 44 -8 
b) Irrational > Rational       
Middle occipital gyrus 0.000 491 6.06 9 -85 7 
 -15 -94 10 
 -9 -82 -2 
Right Inferior frontal gyrus 0.004 306 4.94 36 14 34 
 48 14 49 
 35 5 31 
Right IPL Æ TPJ 0.004 312 4.88 48 -40 34 
 45 -45 13 
 39 -61 7 
c) Parametric Rationality (R>I)      
       
No suprathreshold clusters       
       
d) Parametric Rationality (I >R)      
Middle occipital gyrus 0.000 1619 6.00 -12 -100 10 
 3 -85 13 
 18 -88 10 
Left TPJ 0.022 190 5.81 -51 -43 16 
    -42 -49 13 
    -60 -34 7 
Cingulate 0.019 197 4.64 -9 -10 55 
    15 -13 46 
    0 -10 55 
Right IPL Æ TPJ 0.000 398 4.50 42 -64 46 
 54 -52 1 
 51 -61 13 
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2.4.3 BRAIN AREAS PARAMETRICALLY MODULATED BY RATINGS OF 
RATIONALITY 
&ŽƵƌďƌĂŝŶƌĞŐŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞƉĂƌĂŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůůǇŵŽĚƵůĂƚĞĚďǇŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?
ratings of rationality. When looking for brain responses that were more active when 
actions were rated as most irrational, a large cluster in right IPL extending to TPJ 
was observed. This cluster is overlapping but slightly posterior to that reported in 
the previous analysis and includes MTG (see Figure 2.3A (green), Table 2.2). In 
addition, clusters in middle occipital cortex, left STS and the cingulate were also 
parametrically modulated by rationality. No significant clusters were found in the 
reverse contrast. No regions of the brain were parametrically modulated by how 
much participants reported liking the actions. 
2.4.4 FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY MODULATED BY ACTION RATIONALITY 
I also explored the functional connectivity of the mPFC using a PPI analysis. 
There were no regions showing different functional correlations with the mPFC 
during rational compared to irrational actions at a voxel-level threshold of p<0.005 
and k=10 and a cluster-level threshold of p<0.05 (FWE corrected). 
2.4.5 BRAIN RESPONSES TO SOCIAL FORM 
The postcentral gyrus extending to the IPL and a large cluster spanning the 
posterior portion of the occipital cortex and extending to the STS was more active 
during the observation of a person acting compared to an animated ball. In the 
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reverse contrast, a large cluster was found with peak activation over fusiform gyrus 
extending along the parieto-occipital fissure. In addition a small cluster in posterior 
cingulate gyrus was more active when participants observed an animated ball 
compared to a human action. Only the lingual gyrus distinguished whether the 
participants observed an actor with the face visible or masked (see Figure 2.4A and 
Table 2.3).  
 








T MNI co-ords 
x y z 
a) Ball > Person       
Parieto-occipital fissure. 0.000 3257 8.01 30 -49 -5 
 60 5 10 
 33 -37 -14 
Posterior Cingulate 0.028 174 4.08 -12 -31 19 
 -18 -31 43 
 -12 -40 19 
b) Person > Ball       
Occipital Æ STS 0.000 3372 11.78 51 -79 -2 
 9 -94 -11 
 -48 -76 1 
Postcentral Gyrus Æ IPL 0.011 210 6.09 21 -52 70 
 30 -49 70 
 33 -40 61 
c) Face > No Face       
Lingual Gyrus 0.000 443 5.82 9 -100 16 
 -6 -103 13 
 3 -82 -2 
d) No Face > Face       
       
No suprathreshold clusters       
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Figure 2.4. Brain regions sensitive to social form. Panel A: Main effects of social form. Brain regions 
that responded more to moving balls compared to humans (turquoise), regions which were more 
responsive when observing a human actor compared to moving balls (yellow) and the region which 
responded more to a human when the face was visible, compared to when the face was hidden 
(orange). Bars indicate parameter estimates (average SPM beta weights for the cluster) for clusters 
of activation above threshold. Panel B: The interaction between rationality and social form. All 
images are whole-brain cluster-corrected at p<0.05, FWE corrected. 
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2.4.6 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL FORM 
One interaction contrast yielded significant results. A large cluster in 
occipital cortex, with peak activation in the fusiform gyrus responded more to 
irrational actions with a face and rational actions with a ball, but less to rational 
actions with face and irrational actions with a ball, that is: (fIC + bRC) >(fRC + bIC), 
see Figure 2.4B and Table 2.4. No AON or MZN regions showed an interaction 
between rationality and social form, even at lower thresholds. 
 










T MNI co-ords 
x y z 
a) Face/Ball       
No suprathreshold clusters 
      
      
b) Reverse Face/Ball       
Occipital Æ Right Fusiform Gyrus 0.000 888 4.93 33 -82 -11 
 -15 -49 -23 
 -39 2 -38 
c) No Face/Ball       
No suprathreshold clusters 
      
      
d) Reverse No Face/Ball       
No suprathreshold clusters 
      
      
e) Face/No Face       
No suprathreshold clusters 
      
      
f) Reverse No Face/Face       
No suprathreshold clusters 
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2.5 DISCUSSION 
The present study examined how observation of irrational hand actions 
engages the AON and MZN in the human brain.  Results demonstrate that right 
inferior parietal cortex, middle temporal gyrus (both in the AON) and medial 
prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction (in the MZN) are sensitive to 
observed irrational actions.  The parietal region was also modulated by parƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?
judgements of rationality.  However, none of these regions were sensitive to the 
social form of the stimuli, and all showed similar responses to actions performed by 
humans and balls.  I now discuss the implications of these findings in relation to 
previous studies and theories of rationality understanding.  
2.5.1 BRAIN RESPONSES TO ACTION RATIONALITY 
Four major brain systems were sensitive to action rationality: the medial 
prefrontal cortex, the right inferior parietal cortex extending to temporoparietal 
junction, the inferior frontal gyrus and the middle temporal gyrus.  These regions 
have traditionally been associated with different functions including mentalizing, 
action observation and higher order visual processing.  I now consider each in turn. 
First, mPFC and TPJ are core components of the MZN.  In my dataset, mPFC 
showed a significant deactivation when watching irrational actions, while right TPJ 
showed a significant activation.  Both left and right TPJ showed correlations 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?Ɛpost-scan ratings of rationality and the BOLD signal.  The 
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deactivation of mPFC replicates the results of Marsh and Hamilton (2011), but 
contrasts with the results of Brass et al. (2007).  However, a comparison of 
activation peaks (Figure 2.5) shows that the activation in Brass et al. (2007) is more 
dorsal than the present study. As the activations from these studies are in slightly 
different regions, they may reflect different processes of rationality resolution. 
Movies used in Brass et al. (2007) involved the observation of unusual body 
movements in all conditions. In comparison, the movies in this study showed 
simple, goal directed hand actions that are much more familiar. Compare turning on 
a light switch with your knee to reaching in an arc for an object. In the case of the 
light-switch, the action is novel, whether it is rationalised by carrying books or not. 
However, reaching with an indirect movement path is much more familiar as we 
need to take environmental obstructions into account frequently. Perhaps the way 
we deal with action rationality when an action is novel, compared to familiar can 
account for the differences in findings between the two studies. Crucially, the 
differential response to action rationality in mPFC was not detected in the 
rationality rating model. This could explain why Jastorff et al. (2010) do not find this 
frontal activation in their study which used rationality ratings.  
Both the present study and Brass et al. (2007) report activation of the right 
TPJ during observation of irrational actions.  I further add the finding that bilateral 
TPJ was sensitive to rationality ratings.  Previous studies suggest right TPJ is engaged 
when participants see actions which violate their expectations (Pelphrey, 
Singerman, Allison, & McCarthy, 2003; Saxe et al., 2004) and when participants infer 
goals from non-stereotypic actions (Liepelt, Von Cramon, & Brass, 2008).  In 
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contrast, left TPJ was more active when participants were instructed to think about 
the motive of an action (Spunt & Lieberman, 2012). Together, these results 
demonstrate that the MZN has a full role in responding to observed irrational 
actions.  It is likely that this involves mentalizing about why the agent performed an 
ƵŶƵƐƵĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƌŵĂŬŝŶŐŝŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
 
Figure 2.5. A comparison of peaks of activation in TPJ, MTG and mPFC. Crosses represent the peaks of 
activation in the stimulus driven model (dark blue) and the rationality rating model (green) from the 
present study and previous studies involving the observation of irrational actions (Light Blue: de 
Lange et al., 2007; Pink: Marsh & Hamilton, 2011; Yellow: Jastorff et al., 2010; Red: Brass et al., 
2007).  
 
Activation was also found in right IPL and right IFG, both within the AON.  
These regions were more active when participants saw irrational actions compared 
to rational actions.  This result is congruent with the previous study which found 
stronger right IPL activity when viewing irrational actions (Marsh & Hamilton, 2011).  
It is also consistent with previous reports implicating right frontoparietal cortex in 
the comprehension of more complex actions (Hartmann, Goldenberg, Daumüller, & 
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Hermsdörfer, 2005) and their outcomes (Hamilton & Grafton, 2008). Right IFG is 
also engaged when participants are specifically directed to attend to the means by 
which an action is achieved when observing both typical (Spunt et al., 2011)  and 
irrational actions (de Lange et al., 2008). It is possible that participants attend to the 
kinematic features of the action more closely when the actor violates their 
expectations by performing an irrational action, thus resulting in the increased IFG 
activation reported here.  The co-activation of the right AON and the MZN during 
irrational action observation shows that these two networks can work together in 
action comprehension.  I suggest that the AON identifies the complex action goals 
that require additional analysis, while the TPJ and mPFC may perform further 
mentalizing ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŽƌǁŚǇƚŚĞǇƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚĂŶƵŶƵƐƵal action. 
This is consistent with data reported a previous meta-analysis by Van Overwalle 
(2009).  
Finally, substantial activation of higher order visual regions was found.   
These areas were strongly modulated by rationality ratings but were not seen in the 
stimulus-driven model.  As Figure 2.3A shows, brain areas correlating with 
subjective ratings were generally more posterior than those which responded in the 
stimulus-driven model.  This is congruent with the results of Jastorff et al. (2010), 
who found correlations between rationality ratings and brain activation in MTG but 
not in more frontal areas.   I suggest this pattern may reflect the difference between 
sensitivity to subtle kinematic features in MTG, and categorical perception of 
rationality in the AON and MZN.  Work on object perception shows that early visual 
areas are sensitive to many individual features of an object, while temporal and 
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frontal cortex can show categorical responses to object groups (Jiang et al., 2007; 
van der Linden, van Turennout, & Indefrey, 2010).  These data may reflect a similar 
hierarchy in the processing of action rationality, from kinematic features in MTG to 
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ‘Žƌ ‘ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŝŶƉĂƌŝĞƚĂůĐŽƌƚĞǆ ? 
This study found no evidence for action rationality modulating the 
connectivity of the mPFC. This gives the preliminary indication that that the 
connectivity between the AON and the MZN is similar during the observation of 
rational and irrational actions. However, these results should be treated cautiously 
as the design of this study was not optimised for PPI analyses and further work 
should investigate this more rigorously. 
All of the analyses reported in this chapter have compared matched rational 
and irrational actions which have a curved trajectory. Rational straight actions were 
included in the design to prevent the observer from always expecting a curved 
movement and responses to these movies were never intended to be analysed. 
However, inspection of the parameter estimates for the rational straight actions 
reveals that responses to these movies are sometimes more similar to the irrational 
actions than the rational actions, especially in the mPFC. A possible explanation for 
this pattern of results could be that mPFC activity is reflecting the effort involved in 
rationalising behaviour. As the rational straight actions require no rationalisation 
and the irrational curved actions cannot be rationalised, mPFC activity is reduced. 
However, in the case of the rational curved actions, the observer has to evaluate 
the efficiency of the action against the environmental constraint in order to 
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rationalise behaviour. This more effortful processing could be driving the increase in 
activity in mPFC in only the rational curved actions. However, this is a post-hoc 
explanation and further work will be needed to determine if this really is the case. 
2.5.2 THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL FORM ON RATIONALITY PERCEPTION 
The second aim in this study was to determine the extent to which AON and 
MZN responses to rationality are modulated by the social form of the actor.  Only 
one brain region differentiated both rationality and social form. This was a large 
cluster in the occipital lobe, with the peak of activation found in the fusiform gyrus. 
This region responded more to irrational actions when the face was visible and 
rational ball actions, but less to rational face actions and irrational ball actions. One 
previous eye tracking study demonstrated that after seeing an irrational action, 
participants then fixate more on the face of the actor, presumably in an attempt to 
rationalize the observed behaviour from facial expression or eye gaze cues (Vivanti 
et al., 2011).  If participants in our fMRI study show the same gaze behaviour, this 
could drive the engagement of fusiform gyrus following observation of irrational 
actions with the face visible.  Past studies strongly link fusiform gyrus to face 
perception (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997) and show that this activation is 
modulated by covert attention to the face (Wojciulik, Kanwisher, & Driver, 1998). 
No AON or MZN regions showed interactive responses for rationality and 
social form, suggesting that rationality of actions is computed, irrespective of the 
social form of the actor. Examining the parameter estimates for mPFC (Figure 2.3B) 
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suggests that there might be a different pattern of response to human and ball 
actions, with little difference between rational curved and irrational ball actions.  
This implies that mPFC may be more sensitive to the rationality of human actions; 
however this pattern was not statistically robust.  This is consistent with previous 
work that demonstrates that even 12 month old infants attribute rational intentions 
to animate blocks or balls (Csibra, 2008) and in adults, brain responses to rationality 
do not differentiate an animate agent from a single moving ball (Deen & Saxe, 
2011). 
There was no increased engagement of the IFG component of the mirror 
system during the observation of human actions. This is in line with an increasing 
body of evidence which suggests that mirror systems are not as selective for human 
actions as previously thought (Cross et al., 2011; Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & 
Keysers, 2007; Ramsey & Hamilton, 2010). Instead the brain region which 
distinguished human from ball actions were a large, diffuse cluster in visual cortex 
which is likely to reflect the increase in visual detail when the actor was present. 
This cluster extended to the STS, a region known to respond during perception of 
social stimuli (Centelles et al., 2011; Pelphrey et al., 2004; Saxe et al., 2004). 
2.5.3 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter assesses the relative contributions of the mirror and 
mentalizing systems for understanding irrational actions. Previous results have 
shown mixed results in this field due to differences in stimuli construction and 
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analysis. The findings reported in this chapter clarify some of these differences by 
using strictly controlled stimuli and two different analysis models. My results show 
that when action rationality is altered by environmental constraints, both AON and 
MZN respond to this change.  Therefore, I argue that AON and MZN systems are 
playing complimentary roles in understanding action rationality. I also demonstrate 
that social form has little impact on brain responses to rationality in AON and MZN 
regions, providing evidence that neither system is selective for human action, as 
previously thought. 
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CHAPTER 3. IDENTIFYING ROBUST EYE TRACKING MEASURES 
OF ACTION COMPREHENSION IN TYPICALLY DEVELOPING 
ADULTS 
3.1 ABSTRACT 
Observing irrational actions engages both the action observation and 
mentalizing networks of the brain. However, little is known about the cognitive 
processes that underpin the comprehension of irrational actions. The experiment 
reported in this chapter aims to use eye tracking to identify some of these 
processes by examining a number of measures which may reflect rationality 
comprehension. Twenty typically developing adults watched movies of rational and 
irrational hand actions while their eye movements were recorded. Measures of 
looking time, scan path and saccade latency were calculated. Results showed that 
looking time measures such as the amount of time spent looking at the hand or the 
action goals reflected the rationality of the actions. Conversely, the latency analysis 
was more sensitive to the kinematic features of actions, regardless of action 
rationality. I conclude that the measures used in this paradigm can successfully 
differentiate basic action comprehension such as goal prediction and more complex 
action understanding such as rationality detection. 
 




The experiment presented in Chapter 2 clearly demonstrates that irrational 
actions provide a special test case to investigate the interplay between the action 
observation network and the mentalizing network. The discussion in Chapter 2 also 
makes a number of hypotheses about the perception of irrational actions and 
where participants are attending during action observation. For example, I propose 
that participants closely attend to the action kinematics during observation of 
irrational actions and this may be driving the increased activation in IFG. This 
hypothesis is supported by data suggesting that when participants are asked to 
attend to the way in which an action is performed, IFG is activated (de Lange et al., 
2008; Spunt et al., 2011). In addition, I proposed that the interaction between 
rationality and social form in the occipital cortex may be due to increased fixations 
on the face of the actor during irrational actions. This pattern of results has been 
reported previously (Vivanti et al., 2011) and it would be useful to replicate this 
finding within my own stimuli. The first aim of the present study is to test these 
claims about attention and perception during irrational action observation in 
typically developing adults using eye-tracking.   
As reviewed in Chapter 1, section 1.3, eye tracking can provide a potentially 
excellent method to study action observation in an implicit and natural way. In this 
exploratory study I also aim to identify the eye tracking measures which can be 
used as markers for the cognitive processes that support rationality comprehension. 
In doing so, I hope to develop a clear measure of rationality comprehension that 
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can be used to assess understanding in individuals with autism. I start by reviewing 
some important methodological issues. 
3.2.1 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There are many important methodological issues with eye tracking data. 
One such issue arises from the rich data that eye tracking produces. There are many 
measures that can be taken from eye tracking data yet there is little consensus on 
which is the most appropriate to use. A further issue in using eye tracking to study 
rationality understanding is that most previous studies on this topic have studied 
infant and child eye movements. It is unclear whether reported gaze patterns are 
stable across time and that these measures are valid for adult eye tracking. In this 
section I review the findings from the child and infant studies of action observation, 
with a focus on the measures that have been selected and the cognitive processes 
that they are thought to reflect. 
Looking time measures have been used to assess rationality understanding 
in typically developing infants (Elsner, Pfeifer, Parker, & Hauf, 2013). Modelled 
actions were either irrational (the model turned on a light with her forehead ) or 
rationalised by an environmental constraiŶƚ ?ĂďůĂŶŬĞƚǁƌĂƉƉĞĚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůƐ ?
shoulders prevented her from using her hands). An analysis of looking times 
revealed that infants looked longer at the rationalized actions in which an 
environmental constraint impacted upon the action, although looking times to the 
specific action and constraint areas of the movie did not differ in the majority of 
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trials. The authors interpret this increased looking time during constrained actions 
to mean that the infants detected action rationality and spent time evaluating the 
environmental constraints imposed upon the actions.  
Looking time was also used as a measure of rationality understanding in 
participants with ASC (Vivanti et al., 2011). In their study, Vivanti et al. (2011) 
showed ASC and typically developing children movies of irrational actions in which 
an actor performed an action with an unusual body-part (for example, closing a 
drawer with her shoulder) and matched rational actions in which the actor 
completed the same action but had her hands occupied. Results showed that both 
groups of participants looked longer at the face of the actor during irrational 
actions. Vivanti et al. (2011) propose that increased time looking at the face of the 
actor ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐďĂŚĂǀŝŽƵƌďǇ
seeking more information about the actor and their intention. However, it is not 
possible to tell from these results whether participants in the ASC group actually 
use this information to make inferences about behaviour. 
In a study of prospective looking, infants were habituated to an action in 
which a hand reached and grasped one of two objects. Following habituation, a test 
trial in which the two objects switched location was presented. At test, infants 
made more predicitve first looks to the previoulsy grasped object, not the 
ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇŐƌĂƐƉĞĚŽďũĞĐƚƐ ?ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ(Cannon & Woodward, 2012). Thus measures 
of first-goal-look and looking time to the different goal locations can indicate the 
degree of goal prediction used by the participant. 
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Predicitive gaze has also been reported as an index of goal prediction during 
both action execution and action observation (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). In their 
study Flanagan and Johansson (2003) asked participants to move three blocks in 
series from one location to another whilst their eye movements were recorded. 
During action execution, participants fixated start and end points of each action but 
made very few fixations between these locations. Furthermore, their eye 
movements were predicitive of their actions as they fixated the end point of their 
action 150ms prior to reaching it. Similarly, when participants observed movies of 
someone else performing the task, their  eye movements were also predictive. 
Therefore, Flanagan and Johansson (2003) argue that predictive eye movements 
during action observation can be used as an index of goal understanding. 
Predictive eye movements during irrational actions have been assessed in 
one previous study of typically developing 6- and 12- month old infants (Gredebäck 
& Melinder, 2010). In this study, infants saw movies of rational and irrational 
feeding actions. During a rational action, one adult picks up a piece of banana with a 
ƐƉŽŽŶĂŶĚďƌŝŶŐƐŝƚƚŽĂƐĞĐŽŶĚĂĚƵůƚƐ ?ŵŽƵƚŚ ?/ŶĂŶŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĂĚƵůƚ
picks up the banana and places it on the back of the recipients hand, who then eats 
the banana from her hand. Latency to fixate the end point of the action (head or 
hand) was calculated for each condition. Results showed that rational actions were 
anticipated faster than irrational actions. However there are a number of 
methodological problems with the way in which the stimuli was constructed for this 
type of analysis. Firstly, latency of fixation measures are extremely sensitive to the 
action kinematics and timing used (Rotman et al., 2006), two features that were not 
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matched between conditions in this study. Secondly, predictive eye movements are 
driven by the action goal (Eshuis et al., 2009) and the speed of prediction is 
determined by goal salience (Henrichs, Elsner, Elsner, & Gredebäck, 2012). In their 
ƐƚƵĚǇ ?'ƌĞĚĞďĂĐŬĂŶĚDĞůŝŶĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? )ƵƐĞƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƐ ?ŚĞĂĚĂŶĚŚĂnd as the two 
action goals but these are not matched for saliency or predictability. These goal 
differences could result in the reduced anticipatory looking to the hand that is 
reported. In order to effectively measure anticipatory looking, actions need to be 
carefully matched for kinematics, timing, goal saliency and goal predictability. 
Additionally, previous studies that use latency of goal fixation as a measure take 
only the speed of action prediction as the measure of interest and do not account 
for differences in scan path prior to the predictive fixation. It is interesting to 
investigate where participants gather their information from, prior to making a 
predictive saccade as this may reveal systematic differences in the way in which 
goals are predicted between individuals. 
A final, critical issue in this area is statistical independence in data analysis.  
There is increasing recognition that double-dipping in the analysis of rich datasets 
can inflate false-positives and is not good practice (Kriegeskorte, Simmons, 
Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009).  This is particularly an issue when data-analysis methods 
are not standardised and there are many possible approaches which could lead to 
different results.  To avoid these problems, I record data from a sample of typical 
undergraduate students and examine a variety of measures in this dataset.   
Measures examined here ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ PůŽŽŬŝŶŐƚŝŵĞƚŽŐŽĂůƐ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌ ?ƐĨĂĐĞ ?ƚŽƚŚĞ
hand performing the action, and to the environmental contsraints upon the action; 
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which goal was first fixated; the location of the fixation prior to making a saccade to 
the action goal; and the timing of predictive saccades to the action goal.  I use this 
dataset to develop a full analysis protocol, selecting the measures which best reflect 
action understanding and action rationality in typical adults. This analysis protocol 
can then be applied to a sample of participants with ASC (see Chapter 4). 
As mentioned in section 1.3, this study has one further aim. Within this 
paradigm it is possible to further test the claim that predictive eye movements are 
generated by the mirror system (see section 1.3 for a detailed argument of why this 
may be the case). If this is the case, we would expect to see predictive eye 
movements for all actions, regardless of their rationality. However, if predictive eye 
movements are modulated by action rationality, it is likely that the mirror system is 
not the only brain system involved in generating them. This is because the 
experiment in Chapter 2 demontrates that irrational actions engage additional brain 
systems for comprehension. 
3.3 METHOD 
3.3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty typically developing, right-handed participants took part in this 
study. Data from two participants was excluded from analysis due to eye tracker 
failure (<70% of samples present in at least three blocks). Therefore, results 
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reported here are based on a final sample of 18 participants (16 female, mean age 
22.0 years). 
3.3.2 STIMULI/APPARATUS 
Eye movements were measured using a portable Tobii 1750 infrared 
recording system which sampled at a rate of 50Hz with 1o precision and 0.5o 
accuracy. A standard five point calibration procedure was successfully completed 
prior to each recording. The movies developed for the fMRI experiment in Chapter 2 
were used. Thus a set of 18 movies depicting three levels of rationality (rational 
straight, rational curved and irrational curved) crossed with three levels of social 
form (face, no face and ball) for each of the two goal locations were used. All 
movies were exactly matched for action kinematics and timing on a frame by frame 
basis (see section 2.3.2 for details of how these stimuli were constructed). As with 
the fMRI study presented in Chapter 2, rational straight actions were included in the 
design to prevent the participant from always expecting a curved action but were 
not analysed because they are unmatched for action trajectory. 
3.3.3 DESIGN 
A within-participant two (action type) by three (social form) design was 
employed. Movies were presented in separate blocks of face, no face and ball trials. 
Each block contained 8 repetitions of each action in a random order. Thus in total, 
48 movies were presented per block and the block lasted for approximately 6 
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minutes. To maintain alertness, participants were also asked to respond to three 
questions about the movies at random intervals within each block. These were 
simple questions about the visual properties of the movie. Answers to these 
questions were not analysed. All participants watched six blocks of movies (two of 
each type) in a pseudorandom order. 
3.3.4 PROCEDURE 
The study was approved by the School of Psychology ethics committee. All 
testing took place in a quiet testing laboratory.  Participants sat approximately 64cm 
from the Tobii monitor with a table and a number keypad in front of them. They 
completed the five-point calibration procedure at the start of each of the six 
experimental blocks. Following the last block of movies, participants were shown 
each of the six action types again (with the actor fully visible) and asked to rate the 
rationality for each of the movies using a battery of 6 statements. These items 
ǁĞƌĞ P ‘dŚĞĂĐƚŽƌǁĂƐĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĂƚƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞŐŽĂů ? ? ‘dŚŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĞĞŵĞĚǁĞŝƌĚ ? ? ‘dŚĞ
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƵŶƵƐƵĂů ? ? ‘dŚŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƵŶŶĂƚƵƌĂů ? ? ‘dŚŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ
ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘/ǁŽƵůĚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞƚŚŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇ ? ?WĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐǁĞƌĞĂƐŬĞĚ
whether they agreed or disagreed on a scale of one to five. The score on negative 
items was reversed and a total rationality score was computed for each participant 
for each movie (maximum score of 30 indicated most rational).  
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3.3.5 DATA PROCESSING 
All data processing was completed using in-house scripts written in Matlab. 
To ensure data quality, individual trials were excluded from the analysis if more 
than 20% of eye movement samples were missing during the critical action period 
(the time at which the ball started to move to the time the ball enters the goal 
location, see Table 3.1 for trial exclusion rates). Within included trials, eye 
movement samples were then classified as fixations or saccades using a velocity-
based algorithm with a threshold of 60 degrees/sec (Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000). 
Data samples with a velocity above this threshold were marked as occurring during 
a saccade and excluded from further analysis. Three levels of analysis were then 
conducted in order to identify attention to actions (looking time analysis), where 
saccades into the goal came from (saccade analysis) and the time at which saccades 
from the hand to the goal location were initiated (latency analysis). These analysis 
techniques are detailed in sections below. 
 
Table 3.1. Number of trials included at each level of analysis. 
Analysis Level Inclusion Criteria  
 
Total trials completed  
 
Based on 18 adults completing 6 




  Include Exclude 
Step 1: Looking time analysis <20% samples missing 4773 411 
Step 2: Saccade analysis Saccade to goal present 4256 517 
Step 3: Latency Analysis Goal saccade from hand present 1555 2701 
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3.3.5.1 LOOKING TIME ANALYSIS  
A looking time analysis was conducted to see if allocation of attention to features 
of the scene differed between action type and social form.  Each movie scene was divided 
into 6 areas of interest (AOIs).  AOIs were defined by a close fitting rectangle around each 
of the goal locations, the start point, barrier and face. A moving area of interest was 
created for the ball by drawing a sphere (radius 70 pixels) around the central co-ordinate of 
the ball at each frame of each movie. To account for spatial sampling errors, a margin of 
one visual degree was added to each of these AOIs (see Figure 3.1). Looking time was 
calculated for each AOI as the percentage of data samples falling within the AOI over the 
course of each movie for each participant. Percentage of data samples that were within the 
ĨƌĂŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽǀŝĞďƵƚŶŽƚǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶK/ǁĂƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚĂƐ ‘ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?>ŽŽŬŝŶŐƚimes to 
the target goal, non-target goal, ball, barrier and face were analysed. I did not analyse 
looking time to the start or the background because these areas have no impact on the 
action and I have no apriori expectations that looking times to these regions should be 
affected by action rationality or social form. 
 
Figure 3.1 Panel representing each of the stages of analysis. Left: Raw sample data (white dots) 
overlaying a still frame of a rational curved movie. Areas of interest (AOIs) are drawn over the scene. 
Middle: A schematic diagram of the AOIs used in this study with sample data plotted in white dots. 
Looking time is calculated as the percentage of samples falling within each AOI. Right: Data samples 
are labelled according to the AOI they fall within (colours correspond to the middle panel). The first 
saccade into the goal is identified. The origin of this saccade is used in the saccade analysis and the 
timing of this saccade is used in the latency analysis. 
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3.3.5.2 SACCADE ANALYSIS  
The saccade analysis was conducted in order to see where people were 
attending immediately prior to making a saccade to the action goal. This measure 
indicates where participants gathered information from in order to predict the 
action outcome. Trials were only included in this analysis if there was a saccade to 
the goal of the action present within the trial (see trial inclusion rates in Table 3.1). 
To calculate where goal saccades came from, eye movement samples for each trial 
were divided into gaze segments between saccades. The gaze position of these 
segments was labelled according to the focus of the majority of samples within the 
segment. An algorithm was written in Matlab to generate these labels based on five 
decision criterion (see Table 3.2 for a description and example of each). To validate 
the performance of this algorithm, a sample participant was hand coded and the 
results were compared. Over 48 trials, the sample participant made 393 saccades, 
giving 501 gaze segments. Percentage of gaze segments coded by each criterion 
point for this participant is reported in column 4, Table 3.2. Of these 501 gaze 
segments, the algorithm was able to code 499 in the same way as a human coder. 
Also see Figure 3.2 for an illustration of the algorithm performance on one trial. 
The first saccade into the target goal was identified and the origin of this 
saccade was recorded (see Figure 3.1). For each movie type, the percentage of 
saccades from each AOI into the target goal was calculated for each participant. In 
this level of analysis I analyse saccades from the non-target goal, the ball/hand and 
the face. The non-target goal was selected as increased saccades into the target 
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goal may reflect more prediction errors in which participants are anticipating the 
action to end at the alternate goal. In contrast, saccades directly from the hand may 
indicate easier action prediction. Saccades from the face were selected to explore 
whether participants use the information provided by the face to predict actions. 
 
Table 3.2. Description and frequency of use of the decision criterion used to generate labels for the 
focus of each gaze segment. 
 
Decision Criterion Example Event Description Outcome % Segments 
Coded  
    
If 80% of data samples in a 
segment are within one 
AOI, code as that AOI. 
 
94% of data samples were 
within the hand AOI, 6% 
were elsewhere. 
Label segment as hand. 




If data samples are split 
between an AOI and 




55% of data samples were 
within the barrier AOI, 45% 
were elsewhere. 
 
Label segment as the 
barrier. 





If data samples are split 
between a goal and the 
hand, code as the goal but 
mark as smooth pursuit if 
the samples on the hand 
occurred earlier than the 
samples on the goal. 
 
 
45% of data samples were 
within the hand AOI, 
followed by 55% of the 
samples on the goal. 
 
Label segment as the hand 
but count it as a goal 




If data samples are split 
between the start and the 
hand, code as the hand. 
 
 
30% of samples are within 
the start AOI, 70% in the 
hand AOI. 
 




If >50% of samples are 
missing, code as missing 
data. 
 
65% of samples were 
missing, 20% were within 
the hand AOI, 15% were 
within the top goal AOI. 
 
 








Figure 3.2. Sample data from one trial to demonstrate the performance of the gaze segment labelling 
algorithm. Panel A shows sample data from a rational curved trial from one participant (white dots) 
plotted over a still frame from the movie. Coloured lines indicate AOIs. Panel B shows aaccade map 
from the same trial. Data samples plotted in white dots. Saccade start and end points are denoted by 
numbers and joined with a red line. Panels C and D show the X- and Y- co-ordinates of data samples 
over the course of the trial (blue dots). Black lines indicate the location of the hand over the course of 
the trial. Coloured marks indicate which AOI the sample falls within. Vertical lines indicate the critical 
action period. Panel E plots the velocity of data samples over the course of the trial, measured in 
degrees/second (blue line). Green stars indicate the start of each saccade and red stars indicate the 
end of each saccade. Horizontal line indicates the 60 degrees/second threshold used to identify 
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3.3.5.3 LATENCY ANALYSIS  
Latency of goal prediction was analysed to assess whether action type or 
social form modulate how quickly participants predict the action goal when they are 
attending to the hand. Trials were only included in this measure when the 
participant made a predictive saccade to the action goal from the hand before the 
hand reached the goal (see Table 3.1 for trial inclusion rates). This measure was 
selected in order to identify whether rationality modulates the speed of action 
prediction when participants are attending to the action kinematics. Latency of 
prediction was calculated by subtracting the time that the ball reached the goal 
from the time that the saccade to the goal was initiated. Thus negative fixation 
latencies indicate faster anticipation of the action. Outliers were removed if they 
were ±3 standard deviations from the mean. These data were then analysed using a 
hierarchical linear mixed model which accounted for the different amounts of data 
contributed by each participant. A participant identifier was entered as a 
hierarchical variable to account for correlation within subjects.  
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1 RATIONALITY RATINGS 
Mean ratings of rationality are presented in Figure 3.3. A two (action) by two 
(goal) within participant ANOVA revealed a main effect of rationality (F(1,17)=16.16, 
p=0.01) in which rational curved actions were rated as more rational than irrational 
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curved actions. No effect of goal (F(1,17)=0.21, p=0.65) and no interaction between 
rationality and goal (F(1,17)=0.99, p=0.33) was found. 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean ratings of rationality for each movie type. Higher ratings indicate that a movie was 
judged as more rational. Maximum possible score was 30. RS: rational straight, RC: rational curved, 
IC: Irrational curved. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
 
3.4.2 LOOKING TIME ANALYSIS 
Percentage looking time in each AOI was calculated for each movie type and 
is presented in Figure 3.4A and Table 3.3. Two (action type) by three (social form) by 
two (goal location) within participant ANOVAs were conducted for looking time to 
the target goal, non-target goal, barrier and ball. In trials when the face was visible, 
a two (action) by two (goal) within participant ANOVA was conducted on looking 
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time to the face. All reported results are significant after Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons. 
Looking time to the target goal was modulated by the social form of the 
stimulus. Post-hoc t-tests show that there is a trend towards participants looking 
longer at the target goal during actions performed by the ball, compared to human 
actions. However, this effect is not statistically significant when correcting for 
multiple comparisons. There was no impact of action rationality or goal on looking 
time to the target goal (see Figure 3.4b and Table 3.3a) 
 Looking time to the non-target goal was also modulated by social form. 
Participants looked longer at the non-target goal during actions performed by the 
ball compared to human actions. This result is strongest when comparing actions 
where the face is visible to the ball and only a trending effect when comparing no 
face to ball actions. There was a trending effect of rationality on looking time to the 
non-target goal as participants looked longer at the non-target goal during irrational 
actions, compared to rational actions. However, this effect did not survive 
correction for multiple comparisons. The goal location had no impact on looking 
time to the non-target goal (see Figure 3.4c and Table 3.3b) 
Participants looked longer at the ball/hand during human actions compared 
to those where the ball moved independently. A trending effect of rationality also 
revealed that participants looked longer at the ball/hand during irrational actions 
but this effect does not survive correction for multiple comparisons. Action goal had 
no impact on looking time to the ball/hand (see Figure 3.4d and Table 3.3c)  
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 Participants looked at the barrier more during human actions compared to 
those where the ball moved independently. They also looked more at the barrier 
during rational actions. Furthermore, an interaction between rationality and social 
form shows that this bias to look more at the barrier during rational actions is only 
present when a human is performing the action. An effect of goal also indicated 
that participants looked more at the barrier during actions that ended at the 
bottom goal. See Figure 3.4e and Table 3.3d for results. 
Looking time to the face was not modulated by action rationality or action 
goal (see Table 3.3e). 
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Table 3.3. Statistics for looking time analyses. Significant effects are marked in bold type. Alpha is 
corrected for multiple comparisons such that 
a ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐɲA? ? ? ? ?and b indicates that ɲA䄃? ? ? ? ? ?
Main Effects direction F/(t) df P 
 
a) ANOVA  1: Looking Time to Target Goal 
Social Form  5.09 2,34 0.01
 a
 
 ball > face (2.60) 17 0.02
b 
 ball > no face (2.33) 17 0.03
b 
 no face > face (1.01) 17 0.33
b 
Rationality  0.85 1,17 0.37
 a
 
Goal  0.87 1,17 0.37
 a
 
b) ANOVA  2: Looking Time to Non-Target Goal 
Social Form  5.89 2,34 0.006
 a
 
 ball > face (3.23) 17 0.005
b 
 ball > no face (2.59) 17 0.02
b 
 no face > face (0.66) 17 0.52
b 
Rationality irrational > rational 5.70 1,17 0.03
 a
 
Goal  1.28 1,17 0.27
 a
 
c) ANOVA  3: Looking Time to Ball 
Social Form  59.67 2,34 <0.001
 a
 
 face > ball (6.96) 17 <0.001
b 
 no face > ball (7.80) 17 <0.001
b 
 no face > face (1.07) 17 0.30
b 
Rationality  4.83 2,34 0.04
 a
 
Goal  3.75 2,34 0.07
 a
 
d) ANOVA 4: Looking Time to Barrier 
Social Form  10.68 2,34 <0.001
 a
 
 face > ball (4.51) 17 <0.001
b 
 no face > ball (4.32) 17 <0.001
b 
 no face > face (0.06) 17 0.96
b 
Rationality rational > irrational 86.75 1,17 <0.001
 a
 
Goal top > bottom 15.80 1,17 0.001
 a
 
Social Form x Action 10.26 2,34 <0.001
 a
 
 R ʹ I face > R ʹ I ball (4.19) 17 0.001b 
 R ʹ I no face > R ʹ I ball (4.95) 17 <0.001b 
 R  W I no face > R  W I face (0.20) 17 0.84b 
d) ANOVA  5: Looking Time to Face 
Rationality  0.67 1,17 0.43
 a
 
Goal  7.40 1,17 0.01
 a
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Figure 3.4. Percentage looking time for each area of interest. Panel A shows the cumulative 
percentage of looking time to each area of interest in a stacked bar chart. Colours correspond to the 
areas of interest depicted on the left. Grey bars indicate the data points which were excluded because 
they occurred during a saccade. Black bars indicate missing data. Panels B-E show looking time for 
one area of interest plotted as a function of social form and action rationality. Background colours 
correspond to the areas of interest in panel A. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
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3.4.3 SACCADE ANALYSIS 
The origin of first saccades into the target goal was recorded and the 
percentage of these saccades from each AOI was calculated. As with the 
looking time analysis, this percentage of saccades was analysed using a three 
(social form) by two (rationality) by two (goal) within participant ANOVA for 
saccades from the non-target goal and the ball/hand. Percentage of saccades 
from the face to the goal was analysed using a two (rationality) by two (goal) 
ANOVA using only data from trials when the face was visible. The statistics are 
reported in Table 3.4. 
Percentage of saccades from the non-target goal to the goal was not 
modulated by social form, action rationality or goal (see Table 3.4a). Similarly, 
the percentage of saccades from the ball to the goal did not differ for social 
form, action rationality or goal (see Table 3.4b). Finally, the percentage of 
saccades from the face to the goal was not affected by action rationality but 
there were more saccades from the face to the goal when the action ended in 
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Table 3.4. Statistics for the saccade analysis. Significant effects are marked in bold type. Alpha is 
corrected for multiple comparisons such that 
a ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐɲA? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
3.4.4 LATENCY ANALYSIS 
The mean latency of saccades from the hand/ball to target goal was 
calculated for each movie type. Results are presented in Figure 3.5 and Table 3.5. 
Social form, action rationality and goal were entered into a full factorial linear 
mixed model. A main effect of social form indicated that participants were faster to 
anticipate actions that had less social information. Ball actions were predicted more 
quickly than human actions where the face was occluded and actions where the 
face was visible were predicted slowest of all. 
 
 direction F/(t) df p 
 
a) ANOVA 1 : Saccades from Non-Target Goal to Goal 
Social Form  0.78 2,34 0.47
 a
 
Rationality  0.02 1,17 0.89
 a
 
Goal  0.21 1,17 0.65
 a
 
b) ANOVA 2: Saccades from Ball to Goal 
Social Form  0.87 2,34 0.43
 a
 
Rationality  1.42 1,17 0.25
 a
 
Goal  2.58 1,17 0.13
 a
 
c) ANOVA 3: Saccades from Face to Goal 
Rationality  2.01 1,17 0.17
 a
 
Goal bottom > top 7.91 1,17 0.01
 a
 
     
     





Figure 3.5. Mean latency of goal saccades from the ball as a function of action rationality and social 
form. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
 
 
Table 3.5. Statistics for the latency analysis. Significant effects are marked in bold type. Alpha is 
corrected for multiple comparisons such that 
a ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐɲA? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ b indicates that ɲA䄃? ? ? ? ? ?
  
 direction F/(t) df p 
 
Linear Mixed Model: Latency of Saccades from the Ball to the Goal  
Social Form  41.81 2,1037 <0.001
a 
 no face > ball (4.01) 756 <0.001
b 
 face > no face (5.62) 655 <0.001
b 
 face > ball  (8.74) 681 <0.001
b 
Rationality  0.55 1,1037 0.46
a 
Goal  0.04 1,1037 0.85
a 
 
     




The aim of the present study was to develop a robust measure of action 
comprehension for adults, using eye tracking. It also aimed to test the hypotheses 
generated by the fMRI experiment reported in Chapter 2 that during irrational 
actions participants will focus more on the action kinematics (i.e. look at the hand 
longer) and look more at the face. An analysis protocol was developed to 
thoroughly examine which features of eye movements reflect action rationality and 
are modulated by the social form of the agent.  
With respect to my first aim, I briefly summarize the experimental results in 
relation to rationality detection and social form sensitivity and propose the 
cognitive processes that they may reflect. 
3.5.1 RATIONALITY DETECTION 
Rationality detection was mostly reflected in measures of looking time. 
Participants looked longer at the barrier during a rational compared to an irrational 
action. This is consistent with similar results reported in infants (Elsner et al., 2013) 
and suggests that participants are spending time evaluating the environmental 
constraints that impact upon an action. Gergely and Csibra (2003) argue that this 
process of rationalising the environmental constraints that impact an action is key 
for teleological reasoning about actions. Therefore, time spent looking at the barrier 
may be a marker of teleological reasoning. This interpretation is strengthened by 
the fact that there was an interaction between action rationality and the social form 
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of the agent. It seems that participants spend longer evaluating the environmental 
constraints of rational actions performed by humans compared to balls.  
There was a trending effect towards participants looking at the non-target 
goal more during irrational actions. Whilst this effect is not significant after 
correction for multiple comparisons, it hints that participants are either making 
more prediction errors or are dwelling on why the agent did not put the ball in the 
non-target goal as he originally planned. However, as this effect is only marginal, I 
do not make any big claims about the use of this measure. 
Looking time to the ball/hand was also marginally affected by rationality 
with participants tending to look at the ball for longer during irrational actions. 
Again this effect is only a trend and not significant after correction for multiple 
comparisons but it does hint that participants pay more attention to the action 
kinematics during irrational actions. This could explain the increased activation in 
the IFG during irrational action observation that I reported in Chapter 2. Again, this 
finding must be taken cautiously because the effect is only trending towards 
significance. 
Time spent looking at the face was not distinguishable for rational and 
irrational actions. This is inconsistent with previous studies which report increased 
looking at the face following an irrational action (Vivanti et al., 2011). It is possible 
that the time window between the completion of the action and the end of the 
movie was too short for participants to make a saccade to the face and reflect on 
why the action occurred in an inefficient manner. Alternatively, perhaps the face 
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was not very salient as it did not provide any cues as to how the action would 
proceed. This is supported by the surprising finding that people look very little at 
the face of the actor when it is visible for all action types. This finding does not 
support the explanation for the increased activity in occipital cortex during 
irrational actions with the face visible as proposed in Chapter 2. However, these 
studies tested different groups of participants in very different experimental 
settings so it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the eye movement 
behaviour of the group in the MRI scanner. 
Latency of goal prediction was not sensitive to the rationality of actions. 
This is inconsistent with an earlier study of infants which showed longer fixation 
latencies for irrational actions (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). However, the present 
study used better controlled stimuli and corrected for a number of mismatches 
between the conditions in the previous study. If we include predictive fixations for 
the rational straight actions in the model, an action effect, driven by faster 
anticipation of rational straight actions is significant (F(2,1537)=13.7, p<0.0001). 
Therefore the latency analysis is very sensitive to action kinematics and basic motor 
properties of actions, not higher level rationalisation of actions. This finding 
provides further evidence in support of the hypothesis that predictive eye 
movements are generated by the mirror system (see section 7.2.1 for a more 
comprehensive discussion of this finding).  
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3.5.2 SENSITIVITY TO SOCIAL FORM 
Participants spent more time looking at the goals of the actions and made 
faster predictive eye movements to the action goal when an action was performed 
by the ball moving independently, compared to human actions. These findings can 
be explained simply by the reduced visual detail on the screen during the ball 
actions. As there is less to look at, participants fixate the action goals faster and 
maintain their fixations for longer. Despite this, participants actually spent more 
time looking at the barrier during the human action conditions. This suggests that 
participants spend more effort evaluating the environmental constraint of an action 
if it is performed by a human actor. Participants also attend more closely to the 
ball/hand region during human actions compared to ball actions. This could be 
because the hand may provide important kinematic cues about the action whereas 
the ball does not. Despite this, participants are actually slower to predict actions 
when there is kinematic information available. 
Remarkably, there was only one measure which yielded a significant 
interaction between action rationality and the social form of the agent. This was 
looking time to the barrier as previously discussed. The lack of any other 
interactions between these factors is consistent with the fMRI results presented in 
Chapter 2 and it suggests that action rationality is computed regardless of the social 
form of the agent. 
 




The present study provides a thorough exploration of the use of eye tracking 
to investigate the cognitive processes that drive rationality comprehension. It also 
investigates the validity of the perceptual arguments put forward to explain the 
brain imaging data in Chapter 2. On the whole, some of the measures used in this 
paradigm were sensitive to action rationality and can be used as markers of 
rationality detection (increased looking time to non-target goal and ball) and 
evaluation of environmental constraint (looking time to barrier). Action prediction 
measures were not sensitive to action rationality, implying that these index basic 
goal comprehension rather than higher level reasoning involving the rationalisation 
of actions. The next chapter in this thesis will investigate the presence of these 
markers in participants with ASC. 
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CHAPTER 4. PREDICTIVE GAZE DURING OBSERVATION OF 
IRRATIONAL ACTIONS IN ADULTS WITH AUTISM 
SPECTRUM CONDITIONS 
4.1 ABSTRACT 
Understanding irrational actions may require the observer to make mental 
state inferences about why an action was performed. Individuals with autism 
spectrum conditions (ASC) have well documented difficulties with mentalizing; 
however the degree to which rationality understanding is impaired in autism is not 
yet clear. The present study uses eye-tracking to measure online understanding of 
action rationality in individuals with ASC. Twenty adults with ASC and 20 typically 
developing controls watched movies of rational and irrational actions while their 
eye movements were recorded. Measures of looking time, scan path and saccade 
latency were calculated. Results from looking time and scan path analyses 
demonstrate that participants with ASC have reduced visual attention to salient 
action features, regardless of action rationality. However, when participants with 
ASC do attend to these features, they are able to make anticipatory goal saccades 
as quickly as typically developing controls. Taken together these results indicate 
that individuals with autism have reduced attention to observed actions, but when 
attention is maintained, goal prediction is typical. I conclude that the basic 
mechanisms of action understanding are intact in individuals with ASC although 
there may be impairment in the top-down, social modulation of eye movements. 




We can accumulate a large amount of social information about a person by 
observing how they act. For example, seeing a person with a letter walk along the 
street, we might predict he will stop at the post box.  If he makes a detour to avoid 
walking under a ladder, we might further infer that he is superstitious. Thus, we are 
able to predict behaviour and make mental state judgements about a person 
merely by observing their actions.  Cognitive processes for predicting actions and 
understanding mental states have been differentially implicated in autism spectrum 
condition (ASC).  In this chapter, I study eye gaze behaviour during observation of 
hand actions to determine if people with autism predict or understand actions 
differently.   
As summarized in Chapter 1, section 1.4, individuals with ASC have well 
documented social difficulties (Frith, 2003) which may include specific impairments 
in mentalizing and action understanding. Evidence for a mentalizing impairment in 
individuals with ASC has consistently been shown in their failure to represent 
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĨĂůƐĞďĞůŝĞĨ(Baron-cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Frith, 2001) and through 
poor comprehension of stories that involve mental state reasoning (Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1999). Participants with ASC are also less able to identify and label the 
mental states of animated shapes when they are interacting in an intentional way, 
compared to when they are physically interacting (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 
2002; Marsh & Hamilton, 2011).  Some of these mentalizing difficulties have been 
attributed to a failure to orient to relevant social cues information in their 
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environment (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Morris, Pelphrey, & 
McCarthy, 2002; Riby & Hancock, 2008) and that this reduction in social looking 
correlates with ASC symptom severity (Klin et al., 2002; Speer, Cook, McMahon, & 
Clark, 2007  (although see Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Benson, Frank, & Findlay, 
2009; Freeth, Chapman, Ropar, & Mitchell, 2010; Speer et al., 2007).  
In contrast, evidence for an action understanding impairment in autism is 
mixed. Individuals with autism show diminished anticipation of future actions (Boria 
et al., 2009; Cattaneo et al., 2007; Fabbri-Destro et al., 2009), reduced 
comprehension of complex action sequences (Zalla, Labruyere, & Georgieff, 2006; 
Zalla, Labruyère, Clément, & Georgieff, 2010) and reduced imitation of goal-less 
actions (Wild, Poliakoff, Jerrison, & Gowen, 2012). However, individuals with ASC 
demonstrate superior postural knowledge compared to typically developing 
controls (Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2009), and they are able to complete 
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶŐŽĂůĂĨƚĞƌǁŝƚnessing their failed attempt (Aldridge et al., 2000; 
Carpenter et al., 2001). A further study also shows intact goal-directed imitation in 
ASC (Hamilton, Brindley, et al., 2007). Recently, interest in implicit measures of 
action comprehension has increased.  Tracking eye gaze provides an excellent way 
to record and probe the process of action comprehension in a natural, implicit and 
dynamic way. Studies of typical adults have shown that gaze during action 
observation is both predictive and socially oriented (see Chapter 1, section 1.3). 
Eye movements during action observation have also been studied in 
participants with ASC.  These studies show mixed results for both predictive gaze 
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and social orienting.   Typical predictive gaze during hand actions was shown by 
Flack-Ytter (2010). It was reported that five year olds with ASC, matched typically 
developing five year olds and a group of adults make predictive eye movements to 
action goals during action observation to the same degree, demonstrating that goal 
understanding for basic actions is intact in children with ASC (Falck-Ytter, 2010). 
However, when action prediction depends on the representation of another 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĨĂůƐĞďĞůŝĞĨ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐǁŝƚŚĂƵƚŝƐŵĨĂŝůƚŽƐŚŽǁƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝǀĞŐĂǌĞ (Senju et 
al., 2009). In a recent study of irrational action observation, Vivanti et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that both typically developing adolescents and adolescents with ASC 
orient to the face of an actor, following completion of an irrational action. This 
finding was suprising given the wealth of studes which show reduced social 
orienting in participants with ASC (Klin et al., 2002; Morris et al., 2002; Riby & 
Hancock, 2008; Speer et al., 2007). In the present study, I aim to go beyond previous 
research by thoroughly assessing how adults with ASC respond when seeing goal-
directed actions performed by a human hand or a non-human ball.  I am particularly 
interested in the distinction between understanding the basic goal of an action and 
understanding the beliefs of the actor.   
The experiment presented in Chapter 2 demonstrates that studying 
irrational actions may provide an important bridge between basic comprehension 
of actions and mentalizing about why that action was performed.  Given the mixed 
evidence for action understanding impairments in ASC and the clear mentalizing 
impairments, it is interesting to consider how irrational actions are processed in 
ASC. In a recent study, Marsh & Hamilton (2011) showed participants with ASC and 
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matched typically developing adults movies of rational and irrational actions during 
fMRI scanning. Responses to rational actions were similar across the typical and ASC 
groups, indicating basic action comprehension is intact in ASC. In contrast, 
responses to irrational actions differed. The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), a 
region closely associated with mentalizing, differentiated rational from irrational 
actions in typical, but not ASC participants (this study is described in section 1.2.3 in 
more detail). This study was the first to demonstrate a clear difference in the 
processing of irrational actions in ASC but as yet, we do not understand the 
cognitive reasons for this neural difference. The aim of the present study is to use 
eye tracking to assess whether adults with ASC are able to detect action rationality 
and if so, whether they use this information to make inferences about why the 
action was performed in an irrational manner. Furthermore, social orienting during 
action observation has not been directly studied and the effect of having social 
information available (such as faces and eyes) on predictive gaze will be explored.   
4.2.1 SUMMARY 
Overall, this study has two aims. First, I aim to replicate the effects reported 
in Chapter 3 that show that eye gaze is modulated by action rationality, and test 
whether this modulation differs between typical and autistic participants.  If 
participants with ASC have good basic action understanding but are not able to 
detect action rationality, we would expect their viewing patterns for rational and 
irrational actions to be similar. We would also expect their viewing patterns for 
these actions to be similar to those used by typically developing individuals during 
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rational action observation. If instead, participants with ASC can detect action 
rationality but do not use this information to make inferences about the actions, it 
is expected that eye movement patterns which reflect rationality detection in 
typically developing individuals will also be present in individuals with ASC. 
However, measures which indicate that the participant is reflecting upon the 
reasons for an irrational action (e.g. looking at the face longer) will be absent in 
individuals with ASC. Second, I aim to test if eye gaze is influenced by the social 
form of an action (hand or ball) and whether this differs between typical and 
autistic participants.  Gaze effects which are tied to action rationality may be 
stronger when viewing a full person compared to a moving ball.  Such influences 
may also be stronger in typical participants than in participants with autism. 
Together, these analyses will give important insights into the cognitive processes 
underlying action comprehenion in typical and autistic adults. 
4.3 MATERIAL AND METHODS 
4.3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty adults with ASC and 20 typically developing adults matched to the 
ASC group for age and IQ took part in this study. Participants were recruited 
through local colleges, universities and through ASC support groups. Care was taken 
during recruitment to match groups on age and full scale IQ, measured by the 
Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). Groups were not significantly different in 
age (t(38)=1.9, p=0.06) or IQ (t(38)=1.25, p=0.22) but as the groups are not similar 
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enough to be considered matched (Carolyn & Bonita, 2004) , all analyses were also 
run on a subset of 17 participants from each group that were better matched for 
age (t(32)=0.85, p=0.40) and IQ  (t(32)=0.65, p=0.95). The pattern of results was 
very similar when using this matched subset of participants so I report the statistics 
from the full group analysis here. The few differences between these analyses that 
did arise were the result of significant effects dropping to just below the alpha 
threshold when using the smaller sample. I note where this is the case in the text 
below. 
 Participants with autism had a diagnosis of high functioning autism (n=7), 
autism spectrum condition (n=2) or Aspergers syndrome (n=11). Diagnosis was 
confirmed using the ADOS Module 4 (Lord et al., 2000). One participant failed to 
meet criteria for autism spectrum on both the social and communication subscales 
of the ADOS but he had a clear diagnostic history and scored well above the 
threshold for autism on the Autism Quotient. Therefore, his data has been included 
in the full analysis. Typically developing participants reported no diagnoses of 
developmental disorders. All participants also completed the Autism Quotient (AQ, 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) and typically 
developing participants scored significantly lower than the ASC participants on this 
measure of autistic traits (t(37)=3.95, p<0.001). See Table 4.1 for participant 
characteristics. 
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Table 4.1. Participant characteristics for the typically developing group and the ASC group. p 
indicates the p-value of the paired samples t-test comparing the TD and ASC groups on each 
attribute. 











18.9 ± 4.0 
(16-29) 
 





101.8 ± 17.5 
(76-139) 
 
94.7 ± 18.3 
(69-132) 
0.22 
VIQ 103.1 ± 17.5 
(80-142) 
 
96.4 ± 19.8 
(71-143) 
0.26 
PIQ 99.3 ± 15.6 
(75-127) 
 





17.4 ± 4.5 
(10-27) 














Abbreviations: n- sample size; FSIQ  W full scale intelligence quotient; VIQ  W verbal intelligence 
quotient; PIQ  W performance intelligence quotient; AQ  W autism quotient; ADOS  W autism diagnostic 
observation scale total score. 
 
4.3.2 STIMULI/APPARATUS 
The experimental setup, stimuli and study design was identical to that used 
in the experiment in Chapter 3.  
4.3.3 PROCEDURE 
All participants completed the eye tracking task and rationality ratings as 
described in Chapter 3. The only differences in procedure between this and the 
ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞŝŶĂƋƵŝĞƚƌŽŽŵŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?
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home or college in the present study. During each eye tracking block, the 
experimenter sat next to the participant and encouraged them to keep watching if 
their attention wandered. In addition to the eye-tracking task, all participants 
completed the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and the autism quotient 
(AQ) and participants with ASC completed the ADOS Module 4 with a trained 
examiner. 
4.3.4 DATA PROCESSING 
The data processing and analysis approach used in this study was predefined 
by selecting the measures which reflected action understanding from the 
experiment in Chapter 3 or those measures that we had specific apriori predictions 
about, based on the studies reviewed in Section 3.2.1. The measures selected for 
analysis are listed in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Inclusion criteria and the number of trials included at each stage of analysis for the 
typically developing and ASC groups. 
Analysis Level Inclusion Criteria ASC TD 
Total trials completed:   5760 5760 
  Include Exclude Include Exclude 
Step 1: Looking time analysis <20% samples missing 4282 1478 5100 660 
 Target goal  





Step 2: Saccade analysis Saccade to goal present 3477 805 4582 518 




Step 3: Latency Analysis Predictive goal saccade from 
hand present 
1067 2410 2044 2538 




4.4.1 BEHAVIOURAL RATINGS 
Mean ratings of rationality are presented in Figure 4.1. A two (action) by two 
(goal) by two (group) mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of rationality 
(F(1,34)=5.02, p=0.03) in which rational curved actions were rated as more rational 
than irrational curved actions. No effect of group (F(1,34)=3.08, p=0.09) or goal 
(F(1,34)=1.50, p=0.23) and no interactions between these variables were found.  
 
Figure 4.1. Behavioural ratings of rationality as a function of group and action type. Actions were 
rational straight (RS, dark grey bars), rational curved (RC, mid-grey bars) and irrational curved (IC, 
light grey bars). Rationality score was calculated as the total rating from a battery of six statements 
(maximum = 30). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
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4.4.2 LOOKING TIME ANALYSIS 
Percentage looking time in each AOI was calculated for each movie type and 
is presented in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.3. Two (action type) by three (social form) by 
two (goal location) by two (group) mixed ANOVAs were conducted for looking time 
to the target goal, non-target goal, barrier and ball. In trials when the face was 
visible, a two (action type) by two (goal) by two (group) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted on looking time to the face. All reported results are significant after 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
In the analysis of looking time to the target goal, a significant main effect of 
social form of the stimulus was found. Bonferroni corrected t-tests revealed that 
looking time on the target goal was longer during actions in which the ball moved 
independently, compared to when an agent was present. This effect was reduced 
when comparing the smaller, matched groups of participants (p=0.02). A main 
effect of group was also found indicating that typical participants looked longer at 
the target goal than the autistic participants. No effect of rationality or goal and no 
interactions were found. See Table 4.3a and Figure 4.2b. 
In the analysis of looking time to the non-target goal, a main effect of social 
form was also found. This means that participants looked longer at the non-target 
goal during actions in which the ball moved independently, compared to actions 
performed by a human agent. Again this effect was reduced when comparing the 
smaller, matched groups (p=0.02). The non-target goal was also looked at longer 
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during irrational actions compared to rational actions. There was no main effect of 
group or goal on looking time to the non-target goal. A significant interaction 
between the social form of the stimulus and the goal was found. This interaction is 
driven by participants looking longer at the bottom goal compared to the top goal, 
but only during actions in which the ball moved independently. This goal bias is not 
seen when the ball was moved by a human agent. No other interactions were 
significant. Results are presented in Table 4.3b and Figure 4.2c. 
In the analysis of looking time to the ball, a main effect of group revealed 
that typical participants looked longer at the ball compared to ASC participants. No 
effects of social form, action type or goal were observed and no interactions were 
significant. Results are presented in Table 4.3c and Figure 4.2a. 
In the analysis of looking time to the barrier, a main effect of social form 
indicated that participants looked longer at the barrier during human actions 
compared to those completed by the ball. A rationality effect shows that 
participants also look longer at the barrier during rational compared to irrational 
actions. An interaction between rationality and social form was also found. This 
interaction shows that the bias for looking at the barrier more during rational 
actions is greater during actions performed by a human compared to those 
performed by the ball. Results are presented in Table 4.3d and Figure 4.2d. 
Participants looked at the face for the same amount of time, irrespective of 
action type, group membership and goal. There were no significant interactions 
between these variables (see Table 4.3e).  
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Figure 4.2. Percentage looking time for each AOI in ASC and typically developing participants. Panel A 
displays looking times  as a function of rationality (rational- right cluster and irrational  W left cluster) 
and social form. Colours correspond to the AOI key. Grey segments indicate the percentage of 
samples during a saccade (excluded from analysis) and black segments indicate missing data. Panels 
B-D show percentage looking time to each AOI as a function of group (ASC  W left, TD  W right), action 
type (rational  W solid lines, irrational  W dashed lines) and social form. Background colours correspond 
with the AOI key. 
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Table 4.3. Statistics for the looking time analysis for each area of interest. Values are the F statistic 
(or t-statistic when post hoc t-tests are used), degrees of freedom and p-values. Effects reported in 
bold type are significant after Bonferroni correction for multiple tests.  
a
 indicates the tests where ɲ 
was 0.01 and 
b
 indicates tests where ɲ was 0.0167. 
Main Effects direction F/(t) df p 
 
a) ANOVA  1: Percentage Looking Time to Target Goal 
Social Form  8.26 2,76 0.001
a 
 ball > face (3.37) 39 0.002
b 
 ball > no face (3.13) 39 0.003
b 
 no face > face (0.97) 39 0.34
b 
Rationality  0.03 1,38 0.87
a 




TD > ASC 9.30 1,38 0.004
a
 
b) ANOVA  2:  Percentage Looking Time to Non-Target Goal 
Social Form  9.11 2,76 <0.001
a
 
 ball > face (3.50) 39 0.001
b
 
 ball > no face (2.67) 39 0.01
b
 
 no face > face (2.21) 39 0.03
b
 
Rationality irrational > rational 17.71 1,38 <0.001
a
 
Goal  3.16 1,38 0.08
a
 
Group  2.16 1,38 0.15
a
 
Social Form x Goal  8.34 2,76 0.001
a
 
 ball bottom > ball top (3.48) 39 0.001
b
 
 no face bottom > no face top (0.77) 39 0.45
b
 





c) ANOVA  3:  Percentage Looking Time to Ball 
Social Form  0.02 2,76 0.98
a
 
Rationality  2.82 1,38 0.10
a
 





TD > ASC 10.10 1,38 0.003
a
 
d) ANOVA 4:  Percentage Looking Time to Barrier    
Social Form  16.32 2,76 <0.001
a
 
 face > ball (3.78) 39 <0.001
b
 
 no face > ball (5.63) 39 <0.001
b
 
 no face > face (1.62) 39 0.11
b
 
Rationality rational > irrational 129.13 1,38 <0.001
a
 





4.4.3 SACCADE ANALYSIS 
The origin of saccades to the goal was analysed and results are presented in 
Figure 4.3a and Table 4.4. As with the looking time analysis, two (action type) by 
three (social form) by two (goal location) by two (group) mixed ANOVAs were 
conducted on percentage of saccades from the non-target goal and from the ball to 
the target goal. In trials when the face was visible, a two (action) by two (goal) by 
two (group) mixed ANOVA was conducted on percentage of saccades from the face. 
Again, only significant results that survived Bonferroni correction are reported. 
In the analysis of saccades from the non-target goal, there was a main effect 
of action. This effect showed that more saccades to the goal came from the non-
target goal when the action was irrational. An effect of goal revealed that there 
were more saccades from the non-target goal if the action ended in the bottom 
goal. No effects of social form or group were found. A significant social form by goal 
Goal  3.87 1,38 0.06
a
 
Group  1.67 1,38 0.21
a
 
Social Form x Rationality 19.04 2,76 <0.001
a
 
 R ʹ I face > R ʹ I ball 4.83 39 <0.001b 
 R ʹ I no face > R ʹ I ball 6.41 39 <0.001b 





e) ANOVA  5:  Percentage Looking Time to Face 
Rationality  1.53 1,38 0.22
a
 





 0.24 1,38 0.62
a
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interaction showed that participants made less saccades from the non-target goal 
to the goal when the action culminated at the top goal, but only during actions in 
which the ball moved independently. No other interactions were significant. See 
Figure 4.3b and Table 4.4a. 
The analysis of saccades from the ball found a main effect of group and 
revealed that typical participants made more saccades from the ball to the goal, 
compared to ASC participants. There were no effects of social form, action type or 
goal on the number of saccades from the ball to the goal. An interaction between 
social form and goal revealed that participants made more saccades from the ball to 
the goal when the action ended at the top goal, but only when the ball moved 
independently. In addition, an interaction between action type and goal showed 
that participants made more saccades from the ball to the goal when the action 
ended at the bottom goal, but only when the action was rational. This effect is 
driven by data from the ASC participants. No other interactions were significant. See 
Figure 4.3c and Table 4.4b. 
The analysis of the number of saccades from the face found no effect of 
action type, group membership or goal and no interactions between these 
variables. See Table 4.4c. 
  




Figure 4.3 Percentage of goal saccades originating in each AOI in ASC and typically developing 
participants. Panel A displays these as a function of action type (rational- right cluster and irrational  W 
left cluster) and social form. Colours correspond to the AOI key. Black segments indicate the 
percentage of trials in which no goal saccade was made. Panels B-C:  Percentage of goal saccades 
that originated in each AOI as a function of group (ASC  W left, TD  W right), action type (rational  W solid 
lines, irrational  W dashed lines) and social form. Background colours correspond to the AOI key. Error 
bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
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Table 4.4. Statistics for the saccade analysis for each area of interest. Values are the F statistic (or t-
statistic when post hoc t-tests are used), degrees of freedom and p-values. Effects reported in bold 
type are significant after Bonferroni correction for multiple tests.  
a
 indicates the tests where ɲ was 
0.0167, 
b
 indicates tests where ɲ was 0.025 and c indicates tests where ɲ was 0.0125. 
 
Main Effects direction F/(t) df p 
 
a) ANOVA 1 : Proportion of Saccades from Non-Target Goal to Goal 
Social Form  2.69 2,76 0.08
a
 
Rationality irrational > rational 6.60 1,38 0.01
a
 
Goal bottom > top 9.77 1,38 0.003
a
 
Group  0.56 1,38 0.45
a
 
Social Form x Goal  10.70 2,76 <0.001
a
 
 ball bottom > ball top (6.07) 39 <0.001
a
 
 no face bottom > no face top (1.48) 39 0.15
a
 
 face bottom > face top (0.25) 39 0.81
a
 
b) ANOVA 2:  Proportion of Saccades from Ball to Goal 
Social Form  3.75 2,76 0.03
a
 
Rationality  1.19 1,38 0.28
a
 





TD > ASC 6.31 1,38 0.01
a
 
Social Form x Goal  9.15 2,76 <0.001
a
 
 ball top > ball bottom (4.09) 39 <0.001
a
 
 no face top > no face bottom (2.30) 39 0.03
a
 
 face top > face bottom (0.84) 39 0.41
a
 
Rationality x Goal  7.27 1,38 0.01
a
 
 RC top > RC bottom (3.02) 39 0.004
b
 
 IC top > IC bottom (0.45) 39 0.66
b
 
Rationality x Goal x Group 8.49 1,38 0.006
a
 
 ASC RC top >  ASC  RC bottom (3.05) 19 0.007
c
 
 ASC IC top >  ASC  IC bottom (1.32) 19 0.20
c
 
 TD RC top > TD RC bottom (1.15) 19 0.26
c
 
 TD IC top > TD IC bottom (0.77) 19 0.45
c
 
c) ANOVA 3: IV =  Proportion of Saccades from Face to Goal 
Rationality  0.13 1,38 0.72
a
 
Goal  0.14 1,38 0.71
a
 
Group  0.009 1,38 0.93
a
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4.4.4 LATENCY ANALYSIS 
Mean saccade latency was calculated for each movie type and is presented 
in Figure 4.4. Social form, action type, group and goal were entered into a full 
factorial mixed linear model. A main effect of social form indicated that participants 
were faster to anticipate actions in the ball condition, compared to the no face 
condition. A main effect of goal location showed that the top goal was anticipated 
faster than the bottom goal. Participants were also quicker to anticipate actions 
that ended at the top goal when the action was completed by the ball moving 
independently. This pattern of results was more prominent in participants with ASC. 
However, this three way interaction disappears when comparing the subgroup that 
were better matched for age and IQ (p=0.08). No main effect of group membership 
or action rationality was found (see Table 4.5 for results). 
 
Figure 4.4. Mean latency of goal fixation as a function of group (ASC  W left, TD  W right), action type 
(rational  W dark grey bars, irrational  W light grey bars) and social form. 
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Table 4.5. Statistics for the latency of goal saccade analysis. Values are the F statistic (or t-statistic 
when post hoc t-tests are used), degrees of freedom and p-values. 
a
 indicates the tests where ɲ was 
0.05, 
b







Main Effects direction F/(t) df p 
 
a) Linear Mixed Model: Latency of Saccades from the Ball to the Goal  
Social Form  11.32 2,1818 <0.001
a
 
 no face >  ball  (4.35) 1244 <0.001
b
 
 face > no face (2.25) 1163 0.02
b
 
 face > ball  (2.11) 1271 0.04
b
 
Rationality  0.26 1,1818 0.61
a
 
Goal top > bottom 14.46 1,1818 <0.001
a
 
Group  0.33 1,1818 0.57
a
 
Social Form x Goal  12.42 2,1818 <0.001
a
 
 ball top > ball bottom (5.78) 675 <0.001
b
 
 face top > face bottom (0.30) 594 0.76
b
 
 no face top > no face bottom (0.31) 567 0.76
b
 
Social Form x Goal x Group 3.13 2,1818 0.04
a
 
 ASC ball top > ASC ball bottom (4.40) 214 <0.001
c
 
 ASC face top > ASC face bottom (0.77) 188 0.44
c
 
 ASC no face top > ASC no face bottom (1.21) 166 0.23
c
 
 TD ball top > TD ball bottom (3.89) 459 <0.001
c
 
 TD face top > TD face bottom (1.15) 404 0.25
c
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4.4.5 TASK ENGAGEMENT 
As the number of trials included in each analysis is hierarchical, and 
dependent upon the presence of eye movement features that reflect attention to 
the actions, it is possible to use the number of trials included in each analysis as a 
measure of task engagement. From Table 4.2, it is clear that from the first level of 
data exclusion, there are more excluded trials in the ASC group compared to the 
typically developing group. This is despite the experimenter watching the live gaze 
recording and reminding participants to continue to pay attention if they looked 
away from the screen. Figure 4.5 shows this reduction in task engagement as a 
function of trial number through the block for both the typically developing and ASC 
groups. While task engagement reduced over the course of the block for both 
groups, the decline in task engagement for the ASC group was much greater. 
Beyond this initial exclusion stage based on data quality, the patterns of exclusion 
remain similar. The ASC group fail to look at the goal of the action in more trials 
than the typically developing group (exclusion level two) and only make saccades 
from the hand to the goal in 18% of trials, compared to 35% of trials for the typically 
developing group (exclusion level three). In summary, each of these levels of 
exclusion reflect reduced task engagement in participants with ASC. 
 




Figure 4.5. Cumulative percentage of included data from the ASC (dashed line) and TD (solid line) 
groups as a function of time course through the block. Time on the x-axis is indexed by trial number. 
 
4.5 DISCUSSION 
 The current study aimed to examine action comprehension in adults with 
ASC using eye gaze. This was done by evaluating a number of different measures in 
a pilot dataset (presented in Chapter 2) before applying these measures to the 
experimental data here. The measures used were looking time, the origin of 
saccades to the action goal and latency of first goal fixation. First I discuss the 
results in relation to my two key questions of how eye movements are modulated 
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by action rationality and by social form and whether these markers are present in 
participants with ASC. 
4.5.1 EYE MOVEMENTS REFLECTING RATIONALITY COMPREHENSION 
 A number of eye tracking measures reflected the rationality of the observed 
action in both typical and ASC participants. Firstly, participants looked longer at the 
non-target goal and they made more saccades from the non-target to the target 
goal during irrational actions. Both of these findings suggest that participants are 
making goal prediction errors whilst watching irrational actions. As the action is 
curved for no reason, participants anticipate the action goal incorrectly and look at 
the non-target goal. Additionally, increased time spent looking at the non-target 
ŐŽĂůŵĂǇƌĞĨůĞĐƚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚǁŚǇƚŚĞďĂůůǁĂƐŶŽƚƉůĂĐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
non-target goal. Perhaps they were searching for an environmental constraint 
which altered ƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŵŝĚ-action. This is consistent with the idea that 
participants try to rationalise an irrational action by seeking an explanation for their 
behaviour (Vivanti et al., 2011). However, unlike Vivanti et al., (2011) the present 
study reports no increase in looking at the face of the actor following an irrational 
action in either the ASC or the typical group. This lack of finding could be because 
this task has less social context than the previous study or because the face of the 
actor was not informative in determining the goal of the action. 
Looking time to the barrier also differed between rational and irrational 
actions in both typical and ASC groups. Participants looked longer at the barrier 
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during rational actions, suggesting that they are evaluating the environmental 
constraint that impacts upon the action. This is consistent with the pattern of 
results reported by (Elsner et al., 2013) in infants but it also goes beyond previous 
findings as I demonstrate that the bias for looking at the barrier more during 
rational actions is increased for human actions compared to those completed by the 
moving ball. This implies that a greater level of evaluation of the action constraint 
occurs during human actions and therefore may reflect mentalizing about why the 
actor performed the action in this way.  
Surprisingly, the speed of action prediction was not modulated by action 
rationality in typically developing or ASC participants. This is inconsistent with 
previous evidence that irrational actions are anticipated more slowly than rational 
actions (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). However, this difference may be due to the 
precise control over the stimuli in the present study and the resolution of the 
criticisms of this measure that are reviewed in the introduction (goal saliency, 
matched kinematics). As predictive eye movements are not modulated by action 
rationality and are instead tied to the kinematics of the performed action, this 
provides evidence for the account which suggests predictive eye movements are 
linked to motor system activity (Ambrosini et al., 2012; Cannon & Woodward, 2006; 
Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010). Furthermore, as 
participants with ASC made predictive saccades to the goal as quickly as typically 
developing participants, it seems that their basic goal understanding is intact. This is 
consistent with other studies implicating good goal comprehension in ASC (Dinstein 
et al., 2010; Falck-Ytter, 2010b; Hamilton et al., 2009; Marsh & Hamilton, 2011). 
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4.5.2 THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL FORM ON EYE MOVEMENTS 
 Social form had very little impact on gaze behaviour. All participants looked 
longer at both action goals during actions performed by a ball compared to those 
performed by a human agent. Additionally, participants were faster to predict the 
action goal when it was completed by a ball compared to the human actions. Both 
of these findings can be explained by the reduced amount of information on the 
screen during these ball actions. As the human is absent and there is less to look at, 
participants look at the goal more quickly and maintain their fixations for longer. 
Despite there being more to look at in the human actions, participants spent longer 
looking at the barrier in these movies compared to the actions performed by the 
ball. As mentioned previously, this may be due to the participant making more 
effort to evaluate the environmental constraints during human actions. 
 Contrary to my predictions, participants spent very little time looking at the 
face of the actor during movies where the face was visible. This contrasts with 
previous studies that report dramatic social orienting to the face and, in particular 
the eyes, of the agent on screen (Birmingham, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2008b; Klin et 
al., 2002). However, these studies report increased social orienting when the 
stimulus depicts a social interaction involving more than one agent (Birmingham, 
Bischof, & Kingstone, 2008a). The stimuli used in the present study did not depict 
multiple interacting agents and this may account for the lack of social orienting to 
the face in both typical and ASC participants. As the action was the key feature of 
each movie, orienting to the hand, rather than the face, is more informative. 
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Indeed, typically developing participants look at the hand more than the ASC 
participants, indicating that participants with ASC show less orienting to salient 
action features. However, as this effect was seen in both human and ball actions, it 
is difficult to argue that this orienting to the action is social orienting. It seems that 
the reduction in looking at the hand in ASC is a product of reduced attention to 
biological motion (Blake, Turner, Smoski, Pozdol, & Stone, 2003; Klin, Lin, Gorrindo, 
Ramsay, & Jones, 2009).  
4.5.3 TASK ENGAGEMENT 
 The results that have been discussed so far reflect a very similar pattern of 
results between typical and ASC participants. The realm in which we see group 
differences emerge in this task is when we consider measures that reflect attention 
to the action. For example, ASC participants look at the action goal for less time 
than the typically developing participants. Additionally, they look less at the hand or 
ball performing the action and as such, they also make fewer saccades from the 
hand to the action goal. A reduction in social attention in ASC has previously been 
reported for faces (Riby & Hancock, 2008) and eyes (Speer et al., 2007) but this is 
the first to show reduced attention to actions. I also report a reduction in task 
engagement in the ASC group over the course of the experiment. This is evidenced 
by the number of trials excluded from the analysis due to missing data. It is unlikely 
that the increase in missing data in the ASC group is due to eye-tracker failure as 
strict calibration procedures were passed prior to the start of each block and live 
gaze visualisation was used to check that tracking continued throughout the 
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experiment. Instead, participants with ASC were more likely to look outside of the 
frame of the movie, or away from the screen during the task. In these cases, the 
experimenter reminded the participant to keep watching the movies. 
Both findings of reduced attention to actions and reduced task engagement 
are consistent with the social motivation hypothesis of ASC which predicts reduced 
social orienting and engagement (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 
2012). This theory also proposes that individuals with ASC have the underlying 
competence to process social stimuli yet spontaneously fail to do so. In this task we 
demonstrate that participants with ASC are able to detect action rationality and to 
predict rational and irrational actions to the same degree as typically developing 
individuals. However, this is only the case if we only use the trials in which 
participants with ASC were attending to the actions. The reduction in number of 
trials in which participants with ASC attended to the actions is indicative of reduced 
spontaneous action prediction and comprehension. 
4.5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The present study provides a thorough examination of the eye tracking 
measures which reflect action rationality and the social form of the agent. I report 
very few differences in action observation between ASC and typically developing 
adults which provides support for the idea that rationality detection is intact in ASC. 
Only one eye tracking measure indicated that participants might be making 
inferences about why the irrational actions were performed in an unusual manner 
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(looking time to the barrier) and this was the case for both ASC and typically 
developing adults. 
There were differences in the amount of missing data between participant 
groups and this may reflect reduced social motivation in ASC. However when 
participants with ASC were attending to the actions, they show good action 
comprehension and prediction. Future work should focus on developing 
experimental tasks which include a measure of task engagement to ensure that 
reduced social motivation is not driving any group differences reported. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE SOCIAL MODULATION OF IMITATION 
FIDELITY IN SCHOOL-AGE CHILDREN 
5.1 ABSTRACT 
Children copy the actions of others with high fidelity, even when they are 
not causally relevant. This copying of visibly unnecessary actions is termed 
overimitation. Many competing theories propose mechanisms for overimitation 
behaviour. In the present study I examine these theories by studying the social 
factors that lead children to overimitate actions.  Ninety-four children aged 5- to 8-
years each completed five trials of an overimitation task.  Each trial provided the 
opportunity to overimitate an action on familiar objects with minimal causal 
reasoning demands.  Social cues (live or video demonstration) and eye contact from 
the demonstrator were manipulated.  After the imitation phase ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ƌĂƚŝŶŐƐ
of action rationality were collected. Substantial overimitation was seen which 
increased with age.  In older children, overimitation was higher when watching a 
live demonstrator and when eye contact was absent.  Actions rated as irrational 
were more likely to be imitated than those rated as rational. Children overimitated 
actions on familiar objects even when they rated those actions as irrational, 
suggesting that failure of causal reasoning cannot be driving overimitation.  These 
data support social explanations of overimitation and show that the influence of 
social factors increases with age over the 5- to 8-year-old age range. 
 




In Chapter 4 I conclude that differences between typical and autistic 
participants on measures of rationality comprehension may be due to differences in 
social responsiveness to a given situation. This may be because individuals with ASC 
lack social motivation to affiliate with others (Chevallier et al., 2012). If this is the 
case then it should be possible to observe larger group differences in a rationality 
comprehension task which requires a social response. In order to develop such a 
task, I turn to the literature on overimitation which I have briefly reviewed in 
Section 1.5.3.  
KďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚǁĂǇĨŽƌ
children to learn about the world, reducing the need for costly trial-and-error 
(Gardiner, Bjorklund, Greif, & Gray, (2012) and see (Frith & Frith, 2012) for a 
review). However, learning by observation is complicated by the fact that some 
objects are not transparent in their mechanism (Csibra & Gergely, 2009) and on 
some occasions the demonstrator may behave inefficiently due to habit, error or 
lack of experience with the object.  The child must filter out actions that are causally 
necessary from those that do not contribute to the completion of the action 
(Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, & Bushnell, 2007).  Failure to exclude unnecessary 
actions from a sequence is termed overimitation (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007), 
whereas efficient pursuit of a goal alone is termed goal emulation (Whiten & Ham, 
1992). In this chapter, I investigate which cues ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶĨŝĚĞůŝƚǇ 
and how these cues change with development. 
C H A P T E R  5   W I M I T A T I O N  F I D E L I T Y  I N  T Y P I C A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  |  1 4 6  
 
 
Horner & Whiten (2005) demonstrated that chimpanzees are remarkably 
good at goal emulation if information about action causality is available. However, 
in the same task, a group of 3- to 4-year-old children failed to emulate the goal of 
the action, instead choosing to faithfully imitate both the necessary and 
unnecessary actions demonstrated.  Many subsequent studies have demonstrated 
that from around 14 months of age, children overimitate actions, despite visible 
evidence that they are not causally relevant (Flynn, 2008; Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, 
Macris, & Keil, 2011; Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007; 
Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009).  
There are multiple theories which attempt to explain overimitation in 
children. Broadly speaking, these theories fall into causal reasoning explanations 
and social explanations, although nuances within these categories are debated.  
Firstly, causal reasoning explanations follow the argument that if a demonstrated 
action upon an object is perceived as intentional, the child will believe that the 
action is important. This judgement of importance may be due to the 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĚŝƐƚŽƌƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ĐĂƵƐĂů ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽďũĞĐƚ ƐƵĐŚ ƚŚĂƚ
they believe the action is necessary to achieve the goal (automatic causal encoding 
hypothesis, Lyons et al. (2007)) or it may be judged as important but that the 
purpose of the action is unknown (unspecified purpose hypothesis, Horner & 
Whiten (2005); Whiten et al. (2009)) ?/ŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ ?ŝƚŝƐĂ ‘ƐĂĨĞďĞƚ ?ƚŽĐŽƉǇĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ
and to refine later (Whiten et al., 2009).  Alternatively, social hypotheses propose 
that overimitation performs a social function. Either the child has a desire to be like 
the demonstrator and finds it intrinsically rewarding to share their experiences 
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(shared experience hypothesis, Nielsen & Blank, (2011); Nielsen, (2006))  or they 
ǁĂŶƚ ƚŽ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞ  ‘ůŝŬĞŶĞƐƐ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ŝŶ ĂŶ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ ĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚĞ
(affiliation hypothesis, Over & Carpenter, (2009). Finally, a recent theory proposes 
ƚŚĂƚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶůĞĂƌŶƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞŶŽƌŵƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚǁĂǇ ?ĚŽƚŚŝŶŐƐǁŚĞŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ
are demonstrated. Therefore overimitation occurs because children are conforming 
to these perceived norms (normative behaviour hypothesis, Kenward, Karlsson, & 
Persson, (2011); Kenward, (2012)).   
There is very little consensus over which of these processes may be driving 
overimitation and indeed, perhaps some work in combination, or at different ages. 
One previous review paper argues that all of these hypotheses can explain some 
ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ŽǀĞƌŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ďǇ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ŐŽĂů ŝŶ ĂŶ
imitative situation (Over & Carpenter, 2012). This theory can also explain the co-
occurrence of selective imitation and overimitation in children. Over and Carpenter 
propose that a child can adopt a social goal, a learning goal or a learn-to-be-social 
goal in an imitative situation and this goal determines whether they faithfully or 
selectively imitate. With a social goal, their priority is to imitate the model faithfully 
as this serves an affiliative function, similar to mimicry. Evidence for this account 
comes from studies showing more overimitation when a child interacted with a 
sociable demonstrator compared to a demonstrator who was socially aloof 
(Nielsen, 2006), and when the demonstration was presented live rather than in a 
video (McGuigan et al., 2007; Nielsen, Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008). Additionally, 
children primed by observing ostracism were more likely to overimitate than 
children who witnessed a comparable scenario without ostracism (Over & 
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Carpenter, 2009). In contrast, under a learning goal children are more likely to be 
selective in their imitation. This is evidenced by a study which demonstrates that 
children given a social copying task prior to an overimitation task were more likely 
to overimitate than those children given a collaborative learning task first (Yu & 
Kushnir, 2009) ? ,ĞƌĞ ? ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ŐŽĂl is changed by the aims of the initial task. 
Finally, Over and Carpenter (2012) propose that with a learning-to-be-social goal, 
the child aims to learn the social rules of a given situation. This view parallels the 
normative behaviour hypothesis and explains why children justify their 
overimitation in terms of normative language (Kenward et al., 2011) and protest 
when someone else omits the unnecessary action (Kenward, 2012). While the 
theory proposed by Over and Carpenter (2012) has good explanatory power and 
pulls together a diverse range of theories, it is not yet clear how children adopt a 
specific goal and what cues they use to switch between them.  
One potential reason for the diversity in explanations of overimitation 
behaviour may be because the field is muddied by the diverse range of 
overimitation tasks and the precise definition of overimitation. Originally, 
overimitation was classed as the imitation of visibly irrelevant actions (Horner & 
Whiten, 2005). However, the objects used in demonstrations vary considerably with 
respect to how mechanically complex they are (complex: Lyons et al., 2011 vs 
simple: Marsh, Pearson, Ropar, & Hamilton, (2013) (see also Chapter 6)) and 
whether they are transparent (Lyons et al., 2011; McGuigan et al., 2007; McGuigan, 
2013) or opaque (Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). Many studies 
make the assumption that because an object is physically transparent, the actions 
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performed upon it are cognitively transparent to children, however a recent study 
demonstrates that children make errors in ascribing action relevance for even very 
simple objects (Kenward et al., 2011) ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ
these more complex objects may be due to object learning, rather than social drives 
(Marsh et al., 2013). This can explain why causal reasoning explanations have been 
provided for studies involving overimitation on mechanically complex objects (Lyons 
et al., 2011). Recent studies have also extended the definition of overimitation to 
include faithful imitation of tool selection (Over & Carpenter, 2009) and tool use 
(when it is simpler to use your hand, Nielsen et al., 2008) or imitation of the number 
of irrelevant actions performed (Nielsen, Slaughter, & Dissanayake, 2012). These 
can be considered faithful reproductions of action but may be functionally different 
to classic overimitation in which a causally irrelevant action is completed. To ensure 
that children understand the mechanics of how each object works, and therefore 
ensure that the irrelevant action is visibly so, the present study utilises very simple, 
transparent objects that have no mechanical components and do not involve the 
use of tools to operate. Furthermore, irrelevant actions on the objects are hand 
actions that do not result in physical outcomes (noises or changes to the 
appearance of the object). This should prevent object-learning based imitation 
being coded as overimitation.  
I argue that children will adopt a social goal if the learning component of the 
task is reduced but they will be likely to overimitate for social reasons. To test this, I 
compare rates of overimitation for live and video demonstrations using simple, non-
mechanical objects. Previously, a comparison between live and video 
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demonstrations has been used to demonstrate that overimitation is socially driven 
as children copy more when seeing a live demonstration compared to a video 
demonstration (McGuigan et al., 2007). Further, this increase in overimitation 
persists when the demonstration is given via a live video feed compared to a pre-
recorded video, suggesting that it is the opportunity for social interaction that 
drives this increase (Nielsen et al., 2008).  I predict that children will overimitate 
despite the objects being cognitively transparent and that overimitation will 
increase for the live demonstration condition. 
I also test the claim that social overimitation and mimicry are functionally 
related (Over & Carpenter, 2011). Evidence for this account shows that both 
overimitation and mimicry are modulated by the same social conditions. For 
example, overimitation and mimicry both increase when interacting with people 
with high social status compared to low social status  (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; 
McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011; McGuigan, 2013), and participants primed 
with anti-social cues such as ostracism were more likely to overimitate or mimic 
than participants who witnessed a comparable scenario without ostracism (Lakin, 
Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Over & Carpenter, 2009; Wang & Hamilton, 2013).  To 
further test this claim we examine whether direct eye contact can also enhance 
overimitation behaviour as it does for mimicry (Wang, Newport, & Hamilton, 2011). 
Previously, Brugger et al (2007) showed that 14-to 16-month-olds overimitate 
following social engagement (eye contact and a relevant comment) more than a 
non-engagement condition (look to wall and an irrelevant comment).  However, the 
study by Brugger et al. does not distinguish the between the verbal and eye contact 
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cues. Further, these cues were presented at the start of each action sequence and 
so we cannot say whether the cue is increasing general attention to the 
demonstration or whether it is specifically prompting the infant to complete the 
unnecessary action.  The present study investigates the role of eye contact in an 
overimitation paradigm further.   
Another puzzling feature to emerge from studies of overimitation is that this 
behaviour actually increases throughout early childhood (ages 2- to 5-year-olds 
(McGuigan et al., 2007; McGuigan & Whiten, 2009), and remains in adulthood  
(Flynn & Smith, 2012; McGuigan & Whiten, 2009).  One previous study has looked 
at overimitation in children across a wider age range (2-to 13-year-olds) in Kalahari 
Bushmen children (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). Again, an increase in overimitation is 
reported in this sample yet the authors do not discuss the implications of this 
finding. Increased overimitation may be due to better social skills. The present 
study will systematically test how imitation fidelity changes over middle childhood 
and assess whether these changes are related to changing sensitivity to social cues.  
A further way in which to test whether overimitation is socially motivated is 
to ask participants to explicitly rate the actions as necessary or unnecessary. In a 
previous study, 5-year-old children were asked to report whether they will perform 
the unnecessary action and to justify their decision prior to acting (Kenward et al., 
2011). While only 10% of participants justified the unnecessary action as causally 
relevant, the remaining 90% were unable to justify why they would complete the 
unnecessary action. However, a caveat of this study is that children were only 
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included in the analysis if they completed the unnecessary actions. It is interesting 
to study the differences in ratings between children who choose to faithfully imitate 
and those who do not as this may provide insight into their decision-making 
process. 
Overall, the present study will test four predictions. Firstly, if overimitation is 
socially modulated then overimitation will occur more in situations that elicit more 
social engagement. Thus, unnecessary actions that are demonstrated live will be 
overimitated more frequently than those demonstrated in a video.  The second 
hypothesis examines the role of eye contact in overimitation. If overimitation and 
mimicry are operating on the same social mechanisms (Over & Carpenter, 2012), 
then eye contact prior to an unnecessary action should increase overimitation of 
that action, as it does for mimicry (Wang, Newport, et al., 2011).  Third, this study 
will investigate the developmental change in overimitation. Previous studies have 
reported overimitation in children aged between 14-months and 13-years or in 
adults but no study has tried to link developmental changes in overimitation 
behaviour to the development of other social and cognitive processes. Finally, no 
previous study has linked overimitation behaviour to explicit ratings of the 
rationality of the demonstrated actions. If children overimitate for causal reasons, 
they should report all actions as sensible whereas if they are socially overimitating, 
they should report the unnecessary action as silly. 
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5.3 METHOD  
5.3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Ninety-four children aged 5- to 8-years took part in this experiment. The 
final sample consisted of 26 five-year olds (16 female), 25 six-year-olds (8 female), 
22 seven-year-olds (12 female) and 21 eight-year-olds (11 female).   Children were 
ƌĞĐƌƵŝƚĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƵŵŵĞƌ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ǁĞĞŬ ? ƐĐŚĞme at the University of 
Nottingham. Groups of children from the local area were invited to come and take 
part in a fun session of games and experiments during their summer holidays. All 
parents gave written, informed consent and the study was approved by the 
University of Nottingham Ethics committee.  
5.3.2 DESIGN 
A mixed model design was used. Children were randomly assigned to one of 
two between-participant experimental conditions (live demonstration or video 
demonstration) that were matched for age and gender. Eye contact was 
manipulated within participants. Eye contact was counterbalanced for action (either 








The action sequences used in the practice and experimental trials are 
detailed in Table 5.1.  Movies were created for each trial of the video 
demonstration condition. These commenced with a demonstrator (D) sitting at a 
table with the trial apparatus in front of her. Over the course of the movie, D 
performed the sequence of actions required to complete the goal (see Table 5.1). 
Within each trial D once paused and looked at the camera for approximately 1 
second before looking down and continuing the action. The eye contact either 
directly preceded a rational action or directly preceded an irrational action. Thus, 
two versions of each demonstration were filmed.  For example, when building the 
block tower, version one shows D place block one in the centre of the table, pause 
and look directly at the camera, then continue by picking up block two, rotating it 
360 degrees before placing it on block one (in this case, eye contact occurred 
directly prior to the irrational action) and finally placing block three on top of block 
two. Version two shows exactly the same action sequence but the pause and eye 
contact occurred before picking up block one (directly prior to a rational action). 
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Table 5.1. Descriptions of each action within each trial.  (R) indicates a rational action.  (I) indicates 
an irrational action. 
 
 
Goal Action 1 Action 2 Action 3 
Warm-Up trials 
Make a pattern with 
beads on the rack 
Place bead 1 onto a 
peg  
Place bead 2 on top 
of bead 1 
Place bead 3 on top 
of bead 2 
Put doll into a 
container 
Remove lid from 
container 
Put doll into the 
container 
Put lid back on 
container 
Experimental trials 
Retrieve toy duck 
 
Unclip fastenings of 
box (R) 
Tap the top of the 
box twice with index 
finger (IR) 
Remove the lid of the 
box and retrieve duck 
(R) 
Retrieve toy elephant 
 
Remove elastic band 
(R) 
Slide box along the 
table and back again 
(IR) 
Remove the lid of the 
box and retrieve 
elephant (R) 
Retrieve toy lion 
 
Pull box towards you 
(R) 
Stroke the top of the 
box twice with index 
finger (IR) 
Remove the end of 
the box and retrieve 
lion (R) 
Build tower of blocks
 
Place block 1 in 
centre of table (R) 
dƵƌŶďůŽĐŬ ? ? ? ?මin 
your hands (IR) 
Place block 2 on top 
of block 1 and place 
block 3 on top of 
block 2 (R) 
Make a paper fan
 
Gather up concertina 
paper (R) 
Tap paper on the 
table twice (IR) 
Fold the paper in half 
to produce a fan (R) 




For testing, each child sat at a child-size table next to the experimenter (E).  
Parents were present if the child preferred it, and sat behind the child so that they 
ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐ ?  ǀŝĚĞŽ ĐĂŵĞƌĂ ƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ĂůůŽǁ
independent coding of imitation behaviour.  
All children started the experiment by completing two practice trials. 
Practice trials were included to ensure that the participants were able to meet the 
basic motor demands of the task. They also familiarised participants with the 
routine of the study  W first they watched an adult playing with some toys, then they 
will be given the opportunity to play themselves. During piloting this was found to 
ƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƌĞĂĐŚŽƵƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚƐďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?
In practice trial 1, E said  ?/ĂŵŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŵĂŬĞĂƉĂƚƚĞƌŶǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞďĞĂĚƐŽŶƚŚŝƐƉĞŐ ?
When I am done, I would like you to make the same pattern on a different peg so 
ǁĂƚĐŚŵĞĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇ ?.  E then placed three beads, one at a time, onto a peg. She then 
offered the three remaining beads to the child and said  ?EŽǁŝƚŝƐǇŽƵƌƚƵƌŶ ?ĐĂŶǇŽƵ
ŵĂŬĞ Ă ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶ ŽŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƉĞŐ ? (pointing to a different peg).  Praise was given on 
completion, regardless of whether the same or a different pattern was made.   For 
practice trial 2, E said  ?EĞǆƚ ƵƉ ? ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ŐŽŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƉůĂǇ ǁŝƚŚ ŵǇ ĚŽůů ĐĂůůĞĚ dĞĚ ? ,Ğ
wants to hide in the pot. Watch me carefully and then you will get a turn to hide 
dĞĚ ? ? E then takes the lid off the pot, places Ted in and puts the lid back on. When 
finished, E then takes Ted out of the pot, hands him to the child and says  ?EŽǁŝƚŝƐ
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ǇŽƵƌƚƵƌŶ ?ĐĂŶǇŽƵŚŝĚĞdĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽƚ ? ?Upon completion, E praised the child. All the 
children were able to complete both of the practice trials without difficulty.  
After the practice trials, the experimental trials began. E said  ?EŽǁǁĞ ĂƌĞ
ŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƉůĂǇǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞŵŽƌĞƚŽǇƐďƵƚƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞǇŽƵĐĂŶƐĞĞ<ĂƚĞƉůĂǇŝŶŐĨŝƌƐƚ ?>Ğƚ ?Ɛ
ƐĞĞ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŽǇƐ <ĂƚĞ ŚĂƐ ? ?For children assigned to the video demonstration 
condition, E produced a laptop and placed it in front of the child. E then ran a 
matlab script which presented the trials in a random order. Each trial started with E 
saying  ?>ŽŽŬ <ĂƚĞ ŚĂƐ Ă ƚŽǇ  ?ĚƵĐŬ ? ?whilst showing the child a picture of the last 
frame of the movie that depicted the end goal of the action. E then continued by 
saying  ?<ĂƚĞŝƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƐŚŽǁǇŽƵŚŽǁƐŚĞŐŽƚƚŚĞ ?ĚƵĐŬ ?ŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞďŽǆ ? ?ǁĂƚĐŚŚĞƌ
ĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŶ ǇŽƵ ǁŝůů ŐĞƚ Ă ƚƵƌŶ ? ? E then played the movie demonstration. 
Once the movie was over, E put the laptop to one side (still displaying the end goal 
ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĐƌĞĞŶ ) ĂŶĚ ŐĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉĂƌĂƚƵƐ ǁŚŝůƐƚ ƐĂǇŝŶŐ  ‘Can you get the 
 ?ĚƵĐŬ ?ŽƵƚ ? ?ĚŽŝƚĂƐƋƵŝĐŬůǇĂƐǇŽƵĐĂŶ ? ? Square brackets indicate where the name of 
the toy was substituted on each trial. Note here that the instructions emphasise the 
action goal and speed, but not the means by which the action is achieved. This 
instruction ensures that children clearly understand their goal in the situation and 
should reduce any copying that is driven by demand characteristics.  These 
instructions have been used previously and rates of overimitation are comparable 
to studies with other instructions (Marsh et al., 2013). The child attempted the task, 
was praised and then started a new trial.  
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Once all five trials were completed, the children were then shown 10 short 
clips from the action sequences again. Five of these were rational actions and 5 
were irrational, presented in a random order. After the clip, they were given a 5-
point scale with a smartly dressed man above the 1 and a clown above the 5. They 
were asked how sensible (E points to the smartly dressed man) or how silly (E points 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞĐůŽǁŶ )ǁĂƐ ƚŚĂƚĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚĞĚĚŽǁŶƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐǀĞƌďĂůŽƌƉŽŝŶƚ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
and moved on to the next clip.  
The procedure for children assigned to the live demonstration condition was 
the same as for the video demonstration except there was no laptop. E had 
laminated photographs of the goal of the action to put in front of the child. Trial 
order was randomised by shuffling the photos between each ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ? ?ƐƐĐƌŝƉƚ
was identical to the video condition. When it was time for the demonstration, a 
demonstrator (D) brought the apparatus to the table and sat directly opposite the 
child. When cued by E, D performed the action sequence.  Then D reset the stimulus 
objects to their original configuration behind a screen, then removed the screen 
and moved out of sight.  E then handed the object to the child, with the same 
instructions as the video condition.  Throughout the live demonstrations, a second 
ǀŝĚĞŽĐĂŵĞƌĂǁĂƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚƚŽĐĂƉƚƵƌĞ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐŚĞĐŬƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŝǀĞ
demonstration was accurate.  After all five trials, D came back and performed the 
same 10 sections of the action sequences that were used in the video ratings. After 
each, the child was presented with the sensible/silly action rating scale and was 
asked by E to rate the action. 
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In addition to the overimitation task, each child completed the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale II (BPVS-II), a standard measure of verbal abilities (Dunn, 
Whetton, & Pintillie, 1999) with a separate researcher and parents completed the 
Social Aptitudes Scale (SAS, Liddle, Batty, & Goodman, (2009)), a general measure of 
social abilities. These measures were completed to check that participants in the 
live and video groups did not differ on verbal ability or social skills and were entered 
as predictors in a regression model to predict overimitation. 
5.3.5 CODING AND DATA ANALYSIS 
All coding was based on the video recordings. The coder was blind to the eye 
contact condition whilst coding the movies. However, the coder was able to tell 
whether the child had received live or video demonstrations based on the 
experimental setup. For each trial, the coder was asked to judge whether the goal 
of the action was achieved and whether the irrational action was performed by the 
child. The irrational action was judged to be performed if the child made a definite 
and purposeful movement on the object, as described in Table 5.1. For each trial, 
the child was awarded a score of 1 for each irrational action completed and 0 
otherwise.  Therefore, each child had a total score out of 5 for overimitation. Data 
from 35 children (37%) were double coded by an independent coder. Overall 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽĚĞƌƐǁĂƐ ? ?A? ?ŽŚĞŶ ?Ɛ<ĂƉƉĂA? ? ? ? ? ? 
All children were able to achieve the goal of each action so this was not 
analysed. There were no significant gender differences or gender by overimitation 
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interactions within this dataset so gender shall not be considered further. Table 5.2 
shows participant statistics for each randomly-allocated group. As there was a 
group difference for BPVS and SAS scores (see Table 5.2), all analyses include these 
scores as covariates to partial out the variance attributed them.  
 
Table 5.2. Participant group characteristics. Numbers displayed are group means (and standard 
deviations) for participants in each condition. 
 Live Video Difference (p) 
n 42 52  
Age 6y9m (1y1m) 6y8m(1y1m) 0.67 
BPVS 109.9 (10.6) 115.6 (10.2) 0.01 
SAS 26.2 (5.1) 23.3 (5.6) 0.01 
Overimitation 2.9  (1.9) 1.2 (1.5)  0.001 
 
For data analysis, I ran three ANCOVAs to test each of our three main 
research questions (every model included age as a factor), followed by a logistic 
regression incorporating all variables. First, I compared the effect of live and video 
demonstration.  The total overimitation score out of five for each child was entered 
into a univariate ANCOVA, with demonstration type entered as a between-
participant factor and age in years and months, SAS and BPVS entered as covariates.  
Second, the effects of eye contact on overimitation were analysed on a trial 
by trial basis, due to an unequal number of trials with and without eye contact per 
child (either two or three). Thus, demonstration type, direct eye contact preceding 
an irrational action and apparatus type were entered into a univariate ANCOVA as 
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between trial factors and age, BPVS and SAS were added as covariates. Interaction 
terms for demonstration type and eye contact with age and demonstration type 
with eye contact were also entered into the model. 
Third, rationality ratings were analysed by calculating a rationality difference 
score for each trial, by suďƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐƌĂƚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌ
rating of the irrational action. Thus each trial for each child had a rationality rating 
ranging from -4 (irrational actions rated as more rational than rational actions) to 4 
(irrational actions rated as more irrational than rational actions).  A score of 0 
reflected no perceived difference in rationality between the rational and irrational 
action.  I tested if overimitation on a trial is related to the later rationality rating 
given on that trial.  Rationality difference scores were also analysed on a trial-by-
trial basis and entered as the dependant variable into a univariate ANCOVA. 
Overimitation behaviour, eye-contact and demonstration type were entered as a 
between trial factors and age, BPVS and SAS were entered as covariates.  
Finally, I performed a binary logistic regression to establish which factors are 
good predictors of overimitation behaviour. Age, BVPS, SAS, demonstration type, 
eye contact and rationality ratings were entered as single variables and 
demonstrator eye contact by age, demonstrator eye contact by condition and 
rationality ratings by age were entered as interaction terms.  All variables were 
entered into a backwards likelihood ratio model. 
 




Sixty-two percent of children completed at least one unnecessary action in at 
least one trial in this sample. Rates of overimitation, split by demonstration 
condition and apparatus type are presented in Table 5.3. Participants in the live 
demonstration condition consistently overimitated more compared to those in the 
video demonstration condition. Overimitation behaviour also differed by apparatus 
type as participants overimitated least on the fan trial compared to all other 
apparatus types. Apparatus type was therefore modelled as a nuisance variable in 
all analyses and will not be considered further. 
 
Table 5.3 Percentage of trials in which overimitation occurred, as a function of demonstration and 
apparatus type.  Figures are the mean (and standard deviation) of rationality difference ratings for 
each apparatus type. 
 






Blocks 70 23 1.43 (1.97) 
Duck 70 31 2.20 (1.75) 
Elephant 65 19 1.94 (1.75) 
Fan 23 15 1.71 (1.86) 
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5.4.1 VIDEO VS LIVE DEMONSTRATION 
Percentage overimitation for each age group as a function of demonstration 
type is presented in Figure 5.1. Overimitation score was entered as the dependant 
variable in a univariate ANCOVA with demonstration type entered as a between 
participant factor and age, BPVS and SAS entered as covariates. A significant main 
effect of demonstration type revealed that children were more likely to over-
imitate a model who demonstrated the action live, compared to a video 
demonstration (F(1,77)=15.035, p<0.0001). There was also main effect of age 
(F(1,77)=4.50, p<0.05), showing that older children were more likely to over-imitate 
than younger children. No main effect of BPVS (F(1,77)=0.09, p=0.76) or SAS 
(F(1,77)=0.14, p=0.71) was found. Furthermore, when analysing a subset of the data 
in which groups were matched for BPVS and SAS (n=39 in each condition), the same 
pattern of results was observed. 




Figure 5.1. Overimitation score for younger and older children (based on a median split) as a function 
of demonstration type. The use of a median split for age is for visualisation purposes only; all 
analyses were run using age as a linear covariate. 
 
5.4.2 EYE CONTACT PRECEDING IRRATIONAL ACTIONS 
Percentage overimitation for each age group as a function of preceding eye 
contact is presented in Figure 5.2. Overimitation was entered as the dependant 
variable in a univariate ANCOVA with eye contact and demonstration type entered 
as between trial factors and age, BPVS and SAS entered as covariates. As with the 
previous analysis, a main effect of demonstration type (F(1,367)=46.73, p<0.0001) 
and a main effect of age (F(1,367)=7.05, p=0.008) was present. No main effect of 
eye contact preceding an irrational action is reported (F(1,367)=0.01, p=0.97) 
although a significant age by eye contact interaction was found (F(1,367)=5.99, 
p=0.01). A post hoc t-test shows that this interaction is driven by an increase in 
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overimitation in the older children when eye contact is absent (t(225)=2.04, 
p=0.04).  In addition, an interaction between age and demonstration type 
(F(1,367)=4.82, p=0.03) was found. This suggests that as children get older, they are 
more likely to over-imitate the live (t(214)=2.48, p=0.01) but not the video condition 
(t(263)=-0.26, p=0.79).  
 
Figure 5.2. Overimitation score for younger and older children (based on a median split) as a function 
of preceding eye contact. The use of a median split is for visualisation purposes only; all analyses 
were run using age as a linear covariate. 
 
5.4.3 RATIONALITY RATINGS 
Rationality difference ratings as a function of overimitation behaviour are 
presented in Figure 5.3. Difference ratings for each trial were entered as the 
dependant variable into a univariate ANCOVA with overimitation behaviour, eye 
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contact and demonstration type entered as between-trial factors and age, BPVS and 
SAS entered as covariates.  Children who overimitated an action subsequently rated 
that action as more irrational than the actions that they did not overimitate 
(F(1,364)=3.89, p=0.05). In addition, older children reported larger rationality 
differences between rational and irrational actions, compared to younger children 
(F(1,364)=16.92, p<0.001). Effects of eye contact (F(1,364)=0.31, p=0.58), 
demonstration type (F(1,364)=3.74, p=0.06), BPVS (F(1,364)=3.28, p=0.07) and SAS 
(F(1,364)=1.33, p=0.25) were not significant. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Mean difference in rationality ratings between rational and irrational actions that were 
either overimitated or not overimitated. Results are visualised using a median split for age but all 




C H A P T E R  5   W I M I T A T I O N  F I D E L I T Y  I N  T Y P I C A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  |  1 6 7  
 
 
5.4.4 PREDICTORS OF OVERIMITATION BEHAVIOUR 
I used a logistic regression model to determine which of all the factors 
measured in this study best predicts overimitation behaviour.  Results are shown in 
Table 5.4.  The final model accounted for 26% of the variance in overimitation 
behaviour (NagelKerke R2 = 0.259) using four of ten variables. Firstly, overimitation 
was most likely when participants saw a live demonstration, compared to a video 
demonstration. Second, overimitation occurred less when participants were given 
the fan trial compared to all other trials. Rationality ratings predicted overimitation 
as the higher the rationality difference rating, the more likely the participant was to 
overimitate. Lastly, an age by eye contact interaction was also a significant predictor 
of overimitation, showing that in the older children, eye contact reduced propensity 
to over-imitate. Child age, the age by rationality rating interaction, BPVS, SAS, 
demonstrator eye contact and the demonstration type by rationality rating 
interaction did not predict overimitation behaviour. Overall, this model was able to 
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Table 5.4. Variables entered into the binary logistic regression. Values are the beta weights, the Wald 
statistic and the p-value for each significantly contributing variable. Variables listed in italics indicate 
those variables entered but excluded during analysis. 
 
Variable Beta Wald p 
Demonstration Type -1.41 34.38 0.0001 
Apparatus Type (fan) -1.70 16.28 0.0001 
Rationality Ratings 0.14 4.08 0.04 
Age x EC 0.48 9.49 0.002 
Age Excluded  W step 1 - - 
Age x Rationality Ratings Excluded  W step 2 - - 
BVPS Excluded  W step 3 - - 
SAS Excluded  W step 4 - - 
Eye Contact Excluded  W step 5 - - 
Demonstration  x EC Excluded  W step 6 - - 
 
5.5 DISCUSSION 
The present study aimed to identify the social modulators of overimitation 
whilst reducing the demands of causal inference.  I found substantial levels of 
overimitation which increased with age, despite testing older children than previous 
studies and using simple objects with minimal causal reasoning demands.   These 
data further show that social cues had a larger impact on older children, who 
overimitated more following live demonstrations but less following eye contact.  
Finally, actions that were rated as least rational were more likely to be copied than 
the actions rated as more rational.  I now discuss what our results mean for social 
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models of overimitation, causal reasoning models, and the development of 
overimitation in turn. 
5.5.1 SOCIAL MODELS OF OVERIMITATION 
Based on previous studies (Brugger et al., 2007; Nielsen, 2006), I predicted 
that overimitation would increase with increases in social engagement, that is, with 
live demonstration and with eye contact.  Our predictions were confirmed for the 
video compared to live demonstration comparison. Across all ages in our sample, 
the live demonstrator was copied with higher fidelity than the videoed 
demonstrator. This is likely to be because the social presence is stronger in the live 
condition. This is consistent with previous findings that suggest increased social 
engagement elicits higher levels of overimitation (Brugger et al., 2007; Nielsen, 
2006).  
In contrast, the eye contact manipulation did not yield the predicted results.  
Previous studies show that socially cued action sequences were overimitated more 
than uncued action sequences (Brugger et al., 2007), and adults mimic faster 
following an eye contact cue (Wang et al., 2011). If overimitation and mimicry are 
dependent on the same underlying mechanism (Over & Carpenter (2012)), we 
would predict that direct eye contact prior to an unnecessary action should increase 
the propensity to imitate.  The results from this manipulation were contingent upon 
the age of the participant. In the younger children there was no significant effect of 
eye contact on overimitation behaviour.  In contrast, direct eye contact prior to an 
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unnecessary action significantly reduced the propensity to overimitate in the older 
children.  
This suggests we may need to re-think the role of eye contact in this 
situation and what it may signal. As an ostensive cue, eye contact could be 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚĂƐĂĐƵĞƚŽ ‘ƉĂǇĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝŶŬĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚ ?In this 
case, the children may be made explicitly aware of the unnecessary action and 
choose not to copy it.   The present results demonstrate that eye contact is a subtle 
cue that can be interpreted in different, context dependant ways.  Further studies 
will be needed to understand the relationship between different eye contact cues in 
mimicry and those in overimitation. 
5.5.2 CAUSAL REASONING MODELS OF OVERIMITATION 
The present study used stimuli which are familiar to the child, with minimal 
causal reasoning demands.  If causal misattributions are driving overimitation 
behaviour, we would expect to see very little overimitation in this task. 
Furthermore, we would expect overimitation behaviour to decrease with age and 
with rationality ratings. These predictions do not reflect the pattern of results that 
was observed.  Sixty-two percent of children overimitated at least one trial in this 
sample, and rates of overimitation increased with age.  Rationality ratings were 
collected to assess how children perceived each action. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
children who copied an unnecessary action subsequently rated it as more irrational 
than those who did not copy it. Again, this provides evidence against a causal 
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learning explanation for overimitation behaviour as children who understand that 
an action is irrational (silly) are more likely to imitate that action.  This finding adds 
to the existing literature as previously, ratings of actions have taken prior to the 
child completing the actions, and thus potentially influencing subsequent imitation 
(Kenward et al., 2011). In addition, Kenward et al. (2011) only included children who 
overimitated and as such, could not demonstrate the relationship between 
rationality ratings and behaviour that this study has identified.  Previous studies 
that find evidence in support of the automatic causal encoding model have 
examined children under five years old (Lyons et al., 2011, 2007). It is possible that 
overimitation in this young group is driven by causal reasoning, while social factors 
dominate in older children as causal reasoning and social skills develop. 
5.5.3 DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGES IN OVERIMITATION 
This study explored overimitation over the 5-8 year old age range.  Like 
previous studies, we find that overimitation increases with age (McGuigan et al., 
2011) in a way that is inconsistent with a causal reasoning explanation. Perhaps 
more interestingly I report two interactions between age and the social 
manipulations in this study (namely demonstration type and eye contact). In both of 
these interactions, sensitivity to the social components of the task increases with 
age.   Previous studies that support the automatic causal encoding hypothesis have 
tested younger children (2-5 year olds) and found persistence in overimitation 
despite social cues (Lyons et al., 2011, 2007).  Again, this data suggests that causal 
reasoning dominates responding in this younger age group, while social cues are 
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much more important in the older children studied here.   This should be 
investigated more thoroughly in a wider age range of children. 
Individual difference measures of verbal intelligence and social ability did 
not predict overimitation. The lack of predictive power of social ability was 
surprising, considering that the social features of the task have a large influence on 
overimitation behaviour. However, this sample did not include a full range of social 
abilities and the SAS is a limited social measure. Studies examining overimitation 
behaviour in a sample of children with autism have yielded different results. Two 
previous studies have shown that children with autism faithfully imitate inefficient 
tool selection and use (Nielsen & Hudry, 2010; Nielsen et al., 2012) but 
overimitation was absent in participants with autism for visibly unnecessary actions 
with minimal causal demands (Marsh et al., 2013 also see Chapter 6). These 
differences indicate that the apparatus types used have a huge bearing on social 
overimitation behaviour and further work should investigate precisely what object 
features are important for overimitation. 
5.5.4 LIMITATIONS 
 I would like to acknowledge two limitations of the current study. Firstly, due 
to the difficulty in developing appropriate stimuli and restriction on experiment 
length, the number of eye contact vs no eye contact trials was unbalanced within 
subject. The analysis of this data on trial-by-trial basis minimises the problems 
associated with unequal trial numbers and I believe the results to be unaffected by 
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this. Secondly, the use of familiar objects in traditional imitation tasks is criticised 
(Zentall, 2012) as participants can act on their prior knowledge of the object and 
therefore, it is difficult to distinguish imitative behaviour from normative behaviour. 
Contrary to this argument, results from our study show that despite object 
familiarity, children frequently complete unnecessary actions which are unlikely to 
have been produced without the demonstration of that action. I argue that in 
overimitation paradigms, the use of familiar objects actually strengthens our 
understanding of overimitation as causal reasoning explanations can be eliminated. 
5.5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The present study demonstrates that overimitation increases with age and is 
modulated by social cues, even in a task with minimal demands for causal 
reasoning.  This argues against a pure causal learning explanation of overimitation, 
and demonstrates that social factors play a critical role in the decision about what 
to imitate.  Older children showed greater sensitivity to social cues, demonstrating 
that development of social interaction skills continues over the primary school 
years. Here, I demonstrate that overimitation is linked to both social sensitivity and 
understanding of action rationality. Therefore, this is an ideal task to test the social 
motivation hypothesis of ASC whilst also probing rationality comprehension. This is 
the topic of study in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6. CHILDREN WITH AUTISM DO NOT OVERIMITATE 
6.1 ABSTRACT 
Children copy unnecessary actions with high fidelity, this is termed 
overimitation.  The degree to which children overimitate is socially modulated. 
Children with autism have documented social difficulties and may also have an 
imitation deficit. The present study investigates whether children with autism 
engage in overimitation. Previously, children with autism have been shown to 
faithfully imitate inefficient tool selection and use with novel objects. The aim of 
this study was to see if children with autism continue to engage in overimitation 
with familiar objects. 31 children with autism, 30 chronological age (CA) and 30 
verbal mental age (VMA) matched controls had the opportunity to overimitate on 
five trials. Following imitation, children were asked to rate hoǁ  ‘ƐĞŶƐŝďůĞ ? Žƌ ŚŽǁ
 ‘ƐŝůůǇ ? ĞĂĐŚ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ǁĂƐ ? ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ǁŝƚŚ ĂƵƚŝƐŵ ŽǀĞƌŝŵŝƚĂƚĞĚ
unnecessary actions significantly less than both the CA- and VMA- matched 
controls. Furthermore, children with autism were less able to differentiate sensible 
and silly actions when asked explicitly. These results show that children with autism 
accurately copy goal-directed actions but do not overimitate in circumstances 
where typical children do.  This lack of overimitation means that children with 
autism miss out on a wealth of social learning opportunities that typical children 
exploit. 
 




Copying the behaviour of others is important for forming social bonds with 
other people and for learning about the world (Carpenter, 2006).  After seeing an 
actor demonstrate actions on a novel object, typically developing children faithfully 
copy both necessary and visibly unnecessary actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005). This 
 ‘ŽǀĞƌŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŝƐ ĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ŽďũĞĐƚ ? ďƵƚ
may alsŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚĂƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
demonstrator (Over & Carpenter, 2012) or to conform to perceived norms 
(Kenward, 2012). This literature has been discussed in more detail in Section 5.2 of 
this thesis. The results from the experiment presented in Chapter 5 support the 
social view of overimitation, demonstrating that the presence or absence of the 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ŚĂƐ Ă ůĂƌŐĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽŶ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ĨĂŝƚŚĨƵůůǇ ŝŵŝƚĂƚĞ ? /Ŷ
addition, children were more likely to imitate an unnecessary action when it was 
subsequently rated as silly. This shows that a lack of understanding or uncertainty is 
not driving faithful imitation behaviour. 
Given that overimitation appears to be socially motivated, it is interesting to 
consider how children with ASC perform on this task. Previous studies have  
demonstrated that children with ASC imitate in a goal-directed way (Hamilton, 
Brindley, et al., 2007), and that they imitate meaningful actions more than 
meaningless actions (Rogers, Bennetto, McEvoy, & Pennington, 1996). We also 
know that individuals with ASC are less likely to imitate the style of an action whilst 
still imitating the action goal (Hobson & Lee, 1999) and this is especially pronounced 
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when comparing goal-directed and goal-less actions (Wild et al., 2012). Considering 
this evidence and the finding that overimitation behaviour is socially-driven (see 
Chapter 5), we can make a strong prediction that children with ASC will not 
overimitate. 
 Contrary to this prediction, two previous studies have directly tested this 
hypothesis and concluded that children with autism do engage in overimitation 
behaviour (Nielsen & Hudry, 2010; Nielsen et al., 2012). This is a puzzling finding but 
close examination of the methods used in these studies reveals that they may 
confound object learning and social components of overimitation behaviour. The 
objects used in both of these studies were physically opaque and the demonstrated 
actions that led to the opening of the box involved the use of tools. Furthermore, 
the irrelevant actions performed on these objects also involved using a tool to 
interact with the object in some way. As described previously (section 5.2), this use 
of tools and novel, opaque objects cannot separate object learning and social 
imitation because the task inherently involves learning about the object. Even 
though researchers consider these objects to be causally transparent in their 
mechanŝƐŵ ? ǇŽƵŶŐ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ĐĂƵƐĂů ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ĂďŽƵƚ ŶŽǀĞů ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ŝƐ ƵŶĐůĞĂƌ
(Kenward et al., 2011).  
In the present study I re-examine the hypothesis that children with ASC will 
not overimitate by isolating and measuring the social component of overimitation.  
To do this, I will use simple, non-mechanical objects, which preclude object 
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learning. As in Chapter 5, I will also assess how imitation fidelity changes with 
improvements in social skills. 
6.3 METHOD 
6.3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Participants were 31 children with autism (ASC), 30 typically developing 
children matched for chronological age (CA-match) and 30 typically developing 
children matched for verbal mental age (VMA-match). Table 6.1 describes the 
profile of each group. There was no difference in chronological age between the 
ASC and the CA-match participants (t(59)=1.39, p=0.17) and no difference in verbal 
mental age (assessed by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale - BPVS, Dunn, Dunn, 
Whetton, & Pintillie, 1999) between the ASC and VMA-match participants 
(t(59)=0.15, p=0.88).   
All children in the autism group had a diagnosis of autism, autism spectrum 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ Žƌ ƐƉĞƌŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐǇŶĚƌŽŵĞ ĨƌŽŵ ĂŶ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ĐůŝŶŝĐŝĂŶ Žƌ ƉĂĞĚŝĂƚƌŝĐŝĂŶ ?
This diagnosis was confirmed using parent reports of the social communication 
questionnaire lifetime edition (SCQ, Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003) in 27 participants. 
Additionally, one participant scored just below the recommended cut-off for autism 
on this measure and three parents failed to complete it. These four participants 
were all recruited through specialist schools for autism or through an autism unit at 
a mainstream school so I am confident of their diagnoses.   However, to ensure that 
these participants did not alter my results, all analyses were performed with and 
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without these participants and the results remain unchanged (see section 6.4.1). 
Parents of all children completed the Social Aptitudes Scale (SAS, Liddle, Batty, & 
Goodman (2009)) ? Ă ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ?
children with ASC scored significantly lower on this measure than children in the CA-
match and VMA-match groups (CA: t(53)=14.5, p<0.001, VMA: t(55)=12.8, p<0.001). 
Two children with autism scored just outside of the recommended cut-off for 
autism on this measure, although they both met criteria for autism on the SCQ and 
had a clinical diagnosis. No children in either of the typically developing groups met 
the recommended criteria for autism on the SAS and parents of these children 
reported no developmental disorder. 
Children with autism were recruited from schools in the Nottingham area.   
Typically developing children took part in the study as part of the Summer Scientists 
week event where children complete a number of cognitive tasks over half a day at 
the University of Nottingham.  The parents of all children gave written informed 
consent before testing began. 
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Table 6.1. Participant characteristics for chronological age (CA) matched, verbal mental age (VMA) 
matched and autism spectrum condition (ASC) groups. Figures reported are group mean ± standard 









Abbreviations: CA- chronological age; VMA- verbal mental age; ASC- autism spectrum conditions; 




The procedure for this study was identical to that used in the live condition 
of the study presented in Chapter 5. All participants were tested in a quiet room of 
the University or their school. As with the previous study, participants completed 
the overimitation task followed by the rationality ratings task.  
Group CA- match VMA- match ASC 
n 30 30 31 
Age 
8.66 ± 2.0 
(4.9 - 12.7) 
6.0 ± 1.3 
(4.2 - 8.6) 
9.4 ± 2.3 
(5.2 - 13.6) 
BPVS raw 
94.5 ± 19.9 
(57 - 137) 
65.9 ± 20.6 
(35 - 122) 
66.7 ± 21.5 
(33 - 119) 
SAS 
27.6 ± 4.7 
(10 - 39) 
24.1 ± 4.1 
(17 - 32) 
9.2 ± 4.6 
(0 - 19) 
Overimitation 
2.6 ± 1.9 
(0 - 5) 
2.2 ± 2.1 
(0 - 5) 
1.1 ± 1.6 
(0 - 5) 
Rationality 
Discrimination 
2.5 ± 0.8 
(0 - 3.4) 
2.2 ± 1.2 
(-0.8 - 4) 
1.3 ± 1.2 
(-1.2 - 4) 
Theory of Mind (%) not collected not collected 
57.7 ± 28.7 
(0 - 100) 
SCQ scores not collected not collected 
25.5 ± 4.9 
(15-33) 
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 In addition to the tests of overimitation and rationality discrimination, 
participants completed the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS-II) for VMA-
matching. In order to explore the relationship between overimitation and theory of 
mind ability, ASC participants also completed a standard theory of mind battery, 
including six false belief questions and six trials of a penny hiding task as used in 
(Hamilton, Brindley, et al., 2007). 
6.3.3 DATA CODING AND ANALYSIS 
The entire testing session was video recorded and coding was completed 
retrospectively.  All participants correctly completed the warm-up trials. Correct 
goal achievement was recorded if the participant was able to open the box or build 
the object. Performance was 100% for the typically developing children on all tasks.  
One child with ASC failed to retrieve the duck or build the block tower due to 
increased sensory interest in the objects, and two children with ASC failed to make 
the fan, instead folding the paper in the wrong way.  For these participants, their 
overimitation score was computed as a proportion of the number of trials that they 
did complete. Overall performance for the ASC group was 97%.  Overimitation was 
scored from the videos.  On each trial, a participant was given a score of 1 if he/she 
completed the unnecessary action and a score of 0 if he/she did not.  Scores were 
summed to give a participant overimitation score range from 5 to 0. All coding was 
completed by two independent researchers and reliability between coding was 
ŐŽŽĚ ?ŽŚĞŶ ?ƐŬĂƉƉĂA? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
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A rationality discrimination score was calculated for each trial by subtracting 
ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐƌĂƚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵŚŝƐ ?ŚĞƌƌĂƚŝŶŐ
of the unnecessary action. This score therefore ranges from -4 to 4 and indicates 
the degree to which the participant is able to discriminate rational and irrational 
actions, with higher scores indicating good discrimination and zero scores indicating 
ĐŚĂŶĐĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?ĂĐŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐŵĞĂŶƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇĚŝƐĐrimination score was 
calculated for further analysis. 
Analysis of overimitation and rationality discrimination was conducted using 
separate univariate ANCOVAs for comparisons between the each of the typically 
developing groups and the ASC group. Group membership (TD or ASC) was entered 
as a between-subjects variable in each model. When comparing the VMA-matched 
group to the ASC group, raw BPVS score was added as a covariate and when 
comparing the CA-matched group to the ASC group, age was entered as a covariate.  
In this study, eye contact did not influence overimitation in either typically 
developing or ASC participants (CA-match: t(141)=1.24, p=0.22; VMA-match: 
t(137)=0.21, p=0.84; ASC: t(148)=0.76, p=0.45), so all further analyses reported in 










Children with ASC showed less overimitation than the CA-matched 
(F(1,58)=12.84, p<0.001) or VMA-matched (F(1,58) = 7.01, p=0.01) typically 
developing children. Typically developing children copied 43% (VMA-matched) and 
57% (CA-matched) of the unnecessary actions but children with autism copied only 
22% (see Figure 6.1). There was no effect of age or BPVS on overimitation 
behaviour. To ensure that the four children without a confirmed diagnosis on the 
SCQ are not driving this difference, we performed the analyses again with these 
children excluded. The results remain unchanged (CA-match v. ASC subgroup: 
F(1,53)=12.9, p=0.004) and VMA-match v. ASC subgroup: (F(1,53)=6.2, p<0.01)). 
Furthermore, following the exclusion of these four participants the groups remain 
matched for chronological age (CA-match: t(55)=0.66, p=0.51) and verbal mental 
age  (VMA-match: t(55)=0.70, p=0.49). 
The number of children who failed to overimitate on any trial varied 
between groups. In the chronological age-matched group 7 children did not 
overimitate at all, this is compared to 12 children in the VMA-matched group and 17 
in the ASC group. 
 
 




Figure 6.1. Panel A shows the mean number of irrational actions copied (maximum 5) for the 
chronologial age matched (dark grey), verbal mental age matched (mid grey) and autism spectrum 
condition (light grey) groups. Panel B shows the mean rationality discrimination score (ranging from -
4 to +4) for each of these groups. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error. 
 
6.4.2 RATIONALITY DISCRIMINATION SCORE 
The rationality discrimination score was calculated by subtracting the ratings 
of the necessary actions from the ratings of the unnecessary actions. All three 
groups performed significantly above chance (zero) (CA-match: t(29)=16.1, p<0.001; 
VMA-match: t(29)=10.2, p<0.001; ASC: t(30)=5.9, p<0.001) on this measure (see 
Figure 6.1).  However, children with ASC were significantly worse at judging the 
rationality of actions, when compared to CA-matched (F(1,58)=19.62, p<0.001) and 
VMA-matched (F(1,58)=9.29, p=0.003) groups. These results remain unchanged 
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when the four ASC children without SCQ diagnosis are excluded from the sample 
(CA-match v. ASC subgroup: F(1,53)=22.8, p<0.001) and VMA-match v. ASC 
subgroup: (F(1,53)=10.6, p=0.002). Histograms of the ratings given by each group 
are presented in Figure 6.2. Both groups of typically developing children rated 
almost all the necessary actions as 1 and rated the unnecessary actions as 4 or 5.  
Children with ASC are performing this task in a similar way, with the majority of 
responses falling at the extremes of the scale. However, they are also making more 
errors than the typically developing children, scoring more necessary actions as 5 
and unnecessary actions as 1. This can account for the reduced rationality 
discrimination scores found in the ASC group. 
In order to control for the effects of rationality discrimination ability on 
overimitation, all analyses were repeated with rationality discrimination score 
included as a covariate. The group difference in rates of overimitation between the 
typically developing groups and the ASC group remains unchanged (CA-match: 
F(1,57)=6.19, p=0.02 ; VMA-match: F(1,57)=4.74, p=0.03). Furthermore, the effect 
of rationality discrimination score on overimitation was not significant (CA-match: 
F(1,57)=1.42, p=0.24; VMA-match: F(1,57)=0.46, p=0.50). 




Figure 6.2. Histograms of rationality ratings for necessary (panel A) and unnecessary (panel B) 
actions as given by CA-matched TD participants (dark grey bars), VMA-matched participants (mid-
grey bars) and ASC participants (light grey bars). 
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6.4.3 PREDICTORS OF IMITATION 
I ĂůƐŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞĚǁŚĂƚĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐŽǀĞƌŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŽƌĞ ?ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ
with autism completed a battery of theory of mind tasks and their parents 
completed the lifetime version of the SCQ.  These measures were not available for 
the typically developing children due to time constraints. A composite theory of 
mind score was generated for each child, averaging performance on the false belief 
tasks and the penny hiding tasks.   I used linear regression to test if overimitation 
performance in children with autism was predicted by their age, BVPS score, ToM 
score, SAS score or SCQ score.  In total this model accounted for a significant 
proportion of the variance in overimitation scores (R2=0.44, p=0.02). However, no 
single variable was a significant predictor (age: t=0.41, p=0.68; BPVS: t=1.93, p=0.07; 
theory of mind: t=0.67, p=0.51; SAS: t=0.02, p=0.99; SCQ: t=1.30, p=0.21). Note that 
our sample size of 31 is small for this type of analysis, and further study of the 
relationship between overimitation and other measures of social cognition would 
be valuable.  
6.5 DISCUSSION 
The aim of the present study was to test whether children with ASC 
overimitate when the object-learning component of a task is reduced. The results 
reported here have some important implications. First, typically developing children 
show substantial overimitation of unnecessary actions on familiar objects, despite 
understanding thaƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ  ‘ƐŝůůǇ ? ?  dŚĞƐĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ůĞŶĚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
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position that overimitation in typical children is a social phenomenon rather than 
ďĞŝŶŐ ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ĐĂƵƐĂů ůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚƐ ?  dŚŝƐ ƐŽĐŝĂů
ŽǀĞƌŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŵĂǇ ŝŶĚĞǆ Ă ĐŚŝůĚ ?s motivation (Chevallier et al., 2012) to affiliate 
(Over & Carpenter, 2012) or to conform to perceived norms (Kenward et al., 2011). 
Second, children with autism show significantly less overimitation of the 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?  dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ďǇ ǁĞĂŬŵŽƚŽƌ ƐŬŝůů ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ Ăůů ƚŚĞ
unnecessary actions were familiar simple actions (e.g. tapping a box) and all 
children were able to complete the more complex goal-directed actions in the 
sequence.  It is also not driven by superior causal reasoning, because the children 
with ASC also performed worse on the rationality discrimination task.  The data go 
beyond previous studies which showed reduced imitation of action style (Hobson & 
Lee, 1999) and reduced spontaneous imitation (Ingersoll, 2008) where differences 
in behaviour could be driven by the children with autism failing to adopt the same 
goal as the demonstrator.  In this task, children are instructed that the goal is to 
make/retrieve the toy, and all are able to do so.  The failure of children with autism 
to spontaneously copy unnecessary actions can best be explained in terms of 
reduced social motivation in these children, with less desire or ability to affiliate 
with or conform to the perceived norm. 
The results from the present study contrast with those recently reported by 
Nielsen et al. (2012) which show high rates of overimitation in children with ASC. 
This is despite both studies aiming to test the same hypothesis in children with 
autism with similar ability profiles. There are several possible reasons for this 
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difference. First, the types of objects used in the two studies are very different. The 
present study used simple, familiar objects that were transparent in both their 
causal mechanism and their physical appearance. Furthermore, we directly test 
whether the children understood the causal nature of the actions demonstrated. In 
contrast, Nielsen et al. (2012) used objects that were causally opaque in their 
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ŶŽ ĐŚĞĐŬ ĨŽƌ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
therefore, that the overimitation reported by Nielsen et al. (2012) reflects object 
learning as well as social imitation and it is the object learning that drives imitation 
in ASC children.  A second difference between the studies is that the unnecessary 
actions in the present study were simple hand actions, whereas the unnecessary 
actions in the Nielsen et al. (2012) study involved the use of a tool. There is little 
previous research directly investigating the use of tools in overimitation compared 
to the use of unnecessary hand actions.  The simple hand actions used in our study 
remove the need for object learning and causal reasoning about actions, and 
provide a cleaner measure of social imitation. However, further testing of the 
circumstances that drive children with autism to imitate would be valuable. 
The results from this study do not lead us to conclude that children with ASC 
have difficulty understanding the causal relations between actions and objects. As, 
children with ASC were performing significantly above chance on the rationality 
discrimination measure, I conclude that they do understand the rating scale and are 
able to make judgements about the rationality of actions, yet they do not 
discriminate rational and irrational actions as clearly as typically developing 
children.  Additionally, there is no evidence that reduced overimitation in autism is 
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driven by better detection of action rationality or by better casual reasoning. This 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚŽǀĞƌŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽĨĂĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚĞǁŚŝĐŚ
actions are rational or irrational in a sequence.  This finding is compatible with a 
social explanation of overimitation behaviour rather than an object learning or 
casual reasoning explanation. 
Previous studies have examined social attention in autism using eye-tracking 
tasks (Klin et al., 2002), and have examined social motivation using brain-imaging of 
high functioning adults with ASC (reviewed in Chevallier et al. (2012)), but simple 
methods for measuring social motivation in children did not exist.  The ease of 
implementing this task, and the close links between overimitation and social 
mimicry in adults (Over & Carpenter, 2012), mean that this approach can provide a 
powerful and general tool for examining social motivation in child and adult 
participants.   
6.5.1 CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, this experiment leads to two important conclusions.  First, studies of 
social interaction can examine the social component of imitation behaviour 
independent of the object-learning component, and this can best be done using 
familiar objects.  Second, children with autism do not show overimitation of actions 
on familiar objects.  This specific difference in a behaviour linked to social affiliation 
and norm conformity is compatible with claims of abnormal social motivation in 
autism.
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CHAPTER 7. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
7.1 SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The experiments reported in this thesis draw on a range of methods with 
the general aim of identifying the processes which we use to understand the 
actions of others. More specifically, I aimed to evaluate and use irrational actions as 
a tool to examine the interplay between the action observation and the mentalizing 
networks of the brain. Additionally I aimed to examine the integrity of these 
systems in individuals with autism spectrum condition. Here I briefly summarize the 
results from each of the experiments in relation to these aims before discussing the 
implications of these findings and some emerging questions. 
The experiment presented in Chapter 2 clearly demonstrates that the action 
observation and mentalizing networks of the human brain spontaneously 
differentiate action rationality when viewing irrational actions. Furthermore, these 
networks respond in a similar way when the action is performed by a human agent 
or by an animated ball, implying that we adopt a similar process of rationality 
resolution for human and non-human agents. Finally, I also demonstrate that 
explicit ratings of action rationality correlate with the BOLD signal within these 
networks. Together these results indicate that irrational actions do engage the 
action observation and mentalizing networks of the human brain simultaneously. 
Previously it has been proposed that these networks function independently (Van 
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Overwalle, 2009). Here, I provide new evidence that refutes this claim. Irrational 
actions can be used as a tool to probe the interaction of these networks and to 
establish how they work together to achieve full action comprehension.   
To take this finding further and investigate the cognitive processes that the 
neural activity within these networks reflect, an exploratory eye tracking study was 
conducted. In Chapter 3, I report a number of eye tracking markers which 
demonstrate that typically developing participants are automatically detecting 
action rationality. During observation of an irrational action participants spend 
more time tracking the action and looking at the expected end state of that action. 
In contrast during the observation of rational actions, participants spend longer 
evaluating the environmental constraints that impact the actions. Perhaps this 
extra level of evaluation reflects the rationalisation of the unusual movement path. 
Lending weight to this interpretation is that finding that participants also spent 
longer evaluating the environmental constraints during irrational human actions 
compared to those performed by the moving ball. Other than this interaction, the 
social form of the agent had surprisingly little impact upon eye movements. This 
supports my previous conclusion that rationality is processed for human and non-
human agents alike.  
The final finding to emerge from this study was that predictive eye 
movements were modulated by the action kinematics, but not the rationality of the 
actions. This has important implications for the debate regarding whether 
predictive eye movements are generated by the mirror neuron system (Flanagan & 
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Johansson, 2003; see also section 1.3 for a full review of this debate). We know 
from previous neuroimaging work that analysis of action kinematics activates the 
mirror neuron system, and in particular the IFG (Hamilton & Grafton, 2008; Pobric 
& Hamilton, 2006). In contrast, the evaluation of action rationality recruits 
additional brain networks such as the mentalizing network (Brass, Schmitt, 
Spengler, & Gergely, 2007; Marsh & Hamilton, 2011; see also Chapter 2). As 
predictive eye movements were modulated by action kinematics but insensitive to 
action rationality, it is likely that the mirror neuron system is playing a key role in 
generating them. 
The experiment reported in Chapter 4 was designed to establish whether 
rationality understanding is intact in individuals with ASC and to probe the integrity 
of the action observation and the mentalizing networks. I did this by applying the 
analysis method developed in Chapter 3 to a new dataset from adults with ASC and 
typically developing adults. The rationality detection markers established in the 
typically developing eye movement data from Chapter 3 were also present in 
individuals with ASC. This indicates that participants with ASC do automatically 
detect when an action is irrational. In addition to this finding, participants with ASC 
were able to explicitly rate the rationality of the actions and did not differ from 
typically developing participants in this regard. The realm in which typical and ASC 
participants did differ was when I looked at measures of attention to the action 
such as the time spent looking at the ball and the goal locations or the number of 
saccades from the ball to the goal. There were no differences in the latency of 
action prediction between groups and I replicate the finding from Chapter 3 which 
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demonstrated that latency of goal prediction is modulated by the movement 
kinematics of an action and insensitive to action rationality. 
Given that the ASC group showed very similar cognitive processes for 
rationality resolution when analysing their eye movements, I hypothesised that the 
neural differences previously reported during irrational action observation may be 
due to differences in social processing. The finding of reduced social attention in 
the eye movement data in individuals with ASC also supports this claim. Therefore, 
an interactive task which is dependent upon social responses to irrational actions 
may reveal larger group differences. In Chapter 5 I reported a study that used 
overimitation as a method to assess rationality understanding developmentally. I 
demonstrated that overimitation of irrational actions is both socially modulated 
and related to rationality understanding in typical development. Somewhat 
surprisingly this relationship revealed that overimitation of irrational actions 
ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ŚŽǁƐŝůůǇ ĂŶ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ? dŚŝƐ
suggests that overimitation of irrational actions does not indicate a lack of 
understanding about how an object works; instead it is a socially driven response to 
behave similarly to those around them. This study also demonstrates that 
overimitation can be used as a method to assess rationality comprehension and 
social responsiveness in combination. 
Chapter 6 reported the results from the same task in children with ASC. As 
predicted, children with ASC were less likely to overimitate than their typically 
developing counterparts. Instead, children with ASC completed the tasks using the 
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most efficient goal-directed means available, indicating a lack of social drive to 
affiliate or conform. Thus, at an implicit level, children with ASC have good 
rationality comprehension, effectively parsing out irrational actions from a 
demonstration and only including those actions which allow access to a given goal. 
However, children with ASC are less able to explicitly rate the rationality of the 
actions when compared to typically developing children. Instead, they give less 
certain responses and make more errors in their judgements. Overall, the findings 
from this study show that basic action comprehension and goal-directed imitation is 
intact in ASC but the social response to copy others faithfully is absent. 
7.2 EMERGING QUESTIONS 
Drawing together the results from each of these studies we can see some 
converging findings that answer some more general questions about how we 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ
is difficult for people with autism. I now address these questions, discussing how 
the data from the reported studies advance current thinking, and highlighting the 
areas that warrant more research. 
7.2.1 HOW DO WE TYPICALLY UNDERSTAND IRRATIONAL ACTIONS? 
In the introduction to this thesis I present the idea that irrational actions 
may be a useful tool in the investigation of how we understand the actions that we 
observe. Importantly, I proposed that irrational actions may be the key to studying 
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the bridge between our understanding of what action has been performed and an 
understanding of why that action was performed. Indeed, the data presented in 
Chapter 2 shows that observing irrational actions can spontaneously engage both 
the mirror and mentalizing networks of the human brain in typically developing 
adults. This confirms previous findings (Brass et al., 2007; Marsh & Hamilton, 2011) 
but also advances our knowledge by demonstrating that this engagement was 
irrespective of the social form of the agent performing the action. Previously, both 
the human mirror system and the mentalizing system have been thought of as 
specific networks which are finely tuned to human action (Buccino et al., 2004; 
Press, 2011; Tai, Scherfler, Brooks, Sawamoto, & Castiello, 2004). However, recent 
work has shown that it is possible to attribute goals (Ramsey & Hamilton, 2010) and 
mental states (Castelli et al., 2000) to moving shapes with no human form using the 
mirror and mentalizing systems respectively. I now add to this literature by 
demonstrating that rationality can also be processed for non-human forms in the 
same neural networks. This is consistent with the arguments of Csibra who claims 
that the computation of rationality is conducted for human and non-human forms 
alike (Csibra, Gergely, Bíró, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999). 
However, a question that remains unanswered from neuroimaging data is 
what are the cognitive processes that underlie irrational action understanding and 
why do irrational actions engage both mirror and mentalizing networks? Previously, 
this question has only briefly been touched upon with Brass et al. (2007) proposing 
that irrational actions prompt the observer to make inferences about why an action 
was performed inefficiently, thus additionally recruiting the mentalizing network. 
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To date, there is scant evidence to evaluate this claim although it seems that in 
some cases, observing an irrational action is not sufficient to activate the 
mentalizing network (Jastorff et al., 2010). A more comprehensive model of 
rationality understanding is required to elucidate the cognitive and neural 
processes that support irrational action understanding. The eye tracking data that I 
presented in Chapter 3 may help to break down the process of understanding 
irrational actions into discrete cognitive components that may be localised to 
different regions within the mirror and mentalizing networks. In the following 
paragraphs, I attempt to link different eye movement patterns to the cognitive 
processes that may be involved in understanding action rationality and the brain 
systems that support them. 
During both rational and irrational action observation, participants spent a 
large amount of their time tracking the actions by following the ball as it moved 
across the screen. In addition, this action tracking increased when observing 
irrational actions. Action tracking may signal that participants are engaging in 
kinematic analysis of the action features. This kinematic analysis is crucial for 
evaluating the efficiency or rationality of an action and may also help the observer 
to make or test predictive inferences about the action goal. An ideal candidate 
brain system for these processes is the IFG. Previous research shows that the IFG is 
more active when participants are instructed to attend to the means by which an 
action is achieved (de Lange et al., 2008). In addition, the IFG is sensitive to 
variations in action kinematics despite identical action goals (Hamilton & Grafton, 
2006) and this sensitivity to kinematic action features is reduced following TMS to 
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the IFG (Pobric & Hamilton, 2006). Furthermore, the importance of the IFG for 
making predictive inferences about the outcome of an action are also highlighted 
(Kilner et al., 2004). For these reasons it is possible to draw a link between the 
increased action tracking seen in the eye movements and the increased IFG activity 
reported in the MRI results during irrational action observation.  
A second feature which dominates looking time during both rational and 
irrational actions is the goal locations. Participants spent a large proportion of their 
time looking at the two possible locations where the ball could be placed. This 
visual analysis of the goals may reflect a process of goal identification. Indeed, there 
was an increase in looking time to the non-target goal during irrational actions. The 
increase in looking time in this case may reflect more effortful goal identification for 
these more complex actions. From previous studies we know that simple goal 
encoding is supported by the left anterior intraparietal sulcus, a portion of the left 
IPL (Hamilton & Grafton, 2006; Ramsey & Hamilton, 2010). This region did not 
differentiate action rationality in the MRI results reported in Chapter 2. Therefore, 
it seems that this region encodes simple goals and does not care about the unusual 
means by which these goals were achieved. This is consistent with previous reports 
(Hamilton & Grafton, 2008). However, I did identify an increase in activity in the 
right IPL during irrational actions. This increase was also reported in a previous 
study (Marsh & Hamilton, 2011). I propose that the additional engagement of the 
right IPL during irrational actions allows the observer to attribute goals to more 
complex actions and to identify those actions which violate the principle of 
rationality.   
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The third interesting pattern within the eye movement data was found 
when analysing the looking time to the barrier. In Chapter 3 I showed that 
participants spent more time looking at the barrier during rational, compared to 
irrational actions and that this increase was greater during human actions 
compared to ball actions. It is likely that this inspection of the environmental 
constraints that impact an action reflects mentalizing about why that action has 
been performed unusually (Elsner et al., 2013). Indeed, if we compare the pattern 
of responding in the mPFC across conditions to the pattern of time spent looking at 
the barrier across conditions, there is a good correspondence.  Therefore, activity 
within the mPFC is likely to reflect rationality evaluation or resolution which can 
lead to an understanding of why an action has been performed. 
A final interesting finding to come out of the eye tracking data is that 
predictive eye movements are not modulated by action rationality. This is 
somewhat surprising as irrational actions should be less predictable. However, this 
finding is consistent with a growing body of research which suggests that predictive 
eye movements are generated by the mirror system (see section 1.3). The studies in 
this thesis do not attempt to identify which component of the mirror system is 
generating these predictive eye movements. Both the IPL for its goal identification 
and the IFG for its role in making predictive inferences about actions would be good 
candidates. It is even possible that the two work in combination. Further research 
could use TMS to tease this apart. 
C H A P T E R  7   W G E N E R A L  D I S C U S S I O N  |  1 9 9  
 
 
I now aim to draw these components together into a neurocognitive model 
which sets out how irrational actions are identified and understood.  According to 
ƐŝďƌĂ ?ƐŵŽĚĞůŽĨ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ(Gergely & Csibra, 2003), detection of 
an irrational action relies on a comparison of the action goal and the means by 
which the action is achieved. Therefore, I propose that the IFG and the left IPL 
perform simple kinematic analysis and goal identification respectively. Only the 
combination of information from these systems is required to understand what an 
agent is doing if they are behaving rationally (see Figure 7.1). However, if there is a 
mismatch between the action kinematics and the goal such that the action was not 
performed in the most efficient way, additional processing is required for 
understanding. The engagement of the right IPL in these cases may reflect this 
rationality detection through the more complex identification of the goal. Following 
detection of an irrational action, the mentalizing system is then engaged in order to 
make inferences about why the action was performed in an unusual manner, taking 
into account the environmental constraints (see Figure 7.2). 




Figure 7.1 The neurocognitive processes involved in rational action observation 
 




Figure 7.2 The neurocognitive processes involved in irrational action observation. During irrational 
actions the right IPL is additionally recruited when a mismatch between the action goal and the 
kinematics is detected. If the action is sufficiently irrational to surpass the rationality threshold, the 
mPFC is also recruited to evaluate why the action has been performed in this way. 
 
However, one question that remains unanswered by the experiments in this 
thesis is how irrational does an action need to be before it is considered irrational 
and processed differently? From the comparison of analysis methods used on the 
fMRI data in Chapter 2, it is possible to see that the strength of activity in the action 
ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚĞƐ ůŝŶĞĂƌůǇ ǁŝƚŚ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? ƌĂƚŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ
rationality. However, the mentalizing network does not show this pattern of 
responding. Instead it seems that the mPFC only ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?
ĂŶĚ  ‘ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? ? /ƚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ
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network there is some kind of rationality detection threshold which needs to be 
surpassed to additionally recruit the mentalizing network. Further work is needed 
to establish whether this is really the case and whether this threshold can be 
manipulated by social context or other action features.  
7.2.2 WHAT IS THE TYPICAL SOCIAL RESPONSE TO IRRATIONAL ACTIONS? 
We can learn a lot about a person by observing the way in which they 
behave. However, in most social situations we are also required to respond to 
ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ Ă ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵů ƐŽĐŝĂů ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞ
experiment reported in Chapter 5 of this thesis was designed to investigate 
imitative responses to irrational actions.  
The primary finding from the study presented in Chapter 5 is that despite 
using simple, familiar objects and despite children demonstrating a good 
understanding of the rationality of the actions that they observed, children 
frequently persist in imitating irrational actions. This finding is inconsistent with 
causal reasoning explanations which suggest that children incorporate the irrational 
action into their understanding of how an object works. Instead, I propose that 
overimitation occurs for social reasons and could be a process of affiliation (Over & 
Carpenter, 2012) or conformity (Kenward et al., 2011; Kenward, 2012). One way in 
which this study advances current thinking about overimitation is the detailed 
investigation of the social cues which influence imitation. Clearly social presence 
has a huge influence on imitation behaviour as children of all ages copied irrational 
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actions more when a demonstration was presented live compared to on a video. 
However, the exact nature of how this social presence boosts imitation behaviour is 
not fully understood. Originally I hypothesised that an increase in social 
engagement would lead to an increase in overimitation. This was true when 
comparing live and video demonstrations. However, when social engagement was 
increased with direct eye contact, overimitation actually decreased. Therefore, 
merely manipulating how socially engaging the demonstrator was does not impact 
overimitation in a simple way. Despite direct eye contact having the opposite effect 
to that which I expected, it is important and interesting to note that it still had a 
significant effect on behaviour. In order to explain how these social cues can have 
different effects on overimitation and to integrate these findings into my 
neurocognitive model of rationality understanding, I now draw on some ideas 
raised by an existing model which describes the social control of mimicry. 
The theory of Social Top-down Response Modulation (STORM, Wang & 
Hamilton, (2012)) posits that social cues and context are integrated and evaluated 
within any given social interaction. Mimicry within the interaction is then subtly 
modulated by this evaluation in a strategic way that aids self-advancement. This is 
clearly demonstrated in a study in which participants who were instructed to 
affiliate with their interaction partner were more likely to mimic their partner than 
those who were given no instruction to affiliate (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). 
Importantly for this model, social cues do not simply enhance mimicry but can also 
reduce mimicry under certain conditions in which mimicry could be detrimental to 
the social interaction. For example, participants displayed reduced mimicry of 
C H A P T E R  7   W G E N E R A L  D I S C U S S I O N  |  2 0 4  
 
 
dominant behaviours that were performed by high-status individuals (Tiedens & 
Fragale, 2003). Thus the modulation of mimicry is bi-directional and subtly 
influenced by social information. Perhaps a similar mechanism of social evaluation 
takes place in an overimitation task and this can explain the enhancement and 
reduction of overimitation by different social cues that I reported in Chapter 5. 
 STORM theory also provides an account of how the control of mimicry is 
implemented in the brain (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Mimicry is thought to rely on 
the mirror neuron system as a mechanism for observing an action and performing 
the same action. However, social signals, such as direct eye contact, person 
evaluation and context are simultaneously evaluated by the mentalizing network. 
This network then exerts top down control on the mirror system to guide and 
monitor mimicry. This top down control from the mPFC on the mirror system has 
been demonstrated in an fMRI study of mimicry, showing that direct eye contact 
during a mimicry task enhances the connectivity strength from the mPFC to the 
mirror system (Wang, Ramsey, & Hamilton, 2011). It is possible that a similar 
mechanism occurs during an overimitation task. Social context and rationality 
evaluation are processed in the mPFC and through its control over the mirror 
system, this region dictates whether faithful or selective imitation is most 
appropriate (see Figure 7.3). To date, the neural basis for overimitation has not 
been studied so this model remains speculative. However, recent developments in 
adult overimitation paradigms mean that this field of research is becoming more 
plausible for study. 




Figure 7.3 A neurocognitive model of the social response to irrational actions. Social cues and context 
are integrated with rationality evaluation in the mpfc. The mpfc then exerts top-down control over 
the action observation network to dictate whether faithful or selective imitation is employed. 
 
There is one other interesting feature of the overimitation data which has 
not been discussed so far. This was the finding that not all of the irrational actions 
in the overimitation task reported in Chapter 5 were imitated to the same degree. 
In fact, the irrational action in the fan sequence was imitated significantly less than 
all others. This is interesting because it provides some evidence for the rationality 
threshold that I proposed in the previous section (7.2.1). Within the fan sequence, 
the actor gathered up a concertina of paper and tapped it on the table twice. This 
tapping action was unnecessary as it did not change the physical properties of the 
object however, the action is reasonably familiar or easier to rationalise because it 
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is quite common to use this tapping action to realign separate pieces of paper. If 
this action was considered less irrational, perhaps not surpassing the rationality 
threshold required to induce the additional recruitment of the mentalizing network, 
this could explain why the action was treated differently. Further work needs to 
investigate how different types of irrational actions are understood and the role of 
familiarity of these actions can impact imitation behaviour in order to discover 
whether a rationality threshold truly exists. 
7.2.3 DO INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISM UNDERSTAND ACTION 
RATIONALITY? 
One of the main aims of this thesis was to evaluate whether individuals with 
autism spectrum condition are able to detect when an action violates the principle 
of rationality and whether they comprehend irrational actions in the same ways as 
typically developing individuals. As reviewed in section 1.2.3, the study that sparked 
this line of investigation showed that when observing actions, activity within in the 
mPFC differentiated rational and irrational actions in typically developing 
participants. However, in matched autistic participants, activity within the mPFC 
was not modulated by the rationality of the actions (Marsh & Hamilton, 2011). I 
therefore determined to discover the reasons for this lack of differentiation. One 
possible reason could be that participants with ASC did not detect that an action 
was irrational and treated rational and irrational actions similarly. Alternatively, 
participants with ASC may not spontaneously make inferences about why an 
irrational action was performed, and therefore not engage the mPFC in a passive 
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observation task. In the following sections I now evaluate each of these claims in 
light of the new evidence presented within this thesis. 
One of the simplest ways to establish whether individuals with ASC are able 
to detect action rationality is to ask them to explicitly evaluate how rational an 
action was. In the adult eye-tracking study presented in Chapter 4, I did this by 
asking participants to rate each action based on six statements that reflected the 
rationality or efficiency of the actions. I found no group difference between typical 
and ASC adults on these explicit ratings for either rational or irrational actions. 
Furthermore, both groups rated irrational actions as less rational than the rational 
actions. This suggests that in adults with ASC, explicit rationality identification is 
intact. In support of this finding, the eye-tracking markers which reflected 
rationality detection in typically developing adults were also present in adults with 
ASC. I therefore conclude that the neural difference in the mPFC reported in Marsh 
& Hamilton (2011) cannot be due to a failure of adults with ASC to detect irrational 
actions. 
A similar story is true for the children with ASC that took part in the 
overimitation experiment reported in Chapter 6. In this study explicit rationality 
understanding was assessed by calculating the differentiation of rational and 
ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽŶ Ă ƐĐĂůĞ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ƐĞŶƐŝďůĞ ? ƚŽ  ‘ƐŝůůǇ ? ? ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ǁŝƚŚ ^
were poorer at discriminating the rational and irrational actions than the typically 
developing groups, their performance was still significantly above chance. 
Therefore, it seems that they are able to discriminate rationality in the right way 
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(e.g. saying an irrational action is sillier than a rational action) but that they are less 
confident in their decisions or they had more difficulty using the rating scale. There 
is also evidence that children with ASC implicitly detect irrational actions because 
they effectively parse out the unnecessary actions that are demonstrated to them 
in each sequence and imitate in a goal-directed manner. Thus again I can conclude 
that even in children with ASC, the ability to detect an irrational action is spared.  
If I now apply these findings to my neurocognitive model of rationality 
understanding (see Figure 7.4), it is likely that in ASC the action observation 
network is performing typically. This is evidenced by the eye-tracking markers 
which indicate that typical goal identification and kinematic analysis is occurring. 
Predictive eye movements to the action goals also corroborate this argument.  




Figure 7.4 Rationality detection is intact in individuals with ASC (orange boxes). The deficits with 
irrational action understanding may originate in the mentalizing network (grey boxes). This could be 
due to a lack of rationality evaluation, a failure to integrate social cues with action knowledge or 
poorer top down control over the action observation network. 
 
As I have managed to establish that individuals with ASC are able to detect 
action rationality, the next logical step is to evaluate whether they actually use this 
information to understand why an action has been performed differently. However, 
there is less clear evidence within this thesis to answer this question. From the eye-
tracking data, we see that participants with ASC do spend time evaluating the 
environmental constraints upon an action by looking at the barrier. This may 
suggest that they are using the information about the rationality of the action to 
think about why it has been performed in that way. However, it is unclear whether 
C H A P T E R  7   W G E N E R A L  D I S C U S S I O N  |  2 1 0  
 
 
this evaluation is done in a teleological fashion which precludes the need for 
mentalizing (Gergely & Csibra, 2003) or whether they are actually trying to guess 
the intentions of the agent based on their actions. Further work is needed to 
investigate whether participants with ASC can give rationalizatŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ŽĚĚ
behaviour when explicitly asked and whether they engage in these rationalizations 
spontaneously. 
7.2.4 WHAT IS IMPAIRED IN AUTISM? 
The studies in this thesis find very little evidence to suggest that individuals 
with autism are impaired when it comes to understanding action rationality. 
Specifically, there was no finding that could explain the lack of differential 
activation in the mPFC during the observation of irrational actions. Instead, the 
group differences that are common to both ASC experiments in this thesis seem to 
reflect a lack of social interest or social attention. For example, participants with 
ASC spent less time looking at the actions and this is reflected in measures of 
looking time to the hand, the goals and in the amount of missing data in the eye-
tracking study.  They also imitate less irrational actions in the overimitation study.  
There are two possible explanations for these findings. Firstly, participants 
with ASC may have decreased motivation to be social (Chevallier et al., 2012) and 
so they are less interested in what the agent is doing because they have no desire 
to understand them. This can explain why they do not spend as much time looking 
at the actions or the goals. They may also be less motivated to please the 
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experimenter and so they do not try so hard to maintain their attention during the 
tasks. This could explain both the increase in missing data and the reduction in 
imitation. 
Alternatively, individuals with ASC may have be impaired in social top-down 
response modulation (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). If the mPFC plays a role in 
integrating social information such as social cues and social context and uses this 
information to guide social attention and behaviour, impairment in this top-down 
control could also explain these findings. For example, a lack of social attention 
guiding can explain why participants with ASC do not attend to the actions as 
closely as typically developing participants. This lack of social attention capture may 
also make the eye tracking task more boring for ASC participants, thus explaining 
the loss of data quality. Finally, failure of this control system may also prevent 
participants with ASC from engaging in overimitation behaviour. 
Given the current evidence available it is difficult to promote either a social 
motivation explanation or a STORM explanation for the behaviour that we see in 
individuals with ASC. As yet, the social motivation hypothesis of ASC is poorly 
defined and therefore is difficult to test. However, it goes against a lot of anecdotal 
evidence that individuals with ASC do strive to engage in successful social 
interactions but fail during execution. However, STORM is easier to verify by testing 
the connectivity of the mPFC with the action observation network during an 
overimitation task. If indeed the mPFC is exerting control over the action 
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observation network during overimitation in typically developing adults but not 
those with ASC then the STORM model has good explanatory power for these data.  
7.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
There are a number of directions through which this field of research could 
progress.  Most importantly I think it is necessary to test the models of rationality 
understanding that have been proposed in this thesis. Specifically, the concept of a 
rationality threshold that gates the additional recruitment of the mentalizing 
network needs more empirical support. One way in which to test this theory could 
be to use the overimitation phenomenon but apply it to a large number of different 
actions which may naturally vary with respect to their rationality. This natural 
variation could be dependent upon a number of dimensions such as action 
familiarity, predictability or the degree to which the action departs from its 
conventional course. If a rationality threshold does exist, we might expect that 
rational actions will be imitated faithfully, along with extremely irrational actions. 
However those actions that are not distinctly irrational would be imitated less. 
Therefore I predict that rates of imitation will form a u-shaped function with 
respect to the perceived rationality of an action. If this is the case, we could also 
apply this experimental paradigm to assess the shape of this function in individuals 
with ASC to determine whether their rationality threshold is altered in some way.  
A second feature of the models presented here that needs further testing is 
the idea of the mentalizing system exerting top-down control on the action 
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observation network during an overimitation task. Currently, neuroimaging data 
during overimitation has not been collected due to methodological issues with 
scanning children during interactive tasks. However, if a robust paradigm for 
overimitation in adults is developed then the possibility for testing this idea opens 
up. In particular it is important to look at the direction and strength of connectivity 
between the mentalizing and action observation networks in order to see whether 
similar control systems to those found in mimicry can be identified. 
7.4 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, understanding irrational actions engages both the action 
observation network and the mentalizing networks and so irrational actions can be 
used as a tool to probe the interaction of these systems. It seems that individuals 
with ASC are cognitively able to detect and understand irrational actions. Therefore, 
they do engage in teleological reasoning which is thought to be a precursor to 
mentalizing. Thus it is possible that individuals with ASC have the cognitive capacity 
to mentalize. However, it seems that difficulties with social modulation may 
interfere with this skill. 
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